employs physically handicapped persons. This firm is the Empire Furniture and Rattan Works of Coral Gables, Fla. In 1942 this firm adopted the policy of employing physically handicapped persons. This policy was established by Edward Axlrod, a young man who was physically handicapped from birth.

The pioneering efforts of this young man, and his father, Leo Axlrod, who now carries on the business, helped spread the movement among businesses to hire physically handicapped persons to every important community in the United States and to foreign countries. The story of Edward Axlrod is, of course, familiar to the readers of Performance; there is no need to repeat it here. But it is of interest to show how our sympathetic approach to the problems of small business resulted in a business expansion loan to this enterprising firm.

It was in February 1954, that the proprietor of this firm came to the Small Business Administration. Mr. Axlrod asked the agency to share in a $20,000 bank-participation loan to help him increase production. The firm was then employing 23 persons, mostly physically handicapped, and wanted to expand, to provide employment for 17 additional handicapped persons.

Mr. Axlrod had already talked over with his banker the need for more funds to expand operations. The banker wanted to make the loan, but it was against the bank's policy to make loans for such a long term, in this case 4 years. However, the bank was willing to take half the loan, if we would take the other half. Our investigation was favorable, and a short while later the funds were disbursed to help this firm remodel and expand, and provide more jobs for physically handicapped persons.

That, very briefly, is the story of one loan we have made to help a firm that has pioneered in giving jobs to physically handicapped persons. There have been others, and I have no doubt that in the future there will be more. For it is becoming increasingly clear to all of us that providing jobs for handicapped persons is more than kindness and consideration. It is also good business. Properly placed, physically handicapped persons are good craftsmen. Consider for a moment this statement made to us in their loan application by the Empire Co.:

"While we are extremely proud of our work with the handicapped, we are most happy too, that we make such products of excellence that have given our firm root in the homefurnishing field of our area and the country. We export some furniture to Latin American countries and are attaching a catalog printed in Spanish and English to give you some idea of our line."

There is the traditional spirit of American enterprise for you: It is a spirit we are happy and eager to foster.

We are proud of the agency's record of providing financial assistance to help enterprising small firms expand and grow. So far, we have approved more than 1,300 business loans totaling about $70 million and two-thirds of these loans have been made in participation with private banks.

In addition, we have approved more than 1,100 disaster loans totaling $7,700,000 to individuals and firms who suffered damage in catastrophies such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes. This is a purely humanitarian function.

But the Small Business Administration also has other programs of which it is equally proud, and they are all geared to the central idea of helping small business grow and prosper. All of them are, of course, available to the physically handicapped and to firms employing physically handicapped.

Not so well known, perhaps, as our financial-assistance program, is our program to help small firms obtain a fair share of Government purchase orders. Here is the way it works.

The Small Business Administration has representatives stationed in principal procurement centers of the military departments across the country. Here, all individual proposed procurements valued at $10,000 or more (except those classified as "confidential" or higher) are screened jointly by the Small Business Administration representatives and military procurement officers.

Those found suitable for performance by small business, if jointly agreed to by the Small Business Administration and the military, are earmarked and reserved exclusively for competitive award to small firms. In some cases, portions of proposed procurements are also earmarked for performance by small firms under this program.

Under this one program we have been able to earmark more than $500 million in Government purchases for exclusive competitive award to small firms. This is business that these small firms would probably not have received except for this program.

Of course, the Small Business Administration also assists small firms in other ways. The agency's 40 regional and field offices are constantly making prime contract bid referrals to small firms with suitable facilities to bid on Government contracts.

In addition, through cooperative programs, its representatives are constantly encouraging larger private firms to subcontract more of their orders with smaller firms in their area.

For many small firms, the most serious problem is not one of obtaining financing of Government contracts, but an urgent need for help in overcoming a management or technical problem or in acquiring greater management and technical skill. The Small Business Administration helps here in a number of ways.

In cooperation with the Small Business Administration, collegiate schools of business and other educational institutions offer owners of small firms courses in currently important business administration subjects. These courses, conducted in the evening, are taught by experienced business leaders and college teachers. This year more than 55 such courses were offered.

The Small Business Administration publishes three series of practical, helpful leaflets called Management, Technical and Marketers Aids for Small Business. These leaflets cover a wide range of management and production problems, telling how to recognize and deal with them. They are available free at all of our field offices. In addition to these programs, all of which are available to help physically handicapped persons who have small businesses, as well as others, the Small Business Administration also provides experienced counsel to small business concerns and individuals in locating a marketable product or new line or type of product, or in locating a market for a product.

This products assistance program is designed to assist small firms in finding solutions to research and development problems regarding product improvement and new products. As part of this agency service, field offices maintain lists of Government-owned patented products and processes which are available to small firms free or with only a nominal charge for their use.

Production specialists in the Small Business Administration offices are available to help individual small-business concerns with technical production problems.

All of the services the agency has developed to help small business are available at its field offices. In order to foster better cooperation between firms employing physically handicapped persons and this agency, each field office has been provided with a list of certified sheltered workshops and a list of competitive firms employing handicapped persons. Persons interested in this subject may check their local telephone directories or write the Small Business Administration, Washington 25, D. C.

SENATE

MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1955

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O thou God of the changing years, in this still moment of another week's deliberations may a holy hush within our spirits whisper courage and fortitude and fidelity. We would make our hearts, cleansed by Thy forgiving grace, a temple of Thy presence, knowing that only to the pure dost Thou grant the vision of Thy face. We come asking not that Thou wouldst give heed to the faltering petitions our lips frame, but that Thou wilt bend Thine ear to the crying of our deep need.

We bring to the altar of prayer our inmost selves, cluttered and confused, where good and evil, the petty and the great, the worthy and the unworthy are so entwined. May the eternal immensities shame our little thoughts and ways. May the vision of what we might be convict us of what we are. In this great day of Thy visitation on the earth, may we not miss the things belonging to our peace and to the peace of the whole world. We ask it in the dear Redeemer's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, June 24, 1955, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bill and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 67. An act to adjust the rates of basic compensation of certain officers and employees of the Federal Government, and for other purposes; and

S. J. Res. 67. Joint resolution to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to sell certain vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines; to provide for the rehabilitation of the interisland commerce of the Philippines; and for other purposes.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. KEFAUVER, and by unanimous consent, the Monopoly and Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary was authorized to meet for hearings this afternoon at 2 o'clock, during the session of the Senate.

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the Securities Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

On request of Mr. BIBLE, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on the District of Columbia was authorized to meet today during the session of the Senate.

LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING MORNING HOUR

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, the Senate having met today following an adjournment, there will be the regular morning hour for the presentation of petitions and memorials, the introduction of bills, and the transaction of other routine business. I ask unanimous consent that there be the usual 2-minute limitation on speeches made in connection therewith.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I may state that it is the plan of the leadership at the conclusion of the morning hour to request that Senators who are in attendance upon committees come to the Chamber. In that connection we plan to have a quorum call and then to have the Senate proceed to consider the calendar.

At the conclusion of the calendar, if Senators are ready, the majority leader proposes to move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 586, Senate Joint Resolution 21, to establish a Commission on Government Security, which measure was reported with amendments from the Committee on Government Operations. I wish to have all Senators on notice regarding the procedure.

The transaction of routine business during the morning hour is now in order, so I hope that all Senators who have matters to submit in connection with the morning hour will do so at this time.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A letter from the Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, transmitting, pursuant to law, that Commission's report on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

FRANK G. GERLOCK

A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation for the relief of Frank G. Gerlock (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

GRANTING OF APPLICATIONS FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE FILED BY CERTAIN ALIENS

Two letters from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of orders granting the applications for permanent residence filed by certain aliens, together with a statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law as to each alien and the reasons for granting such applications (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

DUAL EMPLOYMENT OF CUSTODIAL EMPLOYEES IN CERTAIN POST OFFICE BUILDINGS

A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the dual employment of custodial employees in post office buildings operated by the General Services Administration, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

MEMORIAL TO THE LATE ROBERT A. TAFT

A letter from the Chairman, the Robert A. Taft Memorial Foundation, Inc., Washington, D. C., transmitting a resolution adopted by the executive committee of that foundation, offering to the Congress a memorial to the late Senator Robert A. Taft (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

A communication from the President of the United States, favoring the acceptance of the proposed memorial to the late Senator Robert A. Taft, which was offered by the Robert A. Taft Memorial Foundation, Inc.; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Appropriations:

"Senate Joint Resolution 30

"Joint resolution relative to levees on the San Joaquin River and the Stockton Deep Water Channel

"Whereas for the purpose of improving navigation and eliminating a projection of land into the Stockton Deep Water Channel and the San Joaquin River, it has been proposed that there be constructed therein a deep water turning basin opposite Rough and Ready Island; and

"Whereas a portion of the north levee of the Stockton Deep Water Channel has already been weakened by the wave wash of ocean-going vessels; and

"Whereas the ships going and coming to the United States Navy Supply Depot, which is opposite the levee, have contributed greatly to the damage to the levee; and

"Whereas the proposed turning basin will increase the wave washing damage to the same levee; and

"Whereas in the event of a break in the levee, a heavily populated area with homes of families of moderate circumstances, containing approximately 4,000 property owners, would be flooded, with probable great loss of lives and property; and

"Whereas the United States Corps of Engineers has recognized this danger and has proposed a project for the repair and improvement of the levee, which proposal is included in House of Representatives Document No. 752, 80th Congress, second session; and

"Whereas the levee repair and improvement project has been authorized, but no financial provision therefor has been made by the Congress of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

"*Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California (jointly)*, That the President and Congress of the United States be respectfully memorialized to provide an appropriation for the purpose of improving and repairing the north levee of the Stockton Deep Water Channel and the San Joaquin River in order to protect the lives and property of the inhabitants of the area; and be it further

"*Resolved*, That the secretary of the senate be hereby directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Armed Services:

"Senate Joint Resolution 31

"Joint resolution relative to construction of a supercarrier at San Francisco

"Whereas the United States is, at the present time, contemplating the construction of additional aircraft carriers of the 60,000-ton *Forrestal* class; and

"Whereas shipbuilding facilities adequate to undertake the construction of such supercarriers are available in the San Francisco area; and

"Whereas sound military logic during this critical period of world affairs clearly dictates the imperative necessity for the diversification of ship construction; and

"Whereas the maintenance of a healthy ship construction industry in the San Francisco area is particularly important in view of the current Asiatic crisis; and

"Whereas the maintenance and availability of such an industry in the San Francisco area depends in a large measure upon work being provided by the Federal Government: Now, therefore, be it

"*Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California (jointly)*, That the Legislature of the State of California does hereby respectfully urge the Federal Government to provide for the construction of one of the contemplated *Forrestal*-class carriers in the San Francisco area; and be it further

"*Resolved*, That the secretary of the senate be hereby directed to prepare and transmit suitable copies of this resolution to the President and the Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Secretary of the Navy."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Senate Joint Resolution 33

"Joint resolution relative to providing Santa Clara, San Benito, and Santa Cruz Counties with a supply of water from the Central Valley project

"Whereas Santa Clara, San Benito, and Santa Cruz Counties comprise one of the fastest growing regions of the State of California; and

"Whereas a great increase in population and in industrial development, together with intense agricultural activity, have combined to tax severely the existing water supplies of the region; and

"Whereas at present the watersheds of Santa Clara, San Benito, and Santa Cruz Counties are virtually the sole source of the water supply for the region; and

"Whereas to meet the desperate water needs of this region, it is necessary that the most feasible plan to obtain an additional supply of water be determined with the least possible delay; Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California (jointly), That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the Congress of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Reclamation, to take such action as may be necessary to conduct and complete with least possible delay the necessary investigations, surveys and studies for the purpose of providing plans and feasibility reports to furnish a supply of water from the Central Valley project to Santa Clara, San Benito, Santa Cruz, Alameda, and Contra Costa Counties, all generally in keeping with section 2 of the act of October 14, 1949 (63 Stat. 852), authorizing the American River Division Central Valley project; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate be hereby directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, and to the United States Bureau of Reclamation."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Senate Joint Resolution 34

"Joint resolution relative to the construction of proposed National Forest Highway Route 74

"Whereas one of the proposed national-forest highways in this State is National Forest Highway Route 74 (the North Fork Route), which would be located in Sierra National Forest in Madera and Fresno Counties, linking the Bass Lake region and the Shaver Lake and Huntington Lake regions of said national forest; and

"Whereas this route will also serve as part of a connecting link between Yosemite National Park and General Grant Grove, Kings Canyon National Park, and Sequoia National Park; and

"Whereas many schoolchildren residing in the Bass Lake region attend the Sierra Union High School located in Auberry in Fresno County and at the present time are compelled to spend as much as 5 hours daily traveling to and from this school on existing roads in this area, and approximately 2 hours of this time spent in school buses could be eliminated by the construction of National Forest Highway Route 74 between these areas; and

"Whereas while some Federal-aid funds have been allocated for the construction of a portion of this route, and 4.3 miles of the proposed 26.6 miles of said route have been completed, the existing plans of the United States Forest Service, the United States Bureau of Public Roads, and the California Department of Public Works apparently do not call for the completion of this project in the near future: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California (jointly), That the Legislature of the State of California respectfully memorializes the President and the Congress of the United States and the Federal and State officials charged with the duty of constructing national-forest highways in this State to take whatever steps are necessary to provide for the construction of National Forest Highway Route 74 as soon as practical in the orderly development of the forest highway system; and be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of the senate be hereby directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Roads in the Department of Commerce, to the Chief of the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and to the director of the California Department of Public Works."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Florida; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

"Memorial to the Congress of the United States, the President and his Secretary of Interior, Urging Study of the Red Tide in the Waters of the Gulf of Mexico

"Whereas the commercial and sports fishing industries are of the utmost importance to the economic security of the State of Florida; and

"Whereas from time to time certain noxious marine animal or plant organisms, commonly called the red tide, evolves in the water of the Gulf of Mexico; and

"Whereas when there is an occurrence of this organism known as the red tide, it destroys a tremendous number of fish and other marine creatures; and

"Whereas a substantial part of the natural resources of this great State stand to be destroyed by future attacks of the red tide; and

"Whereas the Department of Interior through its Fish and Wildlife Service has rendered a valuable service to the State of Florida by its study of the red tide, and it is with sincere appreciation that this legislature expresses its thanks and gratitude for such service; and

"Whereas there exists a definite and proven need for further extensive and exhaustive study, with a view toward the prevention or abatement of the red tide: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Florida, That the Congress of the United States, the President, and his Secretary of Interior are hereby memorialized and respectfully urged to facilitate and expedite an extensive and exhaustive study of the red tide, with a view toward the prevention or abatement of the red tide; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this memorial be transmitted forthwith by the Secretary of State of the State of Florida to the President of the United States and to his Secretary of Interior; the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in the Congress of the United States; the congressional delegations of the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas; the chairman and members of the Senate and House Joint Committee on Appropriations; and to the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior; be it further

"Resolved, That a copy of this memorial be spread upon the journal of both the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Florida and sufficient copies thereof be furnished to the press.

"Approved by the Governor June 18, 1955.

"Filed in office, secretary of state, June 30, 1955."

Resolutions adopted by the Holy Name Societies of St. Therese of Lisieux Roman Catholic Church, Brooklyn, and St. Leo's Roman Catholic Church, Queens, both of the State of New York, favoring the enactment of the so-called Bricker amendment, relating to the treatymaking power; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The petition of Joseph P. Brogan, and sundry other citizens of the State of New York, favoring the enactment of the so-called Bricker amendment, relating to the treatymaking power; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A resolution adopted by the Delaware State Council, Knights of Columbus, Wilmington, Del., relating to resistance to communistic infiltration and military pressures; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A telegram, in the nature of a petition, from the delegates to the Polish-American Congress, New York, N. Y., signed by Francis J. Wazeter, president, favoring the ratification of the Genocide Treaty; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The petition of Clyde Helmick, and sundry other citizens of the State of West Virginia, praying for the enactment of a constitutional amendment relating to race segregation in schools; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ABOLITION OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION—RESOLUTION

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, and appropriately referred, a resolution adopted by the Freeborn-Mower Cooperative Light and Power Association at their 18th annual meeting on May 25, 1955, condemning the report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Lending Agencies recommending that REA be abolished.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ACTION OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION

Whereas the Hoover Commission Task Force on Lending Agencies has recommended that REA be abolished and whereas the committee further recommends:

1. That the Rural Electrification Administration be incorporated under the Federal Corporation law as the Rural Electrification Corporation.

2. That the Federal Government subscribe $50 million for common stock to this corporation.

3. That the cooperative be required to charge such power and telephone rates as will enable them to pay (a) their own maintenance, (b) provide reserves for expansion, (c) make proportionate purchases of Government stock in the corporation and (d) pay interest and amortization on their loans.

4. That future financing be secured on the open market at considerable higher rate of interest.

5. That no loans be made for construction that private utilities stand ready to build.

Whereas these recommendations, if carried out, would mean the end of our rural electric cooperatives, now be it

Resolved, That the members of the Freeborn-Mower Cooperative Light & Power Association assembled in annual meeting this 25th day of May, 1955, do hereby go on record condemning this report in the strongest possible terms and urge our Congressmen to vote against these recommendations.

AMENDMENT OF NATURAL GAS ACT, AS AMENDED—RESOLUTION

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, and appropriately referred, a resolution adopted by the City Council of Minneapolis, Minn., reiterating their opposition to the passage of the so-called Harris bill, H. R. 4560, to amend the Natural Gas Act, as amended.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and

ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, by resolution passed March 11, 1955, and approved March 14, 1955, opposed the passage of the so-called Harris bill (H. R. 4560); and

Whereas the city council has learned that the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on Wednesday, June 8, 1955, by a vote of 16 to 15 recommended said bill for passage; and

Whereas it is still the opinion of the city council that such bill is inimical to the interests of the consumers of gas in the city of Minneapolis; and

Whereas the city council refers to and makes a part hereof its resolution hereinbefore referred to; and

Whereas hearings before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and evidence produced therein have firmly convinced the city council that the Harris bill may well result in increased cost burdens to consumers of gas in the city of Minneapolis: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the City Council of the City of Minneapolis, That it reiterates and repeats its opposition to the passage of the so-called Harris bill or any legislation having a similar object; be it further

Resolved, That the City Council of the City of Minneapolis requests the Members in Congress from Minnesota to exercise their utmost efforts to defeat this bill; be it further

Resolved, That it requests all the Members in Congress to oppose the passage of this bill; be it further

Resolved, That the city clerk be requested to submit forthwith a copy of this resolution to each Member in the Congress of the United States.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. MONRONEY, from the Committee on Banking and Currency:

H. R. 619. A bill to provide that all United States currency shall bear the inscription "In God We Trust"; without amendment (Rept. No. 637).

By Mr. MCNAMARA, from the Committee on the District of Columbia:

S. 1835. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act, as amended; with amendments (Rept. No. 671).

By Mr. BIBLE, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

S. 756. A bill to provide that the United States shall aid the States in wildlife restoration projects, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. No. 638).

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

S. 59. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended; with amendments (Rept. No. 672).

By Mr. KILGORE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 717. A bill for the relief of Hedi Gertrude Spiecker (Rept. No. 640);

S. 1084. A bill for the relief of Santiago Landa Arrizabalaga (Rept. No. 641);

S. 1112. A bill for the relief of Luca Saltarelli (Rept. No. 642);

S. 1126. A bill for the relief of Dimitrios Antoniou Kostalas (Rept. No. 643);

S. 1154. A bill for the relief of Hal A. Marchant (Rept. No. 673);

S. 1220. A bill for the relief of Josephine Ray (Rept. No. 674);

H. R. 928. A bill for the relief of Eugenio Maida (Rept. No. 644);

H. R. 989. A bill for the relief of Dr. Louis J. Sebille (Rept. No. 675);

H. R. 990. A bill for the relief of Takako Riu Reich (Rept. No. 645);

H. R. 1111. A bill for the relief of Philip Mack (Rept. No. 646);

H. R. 1163. A bill for the relief of Lee Houn and Lily Ho Lee Houn (Rept. No. 647);

H. R. 1247. A bill for the relief of Carol Brandon (Valtrude Probst) (Rept. No. 648);

H. R. 1255. A bill for the relief of Ferenc Babothy (Rept. No. 649);

H. R. 1281. A bill for the relief of Carlo Nonvenuto (Rept. No. 650);

H. R. 1283. A bill for the relief of Olga Joannou Georguea (Rept. No. 651);

H. R. 1287. A bill for the relief of David Mordka Borenstajn, Itta Borenstajn, nee Schipper, and Fella Borenstajn Reichlinger (Rept. No. 652);

H. R. 1357. A bill for the relief of Chin York Gay (Rept. No. 653);

H. R. 1417. A bill for the relief of Charles (Carlos) Gerlica (Rept. No. 654);

H. R. 1467. A bill for the relief of Stijepo Buich (Rept. No. 655);

H. R. 1472. A bill for the relief of Victor Manuel Soares De Mendonca (Rept. No. 656);

H. R. 1473. A bill for the relief of Eleanore Hauser (Rept. No. 657);

H. R. 1474. A bill for the relief of Ross Sherman Trigg (Rept. No. 658);

H. R. 1475. A bill for the relief of Wing Chong Chan (Rept. No. 659);

H. R. 1525. A bill for the relief of Ardes Albacete Yanez (Rept. No. 660);

H. R. 2470. A bill for the relief of T. C. Elliott (Rept. No. 676);

H. R. 2933. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Berta Mansergh (Rept. No. 661);

H. R. 3069. A bill for the relief of Eufronio D. Espina (Rept. No. 662);

H. R. 3070. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Lee Tai Hung Quan and Quan Ah Sang (Rept. No. 663);

H. R. 3075. A bill for the relief of Virgil Won (also known as Virgilio Jackson) (Rept. No. 664);

H. R. 3194. A bill for the relief of E. S. Berney (Rept. No. 677); and

H. R. 3271. A bill for the relief of John Lloyd Smelcer (Rept. No. 678).

By Mr. KILGORE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 476. A bill for the relief of Harold Swarthout and L. R. Swarthout (Rept. No. 679);

S. 550. A bill for the relief of John Axel Arvidson (Rept. No. 665);

S. 1337. A bill for the relief of Joseph Vyskocil (Rept. No. 666);

H. R. 1044. A bill for the relief of Teresa Alice Townsend (Rept. No. 667);

H. R. 1155. A bill for the relief of Solomon Wiesel (Rept. No. 668);

H. R. 1745. A bill for the relief of Paul E. Milward (Rept. No. 680);

H. R. 2769. A bill for the relief of Tennessee C. Batts (Rept. No. 681);

H. R. 3074. A bill for the relief of Jean-Marie Newell (Rept. No. 669); and

H. R. 3363. A bill for the relief of Rodolfo C. Delgado, Jesus M. Lagua, and Vicente D. Reynante (Rept. No. 682).

By Mr. KILGORE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 315. A bill for the relief of Asher Ezrachi (Rept. No. 670); and

S. 415. A bill for the relief of Ernest B. Sanders (Rept. No. 683).

EXTENSION FOR TEMPORARY PERIODS OF CERTAIN HOUSING PROGRAMS, THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT OF 1953, AND DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, I report favorably an original joint resolution, to extend for temporary periods certain housing programs, the Small Business Act of 1953, and the Defense Production Act of 1950, and I submit a report (No. 639) thereon.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The report will be received and the joint resolution will be placed on the calendar.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 85) to extend for temporary periods certain housing programs, the Small Business Act of 1953, and the Defense Production Act of 1950, was read twice by its title and placed on the calendar.

SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DISASTER AT TEXAS CITY, TEX.—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, from the Committee on the Judiciary, I report favorably, with an amendment, the bill (S. 1077) to provide for settlement of claims for damages resulting from the disaster which occurred at Texas City, Tex., on April 16 and 17, 1947, and I submit a report (No. 684) thereon.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The report will be received and the bill will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, the report is a favorable one on Senate bill 1037, introduced by my colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and myself. The bill provides for the payment of claims growing out of the Texas City disaster in 1947. The bill would compensate the families of 570 persons who lost their lives in the disaster, 3,500 persons who were injured, and many persons who suffered millions of dollars of damage because of the fires and explosions occurring in Texas City Harbor when the Federal Government sent there certain explosive fertilizer, which was intended for use in the foreign-aid program.

I hope the Senate will be able to act promptly on this measure, and thus express its will that compensation shall be given to those who, through no fault of their own, lost their lives or were seriously injured or suffered millions of dollars of damage.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports were submitted:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Banking and Currency:

William J. Hallahan, of Maryland, to be a member of the Home Loan Bank Board.

By Mr. MANSFIELD (for Mr. GEORGE), from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Executive D, 82d Congress, 1st session, the Geneva convention of August 12, 1949, for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in Armed Forces in the field; with a reservation and a statement (Ex. Rept. No. 9);

Executive E, 82d Congress, 1st session, the Geneva convention of August 12, 1949, for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at sea; with a statement (Ex. Rept. No. 9);

Executive F, 82d Congress, 1st session, the Geneva convention of August 12, 1949, rela-

tive to the treatment of prisoners of war; with a statement (Ex. Rept. No. 9); and

Executive G, 82d Congress, 1st session, the Geneva convention of August 12, 1949, relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war; with a reservation and statement (Ex. Rept. No. 9).

GEN. MATTHEW BUNKER RIDGWAY—EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, Gen. Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army, retires on June 30.

Under existing law all officers serving in either 3- or 4-star grade are serving in such grades under temporary appointments.

Upon retirement they revert to their permanent 2-star grade unless they are advanced on the retired list pursuant to law.

No increase in pay is involved.

The Senate has in all cases of these 3- and 4-star officers who have retired during the last 8 years advanced them on the retired list to the rank in which they were serving at the time of their retirement.

I trust that the Senate will also take this action in the case of General Ridgway, whose nomination, as in executive session, I now report from the Committee on Armed Services, and request that it be placed on the Executive Calendar.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The nomination will be placed on the Executive Calendar.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, General Ridgway is one of the great officers of our time. I serve notice on the Senate that at the appropriate time tomorrow I shall call up the Executive Calendar, in order that we may complete action on this nomination before the end of the fiscal year.

ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, June 27, 1955, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bill and joint resolution:

S. 67. An act to adjust the rates of basic compensation of certain officers and employees of the Federal Government, and for other purposes; and

S. J. Res. 67. Joint resolution to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to sell certain vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines; to provide for the rehabilitation of the interisland commerce of the Philippines, and for other purposes.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. EASTLAND:

S. 2326. A bill to require any attorney at law practicing before a Federal court, or appearing before a congressional committee as counsel for a witness testifying before such committee, or appearing as counsel before any department or agency in the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to file a non-Communist affidavit; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. EASTLAND when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania:

S. 2327. A bill for the relief of Takako Iba; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY):

S. 2328. A bill providing for the conveyance of the Old Colony project to the Boston Housing Authority; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. CLEMENTS:

S. 2329. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special series of stamps to commemorate the opening of the new Cumberland Gap National Historical Park; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

S. 2330. A bill to amend the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, so as to deny the use of United States mails and facilities of interstate commerce to persons in foreign countries who sell, or offer for sale, within the United States any securities in violation of such act; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. FULBRIGHT when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. CARLSON:

S. 2331. A bill to provide for improvement in the system of personnel administration through the establishment of a senior civil service in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government;

S. 2332. A bill relating to the simplification of the general schedule of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended;

S. 2333. A bill relating to the certification of eligibles under the civil-service laws;

S. 2334. A bill providing for a simplified performance rating system for Federal employees;

S. 2335. A bill relating to appeals by veterans under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944;

S. 2336. A bill relating to reduction in personnel procedure and preference of veterans; and

S. 2337. A bill relating to the transfer of Federal employees from the classified civil service to another personnel merit system; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

(See the remarks of Mr. CARLSON when he introduced the above bills, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. SMATHERS:

S. 2338. A bill for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Charles H. Page; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'MAHONEY (for himself and Mr. BARRETT):

S. 2339. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to include capacity to serve the town of Glendo, Wyo., in a sewerage system to be installed in connection with the construction of Glendo Dam and Reservoir, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. IVES:

S. 2340. A bill for the relief of Umberto Randaccio; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 2341. A bill for the relief of Gertrude Heindel;

S. 2342. A bill for the relief of Yvonne Rohran (Tung) Feng; and

S. 2343. A bill for the relief of Kuo Hwa Lu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORSE (for himself, Mr. BIBLE, and Mr. HRUSKA):

S. 2344. A bill to make the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia subject to the provisions of the Hatch Act; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Texas (for Mr. KENNEDY):

S. J. Res. 84. Joint resolution to establish a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Policy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

S. J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to extend for temporary periods certain housing programs, the Small Business Act of 1953, and the Defense Production Act of 1950; placed on the calendar.

(See the remarks of Mr. FULBRIGHT when he reported the above joint resolution, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, which appear under a separate heading.)

REQUIREMENT FOR FILING A NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVIT IN CERTAIN CASES

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I introduce a bill to require any attorney at law practicing before a Federal court, or appearing before a congressional committee as counsel for a witness testifying before such committee, or appearing as counsel before any department or agency in the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to file a non-Communist affidavit, and ask that it be received and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. I ask unanimous consent that I may make a statement in reference to the bill.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the Senator from Mississippi may proceed.

The bill (S. 2326) to require any attorney at law practicing before a Federal court, or appearing before a congressional committee as counsel for a witness testifying before such committee, or appearing as counsel before any department or agency in the executive branch of the Government of the United States, to file a non-Communist affidavit, introduced by Mr. EASTLAND, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. EASTLAND. Generally speaking, the bill will bar Communist lawyers from practice in Federal courts, before agencies in the executive branch of the Government, and before congressional committees.

Specifically, the bill would require that before any lawyer shall be admitted to practice in any Federal court, or to appear as counsel before any agency in the executive branch of the Government or before any committee of either House of the Congress, or any subcommittee thereof, he shall make and file an affidavit that he is not, and for a period of 3 years immediately preceding the filing of such affidavit has not been, a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America, or any other organization which advocates or teaches the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional means. After such an affidavit had been filed, every reappearance by the attorney filing it would constitute, under my bill, a reaffirmance of the affidavit. The bill also would prohibit the appearance in Federal court, or before any executive agency or congressional committee, by any attorney

who has, before a proper tribunal, refused, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to answer a question respecting his Communist affiliation.

I hope, Mr. President, that this bill may be reported promptly from committee, and promptly passed by the Senate and concurred in by the other body; and I hope it may set a precedent for legislative action by the several States in their respective jurisdictions.

Mr. President, a member of the bar is an officer of the court. In performing his functions as an attorney, his highest duty is to the court and the system of justice which the court both represents and administers. The fitness of an individual to hold this high status is a matter of great importance to the people who must rely upon that system of justice.

As the American Bar Association has so ably pointed out, in the brief of its special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy, and Objectives, membership at the bar is not a right, but is a high privilege, dependent upon continuous compliance with exacting conditions. Meeting and maintaining the high standards for admission to the bar has always been a condition of continued membership in the bar by any attorney.

In his oath of office as a member of the bar, each attorney has sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and of his State. Membership in the Communist Party is inconsistent with that oath. The Congress of the United States has legislatively found the Communist Party to be an arm of a foreign dictatorship, seeking the overthrow of the United States by force and violence. The Subversive Activities Control Board, after a lengthy trial and all due process, has made a similar finding. The courts of this country have repeatedly made judicial findings to the effect that the Communist Party of the United States of America teaches and advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence. Membership in the Communist Party is not a question of belief, nor a question of political affiliation; it is a question of taking part in a conspiracy against the Government of the United States.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair is obliged to inform the Senator that his time has expired.

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 minutes longer.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Mississippi may proceed.

Mr. EASTLAND. As the bar association committee has pointed out, loyalty to this Nation, to its Constitution, and to his own oath of office as an attorney is required of every lawyer so long as he is to practice at the bar.

The profession of the law requires a standard of character and reputation, and the maintenance of a code of ethics and conduct, at least as high as those in any other profession. Because the bar is the natural protector of justice, and upholder of the laws of the Nation, it is natural that these high standards should be fixed and required.

But, Mr. President, Communist lawyers do not protect or seek to protect the laws, nor do they serve or seek to serve justice. They serve only the objectives of the Communist Party, and they seek to subvert justice, to tear down or nullify the laws where that will serve the purposes of the Communist Party, to pervert the meaning of court decisions, to misuse constitutional rights, to make fools of our judges, a mockery of our courts, and a shambles of our judicial processes. They do this under Communist domination, under Communist instructions, under Communist discipline, and solely to further the aims and objectives of the Communist Party.

The statute which I have proposed is not an ex post facto law, nor is it a bill of attainder. It does not provide for a forfeiture. It only sets a reasonable standard for attorneys to meet if they wish to practice in the Federal courts or before agencies in the executive branch of the Government, or to appear as counsel before committees or subcommittees of the Congress. The law which I propose would not even say to a lawyer that he may not be a Communist; it would only force him to choose between being a Communist and practicing before Federal bodies. It would not deny him his right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination in order to avoid testifying about his Communist affiliations; it would only require him to elect between that privilege and the privilege of practicing at the Federal bar.

As Mr. Justice Cardozo said in *Matter of Rouss* (221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 783):

> Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at the moment of admission; but it is equally essential afterward (citing cases). Whenever the condition is broken, the privilege is lost. To refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offenses. The examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. To strike the unworthy lawyer from the role is not to add to the pains and penalties of crime. The examination into character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no longer satisfied.

Mr. President, the privilege against self-incrimination, under the fifth amendment, is a personal privilege. The benefit of it flows to the witness himself, and to no other. Testimony may not be refused because of possible incrimination of any other person. Nor may testimony be refused because of possible or even certain embarrassment to the witness himself. The privilege is a privilege against self-incrimination, not a privilege against embarrassment. To claim the privilege, the witness must honestly believe that a truthful answer would tend to form at least a link in a chain to help convict him of an actual crime, on which the statute of limitations has not run, and with respect to which he has not been granted immunity.

Just as the privilege was not intended to protect the witness against embarrassment, so neither was it intended to insure the continuance of the witness in any office or to protect him in any privileged status.

Let me quote again the special committee on Communist tactics, strategy, and objectives of the American Bar Association. That committee said, in a brief filed with the Supreme Court of the State of Florida:

> The American Bar Association does not contend that membership in the Communist Party establishes disloyalty of a lawyer unless he (1) joined voluntarily, (2) understood the conspiratorial nature of the party, and (3) intended thereby to support its criminal purposes. But membership alone casts upon an attorney, as an officer of the court, the responsibility to disclose fully any such extenuating facts or circumstances. Duress in joining the Communist Party, lack of knowledge of its conspiratorial nature, and intention not to support its criminal purposes, are all facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the person charged with being a member of the party.

Following up that line of thought, Mr. President, it is obvious that if a person has joined the Communist Party without knowledge of its conspiratorial purposes, without intention to support its criminal purposes, he will leave the party when he learns of these purposes. Further, a man who has left the party upon the discovery of these purposes, because he could not go along with such purposes, will not need to claim the protection of the fifth amendment, the protection against being required to incriminate himself, as a basis for refusing to testify with respect to his Communist affiliations.

The preamble of the canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Association states:

> In America, where the stability of courts and of all departments of Government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.

As the American Bar Association special committee on Communist tactics, strategy, and objectives has so cogently declared:

> The American people cannot have absolute confidence in the administration of justice if officers to whom that sacred responsibility is entrusted under law are not faithful to the institutions upon which the administration of justice is predicated. For this reason attorneys must take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State under the laws of which they are admitted to practice.
>
> It is not sufficient to proclaim the lofty concept of the bar, its vital importance to the public and to our form of constitutional government and the ideals upon which the profession's canons of ethics are based. Each of its members must personify them.
>
> Complete trust and confidence in the loyalty to his oath as an attorney are indispenable at all times.

In closing, Mr. President, let me sum up what my bill would do.

By requiring the filing of non-Communist oaths by attorneys, my bill would contribute to public confidence in the

Federal bar; and by banning those attorneys who refuse, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to give testimony respecting their Communist affiliations, my bill would eliminate from Federal practice certain individuals who have clearly forfeited their right to that public confidence which the American Bar Association properly regards as indispensible to the satisfactory functioning of our judicial system.

A party to a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence—and that is what a Communist lawyer is—should not be allowed to practice before any Federal body. My bill would weed him out and keep him out, in the interests of the United States of America.

AMENDMENT OF SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, RELATING TO USE OF MAILS FOR SALE OF CERTAIN SECURITIES

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, so as to deny the use of United States mails and facilities of interstate commerce to persons in foreign countries who sell, or offer for sale, within the United States any securities in violation of such act. I ask unanimous consent that a statement, prepared by me, relating to the bill, may be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2330) to amend the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, so as to deny the use of United States mails and facilities of interstate commerce to persons in foreign countries who sell, or offer for sale, within the United States any securities in violation of such act, introduced by Mr. FULBRIGHT, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

The statement presented by Mr. FULBRIGHT is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT

I have introduced today a bill designed to fill an important gap in our existing securities legislation. One of the most difficult problems to emerge from the Senate Banking and Currency Committee's study of the stock market involves the illegal sale of securities by foreign salesmen to American citizens. Senator WILEY, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has also been greatly concerned with this situation and has provided me with valuable data on the subject.

THE NEED

The inability of the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other branch of the Government to control the sale of securities by foreign brokers and dealers has long been a major deficiency of the Securities Exchange Act. It has been estimated that between $10 million and $50 million worth of securities are sold by foreign confidence men to American investors each year. One such scheme alone extorted $5 million from American investors. Most often it is the person least able to protect himself and who can least afford the loss who suffers.

These illicit operations recognize no State lines, find distance no barrier, and seem to operate in a no-man's land of the law. For instance, very recently I received a letter from a doctor in Arkansas who wrote me telling of the pressure he was receiving by letter and by long-distance telephone call from Montreal, Canada, to invest in a particular security. As a matter of fact, the caller said he was a friend of mine. I investigated and found that the company had little or no assets but the stock was being sold on the basis of the extravagant claims made by the Canadian dealer. Needless to say, I had never before heard of the securities salesman. Fortunately, in this instance, the investor ignored the high-pressure tactics and suffered no loss. Unfortunately, our natural confidence in human nature causes too many of us to succumb to visions of profitable investment even when support for those promises is lacking.

In July 1952 an effort was made by the Government to impose some sanction upon this illegal traffic in securities. A supplementary extradition convention with Canada was ratified by the Senate which was specifically designed to permit the American authorities to extradite violators of its laws from Canada when the violation consisted of securities frauds. We hoped that this convention would, at least to some extent, help bring to trial those who were guilty of fraudulently selling securities across the border between Canada and the United States. In the only case brought under this extradition convention, extradition was denied. It is apparent, therefore, that a new solution must be found.

I recognize that the legislation I have proposed may be imperfect. Clever violators may still be able to carry on their activities. It would be far better if, as the Senate Banking and Currency Committee stated in its report on the stock market study, "the Department of State and the Securities and Exchange Commission should seek the cooperation of the Canadian Government to force the discontinuance of those sales of securities which are in violation of American statutes." But this legislation should provide some measure of protection for American investors until the Department of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Canadian Government arrive at a full solution to the problem.

THE PROBLEM

The Securities Act of 1933 imposes upon all securities sold in interstate commerce or through the mail (with certain exceptions) registration and prospectus requirements. This is designed to insure that the purchasers of securities receive sufficient information about the securities to permit them to form an intelligent judgment upon whether they should buy them. In addition, the act prohibits any sales by means of false, fraudulent, or misleading statements. These provisions are enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission either by civil or by criminal actions against violators. However, when the violator is resident in a foreign country, he is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission and the United States courts, and he can, with impunity, sell securities which have not been registered by means of any statements he finds persuasive. The only limitations may be the extent of the gullibility of the public and his imagination.

The problem, therefore, is to find a way to subject the violator to the jurisdiction of the commission and the American courts, so that the obligations imposed by the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act as may be applicable to him.

THE BILL

The bill would permit the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue an order which would deny to any violator of the Securities Act of 1933 the right to use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce so long as he refuses to appear and answer charges of violation. A notice that charges have been made against the violator and that he has failed to appear to answer the charges is sent to the Postmaster General, the telephone companies and the telegraph company. Upon receipt of the notices, the Postmaster General, the telephone companies and the telegraph company are required to deny to the violator the use of the mails, the telephone, and the telegraph.

The violator may remove these restrictions upon his right to communicate with others by coming into the United States and subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the commission and the courts.

The bill provides as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., That section 20 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection as follows:

"'(d) Whenever it shall appear to the commission, either upon complaint or otherwise, that the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, have been or are about to be violated in the offer or sale of any security by any person in any foreign country to any person in the United States or any Territory thereof, the commission shall give notice thereof to the person so offering or selling such security and shall give such person a reasonable time within which to submit to the jurisdiction of the commission or of any court in which any action may be brought under the authority of this act. If such person fails within the time specified in such notice to submit to the jurisdiction of the commission or such court, the commission shall give notice of such failure to the Postmaster General and to such agencies or instrumentalities of interstate commerce as the commission shall deem necessary, and thereafter, so long as such failure continues, no matter from or addressed to such person shall be carried in the United States mails and it shall be unlawful for any such agency or instrumentality knowingly to transmit or transport, within the United States, any matter or communication from or addressed to such person.'"

SUNDRY BILLS FOR CONSIDERATION BY COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, on Thursday of this week, the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government will expire. This Commission, through its Chairman, former President Hoover, and the other members of the Commission, has made its final report.

As Governor of the State of Kansas, I had the honor to serve on the Federal-State affairs task force of the original Hoover Commission. This gave me an opportunity to familiarize myself with the work of the Commission.

The work of the Commission during these many years has been of real value to the citizens of our Nation. Great credit is due President Hoover for his unselfish service, his outstanding leadership, his patriotic devotion, and his untiring efforts in this field of Government operations, for which he has special qualifications.

When the first Commission went to work, there were 75 separate bureaus with authority in the field of transportation, 104 in Government lending, 37 in

foreign trade, 64 dealing with business relations, 22 with insurance, and 44 with agriculture.

Following the Commission's report, consolidations have been effected in every one of these agencies. While it is true that many of the recommendations of the present Hoover Commission report have not been acted upon, and many have not been favorably received, great good will come from the study and the report. It is my hope that this Congress will give serious consideration and study to them.

As a member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, I am today introducing, for appropriate reference, the proposals and recommendations made by the Commission on changes in our civil-service system.

It seems to me that these recommendations merit study and consideration by the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee. Our committee can determine whether changes should be made in the proposed legislation, and whether it has merit.

I am introducing the following bills:

First. A bill to provide for improvement in the system of personnel administration, through the establishment of a senior civil service in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Second. A bill relating to the simplification of the general schedule of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

Third. A bill relating to the certification of eligibles under the civil-service laws.

Fourth. A bill providing for a simplified performance rating system for Federal employees.

Fifth. A bill relating to appeals by veterans under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.

Sixth. A bill relating to reduction-in-personnel procedure and preference of veterans.

Seventh. A bill relating to the transfer of Federal employees from the classified civil service to another personnel merit system.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bills will be received and appropriately referred.

The bills, introduced by Mr. CARLSON, were received, read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Post Offic and Civil Service, as follows:

S. 2331. A bill to provide for improvement in the system of personnel administration through the establishment of a senior civil service in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government;

S. 2332. A bill relating to the simplification of the general schedule of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended;

S. 2333. A bill relating to the certification of eligibles under the civil-service laws;

S. 2334. A bill providing for a simplified performance rating system for Federal employees;

S. 2335. A bill relating to appeals by veterans under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944;

S. 2336. A bill relating to reduction-in-personnel procedure and preference of veterans; and

S. 2337. A bill relating to the transfer of Federal employees from the classified civil service to another personnel merit system.

PRINTING OF REVIEW OF REPORTS ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AT ST. LOUIS, MO. (S. DOC. NO. 57)

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], I present a letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a report dated July 26, 1954, from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, together with accompanying papers and illustrations, on a review of reports on the Mississippi River at St. Louis, Mo., requested by a resolution of the Committee on Public Works of April 20, 1948. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed as a Senate document, with illustrations, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Mississippi? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, and so forth, were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON:

Responses by him to questions asked on the program entitled "Youth Wants To Know," on Sunday, May 15, 1955.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Texas (for Mr. KENNEDY):

Statement prepared by Senator KENNEDY regarding proposed Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Policy.

By Mr. STENNIS:

Address delivered by Senator SCOTT at a recent breakfast group meeting of Senators.

By Mr. O'MAHONEY:

Interview with Senator MANSFIELD on the international situation as published in the Washington Sunday Star of June 26, 1955.

USE OF THE SALK ANTIPOLIO VACCINE IN CANADA

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD two articles appearing in the Providence Evening Bulletin of Tuesday, June 21, and Wednesday, June 22, written by Leonard D. Warner, special staff reporter for that paper. The articles relate to the use of the Salk vaccine in Canada, and I believe they will be of interest to the Members of Congress.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Providence (R. I.) Evening Bulletin of June 21, 1955]

NO FUSS, JUST RESULTS, IN POLIO PLAN

(By Leonard O. Warner)

OTTAWA.—While United States politicians, scientists, and parents have been concerned about the confusion over the antipolio vaccine, Canada has been vaccinating its children without fuss, with complete calmness, and, thus far, with no errors.

Now and then the men and women in Washington who have been forced by events to make the vaccine their business have talked about the orderliness of the Canadian program, but never too loud.

With characteristic detachment, the Canadians here in the capital city are not shouting too loudly, either. They don't have to. The facts are with them.

The day the dramatic announcement of the vaccine's effectiveness was made at Ann Arbor, Mich., the Canadians had on hand and distributed throughout the Nation enough vaccine for all selected early-age school children.

Up to now, there have been no reactors among the nearly 1,000,000 Canadian children inoculated.

Not one instance of live virus has been discovered in any of the vaccine produced in Canada.

Not a single hitch has developed in the program.

The second dosage injection is going ahead on schedule.

"All this has been accomplished by the exercise of great care, and with some luck," said George Carty, administrative assistant to the Canadian minister of health and national welfare, Paul Martin.

Carty gives two chief reasons for the smoothness with which the antipolio program has gone forward.

The first, he said, is careful planning started back last September. The second is a combination of factors resulting in rigid testing of the safety of the vaccine.

In Canada, all of the vaccine injected into children has been produced by the Connaught Medical Research Laboratories of the University of Toronto.

And the Canadian Department of Health and National Welfare has subjected all of the university-produced vaccine to its own tests, using monkeys at the federal laboratory of hygiene here in Ottawa.

In the United States the vaccine was produced by commercial pharmaceutical houses, and the Government itself did not test the vaccine. The commercial houses had been issued Federal licenses showing they meet specifications prescribed by the Government.

"Of course," Carty said, "there have been a few who said the government was interfering with private enterprise, but we most certainly do not feel that way. This was a matter of the greatest national public health interest, and we feel the government must assume the responsibility."

Why, he was asked, did the government laboratories here in Ottawa find it necessary to check vaccine produced in Tororto by an institution partially supported by the federal government, the university's Connaught laboratories?

Carty reiterated his government's feeling about complete safety, and gave this instance in which the double check paid off:

At both the university and at government laboratories in Ottawa, each batch of vaccine is subjected to 36 tests.

Two batches passed 35 tests but the 36th test, while not poor, indicated some doubt about the safety of the vaccine. The two batches were immediately destroyed.

Health Minister Martin put his department's position in these words when the United States furor developed on May 7 and all injections were ordered stopped there:

"There has been no evidence whatever of unfavorable reactions among the several hundred thousand Canadian children who have been inoculated.

"On the basis of this extensive experience in the use of the vaccine and the safeguards provided by the safety checking, it is the unanimous feeling of the provincial health authorities with whom we have been in touch that the vaccine is safe and no changes in the immunization program are contemplated."

Martin's words reassured most Canadians who had been worried about the United State news. But in Montreal a few mothers failed to bring in their children next Monday for inoculation.

Two days later, however, the Montreal mothers appeared with their children and

since that time there have been no instances of parents refusing to have their children inoculated, at least, none that Carty knew of.

When Carty spoke of luck in the Canadian program, he included in that category the fact that on April 12—the day of the Ann Arbor announcement—the Canadian Government licensed two United States pharmaceutical houses to ship vaccine to this country. Two other companies applied but were refused. Carty does not identify those failing to get import licenses.

One company had shipped 13,000 triple vaccine doses to Canada for sale to physicians. That company's vaccine never has been involved in any of the United States incidents.

But, when the live virus furor broke on May 7, Carty said, "We asked the company if it would not just as soon take all it had left in Canada back home."

Then he said emphasizing that he did not want to place Canada in the position of gloating, "We could just as well have licensed a company whose vaccine did give trouble. That's what I mean by luck."

[From the Providence (R. I.) Evening Bulletin of June 22, 1955]

CANADIANS ANTICIPATE SUCCESS OF SALK VACCINE

(By Leonard D. Warner)

OTTAWA.—The Canadians now acknowledge, with a smile, that they cribbed a little on the use of the antipolio vaccine.

They were so sure the vaccine was safe that a few days before April 12—the date of the Ann Arbor effectiveness report—a few provinces already had started inoculating some of the selected lower age children.

In disclosing what then was a premature activity, George Carty, administrative assistant to Paul Martin, Minister of Health and National Welfare, said the early inoculations point up the complete readiness of the Canadian program.

"We did not know until the Ann Arbor report was made whether the vaccine was effective," Carty said. "On the basis of our double testing, we did know the vaccine was safe. And so a few places started ahead of time."

That's how ready the Canadians were when the Ann Arbor report was made.

In September of last year the advisory council to Paul Martin, Minister of Health, had decided to authorize the Connaught Medical Research Laboratories of the University of Toronto to start producing the vaccine.

"It was the view of members of the council that, since all experimental evidence pointed to the probability of a successful outcome of last year's trial of the vaccine," Martin said, "it would be prudent to initiate production of the vaccine in Canada so that immunizing material would be available immediately on release of the report."

If the report had said "No" or "Maybe," Carty added, the expense of production of the vaccine probably would have been justified because further experiments would be indicated.

Probably a factor in the authorization given to the nonprofit Connaught laboratories was that Dr. R. D. Defries, head of the laboratories, is chairman of the advisory council. In addition, Dr. G. D. W. Cameron, Deputy Minister of Health, was a staff member at Connaught for several years, and knew of the excellence of its work.

There was still another important factor.

Several years ago, three Connaught scientists had developed a method of keeping tissue alive in a solution called Medium 199. They developed it for use in cancer research, but found that it would not work in the way they wanted. And so it was put on the shelf.

When the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis was experimenting with the development of production techniques for the vaccine, Connaught came forward with its Medium 199 and said it might be used to grow the virus. It was used, a contribution of which the Canadians are understandably proud.

But Martin is quick to praise the scientists of the United States for the research leading to the development of the vaccine.

By April 12 the Canadians had 630,000 triple doses of vaccine ready. Much of it already was in the hands of authorities in the nation's 10 Provinces. The Federal Government and the Provinces were sharing the cost on a 50–50 basis.

When the effectiveness report showed that the third dose should be administered 2 months after the first, the Canadians realined their supplies and used the third dose portion for their first injections. That boosted the total available for the first and second doses to 900,000.

Meanwhile, Connaught was hard at work producing more, and the Institute of Microbiology at the University of Montreal also was preparing to get into production.

Another element of planning went into the Canadian program.

The department of health foresaw that discovery of polio in any inoculated child immediately would set off a chain reaction of disfavor.

With that in mind, it organized teams of well known medical men so that if a child were stricken, a team immediately would go to the patient and obtain all the facts. All this was done because some forms of polio are difficult to diagnose, and mistakes could be made, Carty said.

One child did develop polio after receiving the vaccine.

Within hours, the team of experts was at the child's side.

Result: The child had been infected 3 or 4 days before the injection and never should have been inoculated, the medical team said.

There was no national screaming, as there surely would have been had not the experts been ready and able to get all the facts.

In the United States, meanwhile, outbreaks among inoculated children could not be definitely diagnosed always and the confusion arose as a result.

Plans here call for the inoculations to continue until about July 1. If an epidemic occurs before then, the injections will stop.

The Government is committed to a national program only until next July. Before that time, the Government will resurvey the situation.

Despite the success of the program, Martin is emphasizing caution in the thinking of parents.

"We should regard the vaccine as a blessing, not a miracle," he said.

"The vaccine is not a total and complete preventive of paralysis from polio. Indeed, we must face up to the fact that some children may even develop polio after vaccination, since no two children have the same degree of immunity, either natural or acquired. But scientific evidence indicates that such attacks would likely be of a milder form."

Martin himself had polio when he was a young man. His right arm still is slightly affected. And his only son has had a mild form of the disease.

Some Canadians like to point to a set of circumstances that proved fortuitous for the Nation's antipolio program: the Minister of Health had intimate knowledge of the effects of the disease; the Deputy Minister of Health had experience in the ways of the University of Toronto's Connaught laboratories, and the head of the laboratories was also chairman of the national advisory council on health.

That's what the Canadians call "great care and some luck."

IMPORTANCE OF THE REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAM

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, an extremely interesting and important editorial appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald of last Saturday, June 25. The editorial discusses the present Communist "redefection" campaign, designed to persuade many of the persons who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain to return to Communist-dominated countries. As the editorial points out, the program has serious implications in the propaganda struggle which is being waged in the cold war. This campaign points to the urgent necessity of making the refugee relief program a vital and dramatic success. This can be done only if Congress acts during the present session on the amendments which have been proposed by those of us, including the President of the United States, who believe that the full quota of refugees and escapees authorized by the Refugee Relief Act must be brought into the United States before the expiration of the act.

I ask unanimous consent that this well reasoned and convincing editorial, entitled " 'Redefection' Racket," be printed in the body of the RECORD, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE "REDEFECTION" RACKET

Many of our readers no doubt noticed the advertisement inserted in Wednesday's edition of this newspaper by the Czechoslovakian Embassy here in Washington. The same advertisement appeared also in the New York Times and in various other papers throughout the country. It reminded Czechoslovakian refugees of the proclamation of amnesty—dated May 9, the anniversary of the entry of the Red Army into Prague—for all "criminal deserters" who fled the country "under the influence of hostile propaganda" and now desire to return, and instructed them to apply to the Embassy for the necessary documents.

These advertisements were immediately recognized by emigre organizations and by American experts on East European affairs as part of the vast "redefection" campaign upon which the Soviet Government and its satellites have been expending enormous amounts of money and energy. In some way the Communists have managed to obtain the addresses of a very large number of anti-Communists, even emigrants of nearly 40 years ago, who have made homes in the West, so that these persons are now said to be receiving frequent and pitiful appeals from relatives still behind the Iron Curtain, telling in many cases of members of the family who have been arrested as hostages by the political police.

One purpose of the "redefection" campaign, undoubtedly, is to counteract the efficacy of the emigre propaganda transmitted beyond the Iron Curtain by such agencies as Radio Free Europe. Another purpose is to close off the trickle of escapes, which, despite the strictest frontier vigilance, steadily continues. Still another purpose is to create distrust and suspicion between the leaders of emigre organizations, whose prestige and acquaintanceships have usually smoothed their way to relatively comfortable asylum, and the humbler refugees doomed to wait and wait in German or Austrian internment camps.

There are said to be now in the United States about 15,000 persons of Czechoslovakian nativity who can be classified as

refugees from either nazism or communism. There is scant likelihood that more than a very few of these will swallow the bait now offered them by the embassy; for the adjustment and assimilation of these persons has been greatly aided by the numerous Bohemian-American or Slovak-American religious and social groups. But with the other thousands who are still languishing in the refugee camps abroad it may be quite another story. These unfortunates have certainly not realized that hope of freedom which impelled them to risk their lives in the effort to escape. The Germans, sorely bedeviled by the millions of their own refugees from the east, are naturally far less concerned about the personal fates of refugees of other nationalities. The continuing unwillingness of the western countries, including those of North and South America, to admit more than a relative handful of these refugees from communism contributes to the general atmosphere of despair.

Those refugees who succumb to Communist blandishments and consent to repatriation will of course find themselves effusively welcomed at home and will for a time be kept busy describing their disenchantment in propaganda broadcasts and newsreel conferences. But when their propaganda value has been exhausted they will be more likely than not to find themselves in some Communist prison or slave camp. For it should be carefully noted that the amnesty proclamation of May 9 covers only the crime of desertion, and makes no promises whatever of retroactive immunity for other offenses, such as espionage or sabotage against the Communist state.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR II AND THE BIG FOUR MEETING

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the July issue of Nation's Business, appears an article entitled "Trouble Shooter at the Big Four Meeting." The article refers to the Honorable Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the State Department. Although the article is complimentary, I think it should be even more complimentary. However, I suppose my reaction is based upon prejudice, for I have such a high regard for this gentleman and the work he has done through the years.

I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed at this point in the body of the RECORD, Mr. President.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TROUBLE SHOOTER AT THE BIG FOUR MEETING

When President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sit down to talk peace with the leaders of Russia, Britain, and France at the Big Four meeting, the news photographs of the historic occasion may reveal a lean, smartly dressed career diplomat hovering not far from Mr. Dulles' elbow. Few will recognize his face but his name is a household word from Penobscot Bay to Panmunjon.

The man who will be passing notes to Mr. Dulles when the talks get down to negotiating a cold war truce is Douglas MacArthur II, 46-year-old nephew and namesake of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

It is Mr. MacArthur's peculiar fate that he is usually introduced as the general's nephew, rather than by his own title, Counselor of the State Department. Although he is the State Department's trouble-shooter-at-large and one of Mr. Dulles' closest advisers, he has learned, like his colleague, Undersectary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., that it is exceedingly difficult to make a name for yourself when the name you bear is already known to history.

This hard truth was brought home to Mr. MacArthur, for perhaps the thousandth time, on a recent trip to Europe. He had wired ahead for hotel reservations, taking pains as he always does to include the numerals after his signature. He arrived to find the royal suite awaiting him—and the manager bitterly disappointed that his guest was not le général célèbre.

He experienced a similar "Oh, it's only you" reaction when he came to Washington in early 1953 to assume his present post. An excited real estate man passed the word that Douglas MacArthur was buying a house in Georgetown, and several gossip columnists leaped to the conclusion that the general was going to be Mr. Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense.

A surprising number of people who do notice the "II" after his name take him to be General MacArthur's son. This puzzles Mr. MacArthur, since considerable publicity has been given to the fact that the general's only son, Arthur, is just 17 years old. Mr. MacArthur is often tempted to shout that he has a daughter 1 year older than Arthur.

Mr. MacArthur's problem is compounded by the fact that he has not one but two illustrious relatives. His father-in-law is former Vice President (now Senator) ALBEN W. BARKLEY. But the cynics are wrong if they credit the general or the Veep with Mr. MacArthur's present job. It was another general who plucked him from comparative obscurity and installed him in the top echelon of State Department policy makers.

When General Eisenhower was preparing to become supreme commander of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization he instructed his chief of staff, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, to recruit someone from the State Department to serve as diplomatic adviser on the SHAPE headquarters staff. General Gruenther chose Mr. MacArthur, who, as Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs, had been working closely with Pentagon officials on NATO preparations.

General Eisenhower had expected General Gruenther to come up with a prominent ambassador. But he remembered that Mr. MacArthur had served as an assistant political adviser on his SHAEF staff during the liberation of France and that he had formed a good impression of him then.

"Okay, go ahead and hire him," he said.

General Gruenther telephoned Mr. MacArthur at his home that evening.

"Ike wants you to serve on his staff at SHAPE," he announced. "Can you leave for Paris in 48 hours?"

Mr. MacArthur stammered something about having a job to close out and a house to sell.

"All right," said General Gruenther magnanimously. "Take a whole week."

Mr. MacArthur served at SHAPE for 2 years, helping to steer the NATO command through the difficulties and complications that beset a defense force in which 14 sovereign nations have a stake. Salving the sore spots of Allied relations is highly confidential work and his efforts attracted little public attention. But his boss admired and appreciated his work.

"Mr. MacArthur made a tremendous contribution to the success of NATO," General Gruenther said recently. "General Eisenhower grew to trust him implicitly and to rely heavily on his judgment."

Shortly after General Eisenhower was elected President Mr. MacArthur was called home from Europe to be Counselor of the State Department. There is no doubt that he was the President's personal choice for the post; at the time of his appointment he had met Mr. Dulles only once.

The Counselor is not, as some people think, the State Department's chief legal officer. He is precisely what the title implies—a man who gives top-level advice and counsel to the Secretary of State. On the Department's organizational chart, the office ranks below the 2 deputy undersecretaries of state and above the 8 assistant secretaries. Actually, the Counselor's influence on foreign policy may be much greater than that of the deputy undersecretaries. These officials are heavily burdened with administrative duties, whereas he is deliberately freed from routine responsibilities to devote his full attention to major current projects and policy decisions. Mr. MacArthur's predecessor in the post was Charles E. Bohlen, now Ambassador to Russia. Mr. Bohlen's predecessor was George F. Kennan.

Both Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Kennan operated primarily as heavy-duty thinkers and as experts on Russia. Mr. MacArthur has taken on, in addition to the Counselor's traditional advisory role, many of the operational functions of ambassador-at-large, a post formerly held by Philip C. Jessup and now vacant.

It was in this latter capacity, for example, that he took charge last year of preparations for the Manila Conference at which the Southeast Asia collective defense pact was signed. The fact that this conference went off without a serious hitch and produced a treaty which is now regarded as a keystone of the free world's defenses against Red China's imperialism is testimony to his skill in the unromantic but important work that diplomats call "coordinating."

Coordinating is gobble-dy-gook for 2 of the essential tasks of diplomacy; 1, ironing out as many differences as possible before the formal negotiations begin; and 2, making sure that our foreign policy doesn't go off half-cocked out of ignorance of how the other fellow feels.

In these intramural negotiations Mr. MacArthur is careful never to gloss over any differences that crop up. He feels that it is his job not to bury conflicting viewpoints but to pinpoint the exact areas of disagreement. This gives the Secretary of State, and if necessary the President, an accurate picture of the choices and consequences involved in executive decisions. It also insures that any official or agency whose position is overruled will recognize the fact and fall in line with the decided course of the Government.

Once United States policy for the Manila Conference had been threshed out and a proposed draft of the treaty prepared, Mr. MacArthur began meeting informally and individually with Washington representatives of the other pact nations. This shirt-sleeves diplomacy began in July, nearly two months before the conference convened. In late August, Mr. MacArthur flew to Manila where an 8-nation working group proceeded to hammer out the actual terms of the treaty. By the time the foreign ministers arrived, virtually everything had been settled except the wording of the key clause committing the signatories to come to each other's aid in case of attack.

Here there were basic differences—some of the Asian nations wanted a more sweeping pledge than the United States was prepared to give. With lesser problems out of the way, the foreign ministers were able to agree on this clause in a couple of days, and the treaty was signed in an impressive display of speed and harmony.

Although the Manila Pact was perhaps his greatest personal triumph, Mr. MacArthur played a similar advance man role in other major international conferences, including the December 1953, Big Three meeting at Bermuda and the January 1954, Big Four foreign ministers meeting in Berlin. He has been deeply involved in the preparations for the coming meeting at the summit since the first diplomatic feelers were put out early this spring. If Mr. Molotov throws a curve, Mr. MacArthur should be in a position to give Mr. Dulles a quick, whispered briefing

on any previous consideration which United States, British, and French experts have given that matter.

Mr. MacArthur has found advising Mr. Dulles a highly nomadic occupation. The Secretary has a habit of ordering up his airplane and flying to wherever he thinks personal diplomacy may help settle a crisis. Usually Mr. MacArthur has to pack his bags in a hurry (his wife says they are never really unpacked) and roar away with his boss. Since he became Counselor in early 1953, Mr. MacArthur has logged approximately 168,000 miles of air travel, some of it on his own missions, but most often in the company of Mr. Dulles. He has made 10 visits to Paris, 4 to London, 3 to Bonn, 2 each to Taipei and Manila, and 1 each to Rome. The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Bagdad, Riyadh, Dhahran, New Delhi, Karachi, Istanbul, Ankara, Athens, Tripoli, Bermuda, Berlin, Geneva, Milan, Tokyo, Bangkok, Rangoon, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Ottawa, and Vienna.

He winces, however, when someone suggests that he has seen a lot of the world at the taxpayers' expense. What he usually sees is the road between the airport and the United States Embassy, and the four walls of a conference room. From these vantage points, he has discovered, the landscapes of Paris and Phnom Penh are remarkably similar.

When he does get home to Washington, Mr. MacArthur earns his $15,000 a year by putting in a 12-hour day, 6-day week at the State Department with about half of his evenings requisitioned for official social occasions, and a good many Sunday afternoons devoted to conferences at Mr. Dulles' home.

His day begins at 6:45 a. m., when he goes to the study of his Federal period house in Georgetown to read the New York Times and the Washington Post and Times Herald while eating an unvarying breakfast of orange juice, melba toast, and coffee. He usually gets to his office by 8 a. m. There he spends another hour reading the secret messages and diplomatic reports that have arrived overnight.

By 9:15, Mr. MacArthur is ready for the Secretary's daily staff conference. It often lasts from 45 minutes to an hour, and is attended by Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Hoover, Deputy Under Secretaries Loy Henderson and Robert D. Murphy, and the assistant secretaries. It is a key part of the formal machinery for making State Department policy on all current problems.

Mr. Dulles spent much of his adult life preparing for his present job, and he brought to it definite ideas about United States foreign policy. This fact, coupled with his far-ranging travels and his determination to conduct personally as many important negotiations as possible, has exposed him to the charge that he tries to run the State Department as a one-man show.

Mr. MacArthur, who has a high regard for Mr. Dulles, contends that the Secretary's daily staff meeting and other policy meetings on specific problems refute this allegation. He says Mr. Dulles demands candid advice from his subordinates and if one of his own pet ideas is vulnerable, "he wants it shot down in flames."

"In fact," Mr. MacArthur says, "I have never known a man who so thoroughly exposes his thoughts and ideas to his advisers for honest opinions. He doesn't like yes men."

When the staff meeting adjourns, Mr. MacArthur returns to his office, but he is usually interrupted several times by telephone calls summoning him back to Mr. Dulles' office. If the call is urgent—and during periods of great international stress it often is—he barrels out of his office with the fleet-footed grace of a natural athlete who won his letter in football at Yale. But the time that he saves by good broken-field running down the corridor is usually lost when he arrives at the do-it-yourself private elevator that runs to the executive sanctum. In his impatience, he frequently stalls the mechanism entirely by jamming 3 or 4 buttons at once.

This streak of impatience appears to be a factor in what his associates identify as both his outstanding virtue and his chief handicap. On the good side, it is reflected in a hard-driving passion to get ahead with a project, and an almost ruthless dedication of time and energy to the problem at hand. On the debit side, it shows up in occasional outbursts of temper—which he himself deplores—and an inability at times to hide the fact that he does not suffer fools gladly.

It may also help to explain why, with Mr. MacArthur, as with his famous uncle, people tend to divide into two camps: those who admire him tremendously, and those who cannot abide him.

Candid appraisals that were solicited through numerous State Department offices included such diverse comments as:

From a veteran ambassador: "He is one of the best men we have in the Foreign Service. He is forceful, persuasive, a skillful negotiator, and has highly developed powers of analysis."

A second-echelon career official: "He can be nice or nasty, depending on his mood. Frankly, he irks the hell out of me."

A subordinate: "He is a driver, but he drives himself harder than anyone else. The one thing in his mind is to get the job done."

An equal on the policy level: "I rate his intelligence and ability highly. He is extremely direct and has a faculty for cutting through the underbrush and getting to the real problem. I have found him most cooperative, but he has a few personal qualities that irritate some people. I think there is also a dab of jealousy here and there about his rapid rise."

The pattern of these comments suggest that, in Mr. MacArthur's case, familiarity breeds respect. The people who know him best and who have worked most closely with him have the highest regard for him.

It is easy to misjudge Mr. MacArthur on the basis of casual acquaintance. The first time I saw him, he was addressing a luncheon of the Overseas Writers Club in Washington. His manner was reserved, even aloof. He spoke precisely, choosing each word with obvious care, in an accent born of an Ivy League education and many years abroad. I commented to a luncheon companion that "he looks like a pretty stuffy type." Later, in private conversation under more relaxed circumstances, I found him a friendly, gregarious extrovert with a great deal of personal charm.

The public's legitimate concern, of course, is not with the MacArthur personality but with his ability. How much wisdom, experience and skill does he contribute to the delicate task of keeping the peace?

In seeking an answer to this question, we run up against the fact that a confidential adviser, by the nature of his job, cannot be judged by the same yardstick as an executive. It is the executive, in this case Mr. Dulles, who inevitably gets credit or blame, and Mr. MacArthur is too loyal to his boss either to claim or disavow the authorship of any particular aspect of United States policy.

The consensus of his closest colleagues' opinions is that he is a superior diplomatic technician, and a shrewd analyst of tactical problems, but not a profound thinker of Mr. Kennan's caliber. To put it differently, he is more concerned with making current United States foreign policy work than with brooding over different and possibly better solutions to the ultimate questions of atomic-age diplomacy. Someone once described him as a carpenter rather than an architect of our basic cold-war strategy, and he accepts this as a fair description.

One of Mr. MacArthur's most appealing traits is his unabashed enthusiasm for his job and his organization. He loves diplomacy, even the tedious aspects of it, and his attitude toward the Foreign Service is like that of an old Leatherneck toward the United States Marine Corps.

His never regretted decision in favor of a diplomatic career was made when he was 14, an age when by all logic he should have had his heart set on going to West Point or Annapolis. All his family antecedents pointed him toward a military career. His grandfather, Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, had been a famous soldier; his Uncle Douglas was making a brilliant record in the Army; and his father, Arthur MacArthur, Jr., was a captain in the Navy.

In 1923, Captain MacArthur's ship took the Secretary of the Navy on a good will tour of Japan. With a view toward introducing his son early to shipboard life, Captain MacArthur asked and received permission for young Douglas to go along. They sailed from Hampton Roads in May, visited the West Indies, Panama, Hawaii, Japan, China, and the Philippines.

At each port of call, Douglas was placed in the custody of the local United States consul, or embassy staff, while his father was involved in ceremonial duties. He took a great liking to the Foreign Service people who cared for him and for the kind of life they led in faraway, exotic places. When the cruise ended in September, Douglas had firmly made up his mind that he would join the Foreign Service when he grew up.

His father, who died a few years later, assented. Douglas was sent to Milton Academy, a fashionable prep school near Boston, and then to Yale, where he majored in history and broke his nose three times running interference for Albie Booth.

He graduated from Yale in 1932 and passed the examinations for admission to the Foreign Service. But a long waiting list was ahead of him, and it was 1935 before his appointment came through. He spent the intervening 3 years plying the family trade as a lieutenant in the Army. He was stationed at various Civilian Conservation Corps camps in Virginia, an humble duty ameliorated somewhat by the fact that he often spent his weekends in Washington as the house guest of the Army Chief of Staff, his Uncle Douglas.

When he was finally appointed as a Foreign Service officer, he spent routine tours of duty as vice consul in Vancouver and Naples. Then, in 1938, he was sent to the Paris Embassy. He left Paris shortly before the Nazis overran it in 1940, and followed the French Government to Vichy. His wartime work in Vichy had the cloak-and-dagger overtones that are always associated with a diplomatic career in the movies but only rarely in real life. One of his jobs was to help arrange escape routes for Allied fliers shot down over Europe, and he worked closely with the French underground.

Many of the leaders of the French resistance movement whom he met clandestinely in those furtive days are now leaders of the French Government, and Mr. MacArthur's warborn friendship with them has helped to smooth over many a postwar French-United States diplomatic misunderstanding.

The Germans moved into Vichy in 1942, and Mr. MacArthur was sent to an internment camp where he stayed until March 1944, when he was repatiated in an exchange of diplomatic personnel.

In June of that year, General Eisenhower's forces invaded Europe and within a month Mr. MacArthur was on his way back to France to serve as an assistant political adviser on the Eisenhower staff, a job in which he made good use of his contacts with the French underground. Paris was liberated in August, and Mr. MacArthur returned to the Embassy he had fled 4 years before. He stayed there,

as first secretary, until 1948. In 1949, he was brought back to Washington to be chief of the State Department's Western European Division and subsequently Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, the post in which General Gruenther discovered him.

That part of Mr. MacArthur's life which is not devoted to his country's service is built around the two women who have shared his nomadic existence for 21 and 18 years respectively. Mrs. MacArthur, the former Laura Louise Barkley, is a gracious and charming Kentuckian who inherited her father's sense of humor and a good deal of his skill as a raconteur. Their daughter, christened Laura but always called Mimi, is a senior at the fashionable Holton Arms School in Washington.

Mr. MacArthur's only real complaint about his job is that the long hours, the frequent trips abroad, and the interminable social obligations leave him too little time for family life.

At least three, sometimes four, evenings a week, Mr. and Mrs. MacArthur have to dress up and go out to a party given by or for someone of diplomatic importance. Mrs. MacArthur tries to minimize the impact of the social circuit on her husband's health (and her own) by arranging their calendar so that they alternate an evening out with an evening at home.

The off-night-at-home is Mr. MacArthur's main joy in life, and he plans carefully in advance how he will spend these few rationed hours with his family. Dinner is a pleasant ritual that recalls their long residence in France. Mr. MacArthur has what his wife calls "gourmet taste and a spartan conscience"—he likes good food and vintage wines, but has an ex-athlete's fear of gaining weight. After dinner, Mr. MacArthur likes to watch the fights or a baseball game on television. He is a die-hard fan of the Washington Senators.

Aside from Mrs. MacArthur and Mimi, the person closest to Mr. MacArthur is his widowed mother, who lives in Washington, and with whom he visits frequently. He also sees a lot of the Veep, who once counseled his daughter not to "marry that young fellow MacArthur and traipse all around the world," but who now regards his son-in-law as the paragon of all filial virtues. He calls on General MacArthur whenever he goes to New York, but their relationship, while warm and cordial, is no closer than could be expected of an uncle and nephew who spent most of their adult lives on opposite sides of the earth.

From the public utterances of the general and Mr. MacArthur, there would seem to be divergencies in their views on foreign policy. The general on numerous occasions has attacked the collective security concept which was expressed in the NATO and SEATO pacts, and which has become the foundation stone of United States cold war policy. Mr. MacArthur believes that collective security—a network of alliances against Communist aggression in which each nation is a full, free and willing partner—offers the best hope of maintaining peace and freedom.

SILLIMAN EVANS

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, it is with sadness that I arise to inform my colleagues of the passing of Silliman Evans, president-publisher of the Nashville Tennessean. Mr. Evans passed away Sunday morning shortly after having attended the funeral of his old friend and associate, the Honorable Amon Carter, of Fort Worth, Tex. His funeral services will be conducted Wednesday morning at 11 o'clock in Nashville.

Over a period of 40 years Mr. Evans played an important part in the newspaper and political and economic life of our Nation. He counted his friends throughout the Nation by the thousands. He enjoyed the confidence of such distinguished leaders as former Vice President John Nance Garner, Speaker of the House SAM RAYBURN, and our own Senate Majority Leader LYNDON JOHNSON.

At an early age Silliman Evans became an outstandingly successful newspaper reporter. He was editor of a number of Texas newspapers. He became interested in commercial airline developments in Texas. He handled the publicity for the campaign of John Nance Garner for the Presidency and handled the strategy which led to his selection as Vice Presidential nominee in 1932. Thereafter he became the Fourth Assistant Postmaster General where his modernization of the Department was eminently efficient. Later he took over the presidency of the Maryland Casualty Co. and in 1937 became the publisher of the Nashville Tennessean.

Mr. Evans had the distinction from 1932 of attending every Democratic National Convention as delegate from Texas, Maryland, or Tennessee. Senator LYNDON JOHNSON, in introducing him recently to a breakfast given for the national committeewomen in Washington, stated that Tennessee gave a great hero, Davy Crockett, to Texas, but Texas had evened the score by giving Tennessee Silliman Evans.

It has been my pleasure to have been closely associated with Mr. Evans during the past 20 years. He was one of my closest friends and advisors. I had an opportunity of knowing his great capacity for friendship, his remarkable ability, and the warmness of his heart and his progressive liberal attitude. In all of these Mr. Evans excelled to a remarkable degree.

Silliman Evans, through his personal influence and through the progressive Nashville Tennessean, was one of the strongest influences for progress and development in the South. He waged vigorous battles for the Tennessee Valley Authority, the development of the Cumberland, the removal of the poll tax, and better treatment for farmers. He represented liberalism in its finest sense. Mr. Evans never gave up a cause after having embarked upon it. He fought vigorously and uncompromisingly for issues and candidates, even though he may have known the cause was hopeless. Frequently he and his newspaper espoused the candidacy of people who had little chance of winning. However, that did not detract from the vigor of Mr. Evans' support.

Silliman Evans' many friends will miss him greatly. His advice and counsel were always sincere and generously given. When friendship was once established, he never sold a friend short. He stuck by them through thick and thin. I wish to extend to his wife and sons my deepest sympathy and to say to his successors and staff of the Nashville Tennessean that they have an added responsibility of carrying on that great newspaper in the tradition of Silliman Evans.

ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN CANADA AND IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, through the decisions of this Republican national administration, additional aluminum production has been discouraged in our American Pacific Northwest.

To begin with, Secretary of the Interior McKay has deliberately stopped the great Federal power program which made possible, between 1940 and 1952, the establishing in the Northwest of 44 percent of all the aluminum capacity in the United States. Prior to that time, not an ounce of aluminum had been smeltered in our region.

But Mr. McKay not only curtailed all new Federal hydroelectric development; he also prevented the budgeting of funds for transmission lines and substations that would enable the Bonneville Power Administration to furnish energy for carrying out a Government contract with the Harvey Machine Co., which hoped to erect a great aluminum smelter at The Dalles, Oreg. Failure to have this plant constructed has caused much chagrin and disappointment in Wasco County, particularly, and in Oregon generally. After all, this employment could be essential in providing new jobs and payrolls after the building jobs on the Dalles Dam taper off and decline.

However, Mr. President, while this administration has let aluminum production go by the boards in our own Northwest, the Canadians across the international border have been efficiently busy. The vast Kitimat aluminum plant in British Columbia, now turning out ingots at the rate of 88,500 tons a year, is soon to be expanded to a capacity of 181,500 tons. Furthermore, the Aluminum Company of Canada has announced this week that Kitimat will have an output of 331,500 tons by 1959. Eventually, Kitimat will produce 550,000 tons, which will make it the largest producer of primary aluminum anywhere in the world.

With full development, there is ample hydroelectricity in the Pacific Northwest both for aluminum production and ordinary needs. While aluminum smelting does not employ large numbers of people, the inevitable secondary fabrication—as the Northwest becomes the aluminum center of the continent—will result in the hiring of thousands of skilled men and women at high year-around wages. This is a crucial economic necessity for the region where I was born and raised.

Let me quote a significant paragraph from a New York Times article of Sunday, June 26, 1955; an article from Kitimat, British Columbia, by Jack R. Ryan, correspondent of the Times:

> Virtually all of this metal (aluminum) is going to users in the United States who are eager for more just as soon as they can get it.

What does this mean, Mr. President? It means that our own Nation, which is hungry for aluminum, must depend upon Canadian production for this vital metal of the 20th century. Kitimat is a record-breaking source of vast quantities of aluminum because of the low-cost waterpower generated on the seacoast by dropping so-called hanging

lakes through a 10-mile tunnel into Kemano Fiord.

In our own Northwest we have magnificent sites for power, perhaps not as good as that at Kemano and Kitimat, but wonderful sites nonetheless—sites like Hells Canyon and John Day and many others, for example. Yet this administration proposes to give Hells Canyon to the Idaho Power Co. for piecemeal, partial, and less than full development. In addition, the Interior Department has shown no willingness to recommend the transmission lines and transformers which are necessary to energize the proposed aluminum plant at The Dalles, Oreg.

So that Members of the Senate can understand the irony of further production in Canada to serve the United States, while we let our own aluminum opportunities go to waste here, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the story from the New York Times of June 26, 1955, entitled "Alcan Expanding Aluminum Output."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ALCAN EXPANDING ALUMINUM OUTPUT—LONELY INDIAN FISHING VILLAGE ON WILD FIORD IS NOW SCENE OF TOP FREE WORLD PROJECT—MORE POTLINES ON WAY—88,500-TON ANNUAL CAPACITY EXPECTED TO BE RAISED BY 1959 TO 331,500 TONS

(By Jack R. Ryan)

KITIMAT, BRITISH COLUMBIA, June 25.—This thriving new town on a wilderness fiord 100 miles below the Alaskan border is the scene of the largest aluminum expansion project underway in the free world.

Four years ago there was only a lonely Indian fishing village here. The deep forests were populated mostly by black bears, grizzlies, and wolves.

Today Kitimat is home to 5,000 men, women, and children. And its aluminum smelter, fed on processed ore brought by ship from faraway Jamaica, British West Indies, is turning out ingots at the rate of nearly 88,500 tons a year.

Virtually all of this metal is going to users in the United States who are eager for more just as soon as they can get it.

The urgent peacetime demand for aluminum caused the Aluminum Co. of Canada to accelerate its Kitimat expansion program, and twice since the smelter poured its first metal last August large new additions to capacity have been authorized.

BUILDING MORE POTLINES

Construction crews are erecting the blocks long buildings that will house two new potlines or series of production units. The first should be producing next March, the second a year from now. And a new site to the northeast is being prepared for 2 more, for a total of 6.

Last January an avalanche in mile-high Kildala Pass temporarily disrupted the smelter's electrical power supply, and some potlines were damaged. For this reason Kitimat has not yet operated at its present capacity rate of 91,500 tons.

However, the new construction is right on schedule, and by the end of next year the installed capacity will be 181,500 tons. In 1959, barring the unforeseen, it will have reached the present goal of 331,500 tons. Eventually, the capacity is expected to be raised to 550,000 tons, which would make Kitimat the world's largest primary producer.

R. E. Powell, Alcan president, estimates that $300 million has been spent so far on the Kitimat project and its spectacular hydroelectric development. By the end of the presently authorized construction program, this will have climbed to at least $510 million, including some necessary expansion of alumina processing facilities in Jamacia.

HUGE POWER POTENTIAL

Alcan chose this region, 400 miles north of Vancouver and roughly 80 miles up the deep tidewater channels from the sea, because of the abundance of hydroelectric power in a series of nearby lakes high in British Columbia's coastal range.

The carefully planned townsite of Kitimat has nearly 500 homes now. At least 450 more are to be built this summer, along with a high school, 2 large commercial store buildings, and a railway station for the new railroad to Terrace, British Columbia, 43 miles up the valley. By the end of 1959, when the present expansion is completed, the town's population is expected to be around 20,000.

Already a dairy products plant, a welding gas manufacturer, cement-block plant and more than 100 small private businesses are being established in Kitimat.

The townsfolk confidently predict that other major industries will be attracted here by the power, pulpwood and other resources. Studies are being made in the area for the Kitimat Pulp & Paper Co., envisaged as a joint venture of Alcan's parent company, Aluminium, Ltd., and the Power River Co., large newsprint producer.

"We'll make all the electrical power available here that any new industry wants," says McNelly DuBose, vice president in charge of the British Columbia project. "All we need is a little advance notice so we can tap some more of our enormous hydroelectric potential."

He believes Kitimat would be ideal for a large chlorine plant to serve the Northwest's flourishing paper industry.

Kitimat's electricity is generated at Kemano, a settlement of about 700 persons, 50 miles to the south in a narrow fiord overshadowed by precipitous snowy peaks. The gleaming modern powerhouse is inside a chamber blasted from solid rock deep within a mountain and safe from landslides and aerial attack.

The huge cavern, big enough to contain the liner *Queen Mary*, has 3 turbine generators installed now, with a capacity of 450,000 horsepower. Workmen are preparing foundations for two more to keep pace with the smelter expansion. There is room for 8 altogether, to raise capacity to 1,120,000 horsepower.

Water to drive the turbines drops 16 times the height of Niagara Falls, through a penstock bored into the mountain and connecting with a huge 10-mile-long tunnel from Tahtsa Lake to the east. This lake is only 1 of a dozen making up a 140-mile long reservoir created by plugging the eastern outlet of a vast natural drainage area with a dam on the Nechako River.

The water has been rising against this dam since it was completed late in 1952—and not until 1957 will the reservoir be full.

SWEDES' DAY

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 4 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Minnesota may proceed.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, two celebrations, related but separated by more than 5,000 miles of land and water, took place within the past few days. One was in Sweden, the other in Minnesota. On Friday, June 24, the people of Sweden put aside for awhile their daily cares to observe the holiday known as Midsummer Eve.

It is only appropriate that the following Sunday, June 26, is Svenskarnas Dag, or Swedes' Day, in Minnesota.

I am sorry that I could not be in Minneapolis for the celebration of Svenskarnas Dag this year. I have been present many times over the years, and each occasion has been a source of inspiration, a powerful reminder of important past events and a cause for renewed faith in the future of our country.

The roots of these celebrations go back for a thousand years or more. The thriving, modern civilizations of Minnesota and of Sweden have been wrought out of adversity by diligence and faith. For centuries the people of Sweden coped with difficult conditions, the poor soil of parts of the country, the harsh climate of long dark winters and brief bright summers, long distances and isolation, the years of war and the years of famine. But even in these bygone days, under the worst of circumstances, the people of Sweden never accepted the yoke of the oppressor, from within or without. For more than 500 years, without a break, the ordinary people have had a real voice in their government.

Now, as in years past, as the people of Sweden celebrated Midsummer Eve they rejoiced in much more than the warmth and brightness of the summer. Again this year they celebrated as well their freedom, their enlightened democratic way of life, their resolute preparedness to defend that way of life in a troubled age, and their 150-year-old record of peace. And as they gathered in the bright, sunny evening of Midsummer Eve under the blue and yellow flag, many of them were thinking of brothers and sisters, children and grandchildren, cousins and uncles and aunts who look up to the Stars and Stripes.

The contribution of more than a million Swedish immigrants to the United States over the last 100 years, particularly in Minnesota, the Midwest generally, and the West, is a well known and inspiring chapter of American history. It is only 7 years since we commemorated the centennial of the arrival of the first Swedes in Minnesota. Today, more than a quarter of the people there trace their origins to Sweden. Doctors, lawyers, farmers, businessmen, builders, legislators, governors, educators, authors, musicians—they have succeeded in all walks of life. Together with the stream of settlers from all corners of the globe they helped transform Minnesota from a wilderness to a populous, vigorous, prosperous State in less than a hundred years.

The early contributions of the Swedish people to the building of America, going back as they do for more than 300 years, are perhaps of equal importance. Although the great wave of immigration did not begin until about 1850, the first handful of colonists from Sweden had landed in Delaware in 1638, more than 200 years earlier. I believe it is notable that the very first book prepared for this struggling little colony was a religious volume, a translation of Luther's Catechism from Swedish into the language of the Algonquin Indians. This same deep Christian spirit characterized the latecomers as well as the early comers, and

it is a vital part of the daily lives of the people of Minnesota today.

During the Revolutionary War the ideals of freedom and justice proclaimed by the American colonists set off a kindred spark among the Swedes. Many of them volunteered for service in the American cause, and participated as part of the forces of our French allies. The historical records clearly show that at least 70 Swedish officers distinguished themselves in behalf of the United States in the Revolutionary War, and that at least one of them was decorated by George Washington himself.

Two descendents of Swedish colonists also distinguished themselves in this early struggle for freedom. One was John Hanson, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and for a time President of the Confederation. The other was John Morton, a member of the Pennsylvania delegation which approved the Declaration.

It is also worth remembering that Sweden was the first country not engaged in the Revolutionary War to recognize the struggling young United States of America as a free, equal, and independent Nation. This was done in a Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed in Paris in April of 1783.

I am proud of the Swedes of Minnesota and I know, from conversations with the people of Sweden, that they take great pride in the achievements of their countrymen in the United States. From generation to generation, they have carried a spirit of freedom and independence that has never wavered. In Sweden today, this spirit keeps a small nation a bright outpost of liberty, progress, and independence almost in the shadow of the Iron Curtain. In Minnesota, on Swedes' Day, we salute this spirit and we recognize again the magnificent contribution of the people of Swedish descent to the making of the United States of America.

SUPPORT PRICE FOR CERTAIN SEGMENTS OF THE MINING INDUSTRY

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Delaware may proceed.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I call to the attention of the Senate a bill now on the Senate Calendar, Calendar No. 363—S. 922—to amend the Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of 1953 in order to further extend the program to encourage the discovery, development, and production of certain domestic minerals. In my opinion this bill represents one of the boldest raids on the Federal Treasury that has been proposed in recent years.

This bill proposes to furnish a very profitable support price for certain segments of the mining industry at a tremendous cost to the American taxpayers of approximately three-fourths billion dollars.

Furthermore, Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, speaking as the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, flatly states that there is no justification in the name of national defense for the enactment of S. 922.

This bill, if enacted into law, will commit the United States Government for the next 12 years to purchase the entire production of several mentioned minerals at a specified price, which price is far above the prevailing domestic or world market.

To make the proposal even worse, the bill carries an escalator clause suggesting that these prices in the future can be raised but under no circumstances can they be lowered.

The bill was reported by the committee without any public hearings and without the benefit of the opinion of any Government agency involved, yet at the same time it is recommended to the Senate as being needed as a national-defense measure.

I requested Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, that he express the opinion of his agency as to whether or not the measure is needed to carry out our stockpiling program. At the same time I asked him for an estimate of the cost to the Federal Treasury.

In Mr. Flemming's reply dated June 23, 1955, he stated:

> There would be no justification in the name of national defense for either extending or enlarging these programs in the manner proposed by S. 922.

Continuing, Mr. Flemming said:

> Should it be found necessary for national defense purposes to undertake further measures to bring about increased production of any or all of these materials, the authority already provided by the Congress through the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, is wholly adequate for the purpose.

His letter concluded with the flat statement that they did not recommend the enactment of S. 922. He accompanied that adverse report with an estimate which had been compiled by the General Services Administration showing the long-range cost to the American taxpayers, should S. 922 be enacted, as being approximately three-fourths billion dollars.

I ask unanimous consent that this adverse report signed by Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, be incorporated in the RECORD at this point, followed by the estimate of the cost as compiled by the General Services Administration.

There being no objection, the report and estimate of cost were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION,
Washington, D. C., June 23, 1955.

Hon. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: This replies to your request of June 20, 1955 for our comments on S. 922. There is attached hereto a schedule prepared by the General Services Administration which shows the cost of extending the Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act as proposed by S. 922. Referring to the columns under the heading "12 years," the first column shows the gross transactions—the total estimated prices which the Government will pay for each of the minerals covered by the proposed legislation. The second column shows the estimated loss on each program based on the prices paid as contrasted with current market prices.

The purpose of S. 922 is to amend the Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of 1953. The latter extended the period within which the Government would purchase at substantial premium prices the amounts of various domestically produced metals and minerals called for by certain expansion programs originally initiated under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended. The Government authorized these programs shortly after the start of the Korean war as a hedge against the possibility that all-out war might come sometime in 1951 or 1952. In these circumstances these domestic materials would have been used to meet defense and industrial needs of the Nation. Some, such as manganese, would have required extensive and costly beneficiation.

The proposed legislation would not only again extend delivery period of such programs up to 12 years but would also remove all limitations on the amounts of such materials which the Government would be required to purchase.

In general, the United States supply position for these metals and minerals has so improved that there would be no justification in the name of national defense for either extending or enlarging these programs in the manner proposed by S. 922.

Should it be found necessary for national defense purposes to undertake further measures to bring about increased production of any or all of these materials, the authority already provided by the Congress through the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, is wholly adequate for the purpose.

In view of the foregoing, we do not recommend enactment of S. 922.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR S. FLEMMING,
Director.

General Services Administration—Estimated cost of domestic purchase regulations—Increased cost for 12-year extension of purchase regulation

[In thousands of dollars]

Commodity	1 year		12 years	
	Gross cost	Estimated loss	Gross cost	Estimated loss
Asbestos	706	214	8,472	2,563
Beryl	280	67	3,360	806
Columbium-tantalum	69	69	828	828
Manganese:				
Butte-Phillipsburg	3,780	2,870	45,360	34,440
Deming	5,940	4,510	71,280	54,120
Wenden	13,500	10,250	162,000	123,000
Domestic small producers	5,280	3,850	63,360	46,200
Mica	3,720	2,520	44,640	30,240
Tungsten	75,600	39,600	907,200	475,200
Total DPA	108,875	63,950	1,306,500	767,397
Chrome	[1] 2,885		[1] 34,615	
Grand total	111,760	63,950	1,341,115	767,397

[1] Expenditures under Public Law 520.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I am sending a copy of Mr. Flemming's adverse report, along with the estimate of cost to which I have referred to each Member of the Senate.

This bill, which was not accompanied by the usual reports of the agencies affected and which obviously represents a three-quarter-billion-dollar raid on the Federal Treasury, should be stricken from the Senate Calendar and referred back to the committee. Should it not be voluntarily withdrawn, at the appropriate time I shall move to recommit the bill.

THE EXCHANGE-OF-PERSONS PROGRAM

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I have taken occasion before to call to the attention of the Senate the progress which we are making in the direction of a peaceful world through the exchange-of-persons program.

The reports of good will which has been generated around the world because people from other countries have come to our shores, and our people have, in return, been sent abroad, are encouraging and astounding. It appears that there is no substitute for eyewitness reports when we want to dispel rumors, erase faulty images, and disclose lies which enemy propagandists plant in the minds of citizens in other countries in an effort to minimize the importance of the United States.

A number of Senators have been active in promoting the idea of a stronger exchange-of-persons program. Our able Vice President, RICHARD NIXON, has repeatedly urged that the program be accelerated. Our Ambassadors endorse it most heartily. Newsmen have reported that exchange programs are our best weapons against Communist propaganda.

When a program is this successful, it naturally happens that other agencies of government, in an effort to strengthen their own position, look with covetous eyes at it, hoping to annex some of the functions of the program. This has happened and is happening with the exchange-of-persons program. I think that is a tribute to the effective use to which the Department of State has put the program in bettering our position in world affairs.

I pay tribute to our Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, for his awareness of the importance of this program, and for keeping it an active arm of his Department.

The exchange-of-persons program, which brings foreign leaders, newsmen, students, teachers, technicians, and many others to our shores, is a program whose benefits will last over the years. It develops a friendly tie on a person-to-person level that cannot be severed by distortion or lies. One visitor told me that before he came to America he felt that all of us here were, in his words, "either millionaires or crooks, or both," and he said that after traveling around the country this idea was dispelled totally. He is an important molder of opinion in his own country, and we were wise to have had him here to see for himself what kind of people make up America.

We must ever increase the prestige of this activity. We must not let it be identified as a propaganda machine so that exchanges are made here, as in the Soviet, with the idea that we should propagandize, spy, engage in subversive activities, or promote political ideologies. We must take care that no changes are made which will remotely give our exchange program that character either in the minds of our own people or in the minds of the people of foreign countries.

We must view this as a forward-looking, longtime operation, and take care that it does not become identified with short-term programs which may change the purpose or uproot the ideas behind these exchanges. I have resisted, and I shall continue to resist, any efforts, anywhere, which will curb or basically change the initial plan for carrying out the purposes of the laws passed in Congress to implement this program.

At this point, Mr. President, I submit for the RECORD an editorial from the Christian Science Monitor for June 13, 1955, entitled "Grassroots Peacemaking," which sets out clearly the benefits of the exchange-of-persons program.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRASSROOTS PEACEMAKING

Americans as individuals are strong on neighborliness. They are quick to make friends with people from other countries, happy to welcome them into their homes, eager to introduced visitors to the best features of American life. Increasingly, too, they have become a nation of travelers, keen to learn how other peoples live and work, no less keen to have America's aims and ideals understood abroad. But these attitures are not always reflected fully in Washington.

Usually neighborliness makes for mutual appreciation. But hasty travel—especially under some conditions—can also create a sense of strangeness which is often akin to distaste. The more solid foundation of understanding—on which diplomats can build peace—often requires fuller acquaintance. This is especially fostered by the longer visits or continuing correspondence of students, business and professional men, soldiers, and artists who find common interests that bridge national borders.

So especially useful are exchanges of students and educators that several public and private plans have been set up to foster them. The Fulbright Act and the Mundt-Smith Act provide particularly valuable machinery for this program. Since 1948 about 15,000 Fulbright scholars have gone abroad to study or come from 30 countries to the United States. Part of the expense has been met by sale of surplus property left overseas at the end of the war, certain colleges have granted scholarships, and some students have received aid under the Mundt-Smith Act.

Last year under all the programs reported on by the State Department there were more than 7,000 exchanges, roughly two-thirds being students coming to the United States from 76 countries.

Measuring the results is difficult, for they are so largely found in the broadening of mental horizons and the development of understanding. But tangible fruitage also is beginning to appear. In the Philippines is a school modeled after Berea College—founded by a Filipino girl who "discovered Kentucky." Top-flight American nuclear experts are going out to atom-hungry nations to explain peaceful uses. Many other examples of concrete gains are now coming to light.

This year President Eisenhower asked Congress for $22 million to provide for the international educational program. The House of Representatives cut it in half. Happily, the Senate Appropriations Committee has restored the cuts. But the appropriation still has to pass the Senate and then survive compromises in a conference committee. Improvements may be needed in the handling of the program. We cannot assume that merely bringing students to the United States is going to work wonders—sometimes they have serious adjustments to make during their stay and again in finding a suitable place in their own country's life. But chopping the program down will not improve it.

Certainly a Congress which is concerned about the spread of communism should not cripple a most effective weapon against communism. By comparison with Moscow's efforts the American program is small. The Soviet is sparing neither time nor money in drawing students from abroad; one non-Communist Asian country alone is sending thousands. There are many countries whose future leaders will study either in Russia or the United States. In the basic world struggle of ideas it can easily happen that less money than would build a bomber can win a strategic nation's friendship.

The essential neighborliness of the American people should be expressed in more active support of a program which cultivates much more needed grassroots friendships. These are not only a defense against communism but essential foundations for peace.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call may be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ACQUIREMENT OF CERTAIN RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND TIMBER ACCESS ROADS

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 1464) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire certain rights-of-way and timber access roads, which was, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That the Secretary of the Interior may acquire rights-of-way and existing connecting roads adjacent to public lands whenever he determines that such acquisition is needed to provide a suitable and adequate system of timber access roads to public lands under his jurisdiction.

SEC. 2. For the purpose of this act, the term "public lands" includes the Revested Oregon and California Railroad and the Reconveyed Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands in Oregon.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the House amendment and request a conference thereon with the House of Representatives, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. LONG,

Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. MALONE, and Mr. DWORSHAK conferees on the part of the Senate.

CALL OF THE CALENDAR

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas will state it.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I believe the unanimous-consent agreement for the call of the calendar provided for the consideration of bills unobjected to; therefore, is my understanding correct that the Senate will proceed beginning with Calendar No. 589?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Pursuant to the order entered last Friday, the Senate will now proceed with the call of the calendar of bills and resolutions to which there is no objection. The clerk will state the first measure in order on the calendar.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 42) favoring the suspension of deportation in the case of certain aliens was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 244 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 214; 8 U. S. C. 1254 (c)):

A-5981713, Dickel, Jr., Wlater.
E-078565, Fontes, Sebastiano De.
A-2553452, Garcia, Nicolas.
E-47368, Gasca-Sardina, Juan.
E-069249, Lozano, Jose Pascual.
A-5845821, Maniscalco, Giuseppe.
E-16323, Mercadante, Rocco.
E-069259, Sweedler, Hilda.
A-2266360, Triana-Aguilar, Lucas.
A-1116968, Watchinsky, Samuel.
A-1552531, Lopez-Chavez, Juan.
E-057379, Manouskos, James George.
E-89257, Ciaccia, Catello Charles.
E-069558, Lucio-Leon, Felipe.
A-5988306, Rudy, George.
E-078638, Capozzi, Francesco.
E-069474, Castaneda, Juana Ponce-Rosales de.
A-1894829, Slojkowski, John Anthony.
E-057816, Solano, Ramon.
E-077119, Garcia, Antonio Menendez.
A-4595749, Jakubiak, Frank Anthony.
A-2236659, Jarger, Jr., George.
A-4608159, Maniscalco, Samuel.
E-054983, Mayo, Walter John.
E-058681, Ortiz-Gonzalez, Faustino.
A-4747607, Schmidt, Karl.
A-5149973, Schmitt, Joseph Otto.
A-4793952, Wagner, Sam.
A-3167418, Dippner, Hermann.
A-2744439, Kuprashewithz, Wladimir.
A-1168565, Silverio, Caroline Lucca Di Pietro.
A-4100237, Woislaw, Stanislaw.
A-3939724, Woislaw, Felikcia Anna.
A-5624707, Yen, Lok.
A-2590255, Bakovich, Nick.
E-053681, Barlow, Enid.
1200-43511, Chadwick, Ann Betancourt.
A-1339656, Doolittle, Immacolatina.
A-1437231, Mark, Zef.
E-076774, Porcello, Vincenzo.
A-4777524, Ramirez-Medel, Anastacio.
E-47358, Salazar-Aguilar, Jesse Robert.
E-89260, Shaw, Norman Howard.
A-1109526, Stephens, George Saunders.
A-5932871, Torowis, Jurko.
A-1644860, Wengorowski, Ignatz.
A-5914114, Wolck, Vladimir.
A-5844626, Firetto, Paolo.
A-4948601, Schmidt, Frederick .
A-1153640, Woishnis, Frances Victoria.
A-5339974, Bostrom, Iver August.
E-075816, Castro, Stephen.
A-3322617, Cromie, Thomas Wilfred.
E-076879, Dujuambi, Monte Alfonso Carmett.
A-4167829, Garbus, Abraham.
T-2682534, Mercier, Lucien Treffle.
A-5969128, Michelson, Robert.
A-3231388, Morgan, Charlotte.
A-3900018, Vicklund, Knut Oskar.
A-5753722, Lupino, Louis.
A-5849321, Rostowsky, Frances Catherine (nee Vaiciunas).
A-1595525, Sevagian, Avedis.
A-1604070, Bosky, Paul Adam.
A-2452366, Bungard, Leonard Joseph.
E-47592, Martinez-Luna Hipolito.
A-1631944, Psaros, Speros.
A-3972039, Walker, Gerardo Verdugo.
A-2146407, Wineman, Sam.
E-131755, Wolfson, Abe Bernard.
A-2176896, Wood, James Achibald.
A-4348492, Badalmenti, Dominick.
A-3814987, Caldera-Roldan, Joaquin.
A-2303530, Fryza, George.
A-3554030, Gaytan-Ybarra, Angel.
A-4945116, Grossman, Carmelina.
A-3043634, Duchin, Abraham.
A-2544643, Lande, Ove John.
A-1745616, Litwak, Jake.
A-3042362, Luteron, Illes.
A-5024257, Odder, Toufic.
A-5541581, Russell, Rose Agnes.
A-3774200, Weinstein, Catherine.
A-3433019, Weissman, Hyman.
A-4038929, Culotta, Vincent.
A-4091431, Franicevich, Frank Marija.
A-3243585, Wasserman, Aron Harry.
A-4961731, Wiersch, Rose.
A-8280922, Bartnik, Andrew.
A-4402553, Calish, Ben.
A-8447000, Camiolo, Cristoforo.
A-4749433, Cooper, Benjamin.
A-2608947, Davitto, Barnardo Vercoglio.
A-7361922, Dobrovich, John.
E-080681, Galdikas, Anthony Constance.
A-4819163, Goldberg, Joseph Benjamin.
A-545825, Goldenberg, Scoocher.
A-1738912T, Greenfield, Philip.
A-1165031, Harishuk, James Frederick.
A-1953490, Jacob, Leo Carl.
A-1224861, Kubis, John Joseph.
A-5571019, Maciejewski, Floryian.
A-4088212, Maloff, Carl.
A-1038887, Mordos, Aniela.
A-3773694, Nockowitz, Charles.
E-078680, Paukstys, Vincent.
1415-3776, Paz-Lucio, Isaac De La.
A-2256143, Rojas-Guzman, Pedro.
A-3607468, Schwarz, John.
0402/8161, Smith, Walter.
A-3130901, Telles-Mejia, Tomas.
A-1011263, Valdez, Patricio.
A-5634530, Vito, Liborio.
A-5160088, Zech, John.
A-2390285, Zielinski, Frank.
T-303059, Bartolini, Alberto.
8511-A-1274, Caramanlau, Gheorghe.
E-053084, Cepeda-Teran, Aurelio.
A-3042474, Chaykowski, Michael.
A-1427387, Chervinski, Charles.
E-89265, Chillemi, Giovanni.
A-5934786, Cimino, Jean.
0800-106472, Cobos, Tomas.
A-1459543, Cowart, Harry Fuller.
E-069328, Dem, Louise.
A-2888771, Drewnowski, Czeslaw.
A-1847251, Elber, Isadore.
A-5524604, Feldman, Pal.
A-4724104, Ferro, Pete.
A-2174885, Figiolia, Louis Jack.
A-3740609, Grado, Luigi Di.
A-4705290, Gutstein, Albert.
A-5343594, Holody, Martin.
A-2194350, Honkamaa, Charles.
A-3155214, Irla, Anthony Stanley.
A-3237162, Kalinovik, Alexander Paul.
A-1028748, Kaplan, Abraham.
A-2518778, Kashigian, Artin.
A-5918920, Kauth, Kurt Max.
A-3132325, Knowles, Ann Eirwen.
A-7858221, Kryczka, John.
A-5402770, Lamars, Pete.
A-3623367, Latarski, Sigmund.
A-4963675, Lukac, John.
A-2941249, Maneniskis, Joseph.
A-5151675, Matheson, Wilfred Laurier (William Matheson).
A-3017074, Medoway, Sam.
E-070997, Novak, Bela.
A-5720885, Nowak, John.
A-3818026, Ostrashelski, Constantine.
E-083290, Pong, Soon.
A-8116357, Reed, John David.
A-4755643, Richter, Walter.
A-5753580, Rocco, Louis.
A-2671145, Rucienski, Aleksander.
2770-P-142631, Sandler, Josel David.
A-1853190, Sandor, Victor.
E-086512, Schwar, Klara.
0800-84629, Simon, Aurif.
A-586231, Slater, Frank.
E-47365, Sosa-Paz, Luz.
A-1840646, Torres, Jose Buenaventura.
A-1815668, Tuchet, Frank.
A-4967148, Walonce, Stanley Francis.
A-2935138, Wilkas, Julius.
A-1704536, Ziegenhirt, Joseph Francisco.
A-3122325, Forsbacka, Johannes Alfred.
A-5967839, Hovanec, John.
A-1985254, Jurlin, Daniel D.
A-7485159, Keefe, Everett Vernon.
E-057815, Moreno-Aguilar, Conrado.
A-4727339, Proch, John Alexander.

HAVA SHPAK, A. A. SHPAK, AND SYMPCHA SHPAK— BILL RECOMMITTED

The bill (S. 332) for the relief of Hava Shpak, A. A. Shpak, and Sympcha Shpak was announced as next in order.

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, as a result of action taken by the Committee on the Judiciary this morning, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar No. 590, Senate bill 332, be recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary for further study.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the bill is recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary.

KI YOUNG KWAN

The bill (S. 501) for the relief of Ki Young Kwan was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Ki Young Kwan shall be held and considered to have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of the date of the enactment of this act, upon payment of the required visa fee. Upon the granting of permanent residence to such alien as provided for in this act, the Secretary of State shall instruct the proper quota-control officer to deduct one number from the appropriate quota for the first year that such quota is available.

EDMUND LOWE AND RICHARD LOWE

The bill (S. 578) for the relief of Edmund Lowe and Richard Lowe was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

Edmund Lowe and Richard Lowe shall be held and considered to be the minor children of their mother, Mrs. Sam Lee Jue, a citizen of the United States.

DOMINIC GAETANO MORIN

The bill (S. 871) for the relief of Dominic Gaetano Morin was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Dominic Gaetano Morin shall be held and considered to have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of the date of the enactment of this act, upon payment of the required visa fee. Upon the granting of permanent residence to such alien as provided for in this act, the Secretary of State shall instruct the proper quota-control officer to deduct one number from the appropriate quota for the first year that such quota is available.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON BOUNDARY OF STATES OF MARYLAND AND DELAWARE—BILL PASSED OVER

The bill (S. 987) to authorize the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Coast and Geodetic Survey, to assist the States of Maryland and Delaware to establish their common boundary, was announced as next in order.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill go over to the next call of the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the bill will be passed over to the next call of the calendar.

PAUL Y. LOONG

The bill (H. R. 880) for the relief of Paul Y. Loong was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MRS. MARION JOSEPHINE MONNELL

The bill (H. R. 935) for the relief of Mrs. Marion Josephine Monnell was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

LUZIE BIONDO (LUZIE M. SCHMIDT)

The bill (H. R. 943) for the relief of Luzie Biondo (Luzie M. Schmidt) was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MAX KOZLOWSKI

The bill (H. R. 968) for the relief of Max Kozlowski was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MRS. ELIZABETH DOWDS

The bill (H. R. 973) for the relief of Mrs. Elizabeth Dowds was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MRS. ELLEN HILLIER

The bill (H. R. 977) for the relief of Mrs. Ellen Hillier was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

SUSANNE FELLNER

The bill (H. R. 988) for the relief of Susanne Fellner was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

FRIEDA QUIRING AND TINA QUIRING

The bill (H. R. 995) for the relief of Frieda Quiring and Tina Quiring was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

IRMGARD EMILIE KREPPS

The bill (H. R. 997) for the relief of Irmgard Emilie Krepps was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MEIKO SHIKIBU

The bill (H. R. 998) for the relief of Meiko Shikibu was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MELINA BONTON

The bill (H. R. 1028) for the relief of Melina Bonton was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

ARMENOUHI ASSADOUR ARTINIAN

The bill (H. R. 1047) for the relief of Armenouhi Assadour Artinian was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

ROBERT SHEN-YEN HOU-MING LIEU

The bill (H. R. 1083) for the relief of Robert Shen-Yen Hou-ming Lieu was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MILAD S. ISAAC

The bill (H. R. 1157) for the relief of Milad S. Isaac was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

EMANUEL FRANGESKOS

The bill (H. R. 1158) for the helief of Emanuel Frangeskos was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

CYNTHIA JACOB

The bill (H. R. 1205) for the relief of Cynthia Jacob was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

MISS TOSHIKO HOZAKA AND HER CHILD, ROGER

The bill (H. R. 1299) for the relief of Miss Toshiko Hozaka and her child, Roger, was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

LUTHER ROSE

The bill (H. R. 1300) for the relief of Luther Rose was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

VICTORINE MAY DONALDSON

The bill (H. R. 1337) for the relief of Victorine May Donaldson was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

JOHN J. BRAUND

The bill (H. R. 4549) for the relief of John J. Braund, was announced as next in order.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, in connection with Calendar No. 616, H. R. 4549, it is suggested that the discrepancy between "$1,500," which appears on the calendar and the "$15,000" which appears in the bill should be noted and corrected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD with the amount as contained in the bill rather than with the amount as shown on the calendar.

The bill was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to John J. Braund, Washington, D. C., the sum of $15,000, representing the amount reported by the Court of Claims to the Congress in response to House Resolution 700, 82d Congress (Congressional No. 9–52, order entered February 8, 1955), to be the amount agreed to by the United States and the said John J. Braund as constituting a full settlement of all past and future claims of the said John J. Braund against the United States with respect to patent No. 2,493,439, issued January 3, 1950, as well as to any inventions disclosed thereunder, and all other claims within the scope of H. R. 4507, 82d Congress: *Provided*, That no part of the amount appropriated in this act in excess of 10 percent thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.

REIMBURSEMENT OF MEADOW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 29, UPHAM, N. DAK.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 288) to provide for the reimbursement of Meadow School District No. 29, Upham, N. Dak., for loss of revenue resulting from the acquisition of certain lands within the school district by the Department of the Interior, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, on page 2, line 7, after the word "act", to strike out "in excess of 10 percent thereof", so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Meadow School District No. 29, Upham, N. Dak., the sum

of $5,197.56 in full satisfaction of such school district's claim against the United States for reimbursement of loss of revenue resulting from the acquisition by the United States Department of the Interior of approximately 30 percent of the lands within such school district for a wildlife refuge, such amount representing the equitable share of such school district's bonded indebtedness remaining due against such lands acquired by the Department of the Interior at the time of such acquisition: *Provided*, That no part of the amount appropriated in this act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

WILMA ANN SCHILLING AND HER DAUGHTER, INGERTRAUD ROSALITA SCHILLING

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 1159) for the relief of Wilma Ann Schilling and her daughter, Ingertraud Rosalita Schilling, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That, in the administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Wilma Ann Schilling, the fiancée of Everett B. Felton, a citizen of the United States, and her minor child, Ingertraud Rosalita Schilling, shall be eligible for visas as nonimmigrant temporary visitors for a period of 3 months: *Provided*, That the administrative authorities find that the said Wilma Ann Schilling is coming to the United States with a bona fide intention of being married to the said Everett B. Felton, and that she is found otherwise admissible under all of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, other than section 212 (a) (9) of the said act: *Provided further*, That this exemption shal' apply only to a ground for exclusion of which the Department of State or the Department of Justice had knowledge prior to the enactment of this act.

In the event the marriage between the above-named persons does not occur within 3 months after the entry of the said Wilma Ann Schilling and her daughter, Ingertraud Rosalita Schilling, they shall be required to depart from the United States and upon failure to do so shall be deported in accordance with the provisions of sections 242 and 243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In the event that the marriage between the above-named persons shall occur within 3 months after the entry of the said Wilma Ann Schilling and her daughter, Ingertraud Rosalita Schilling, the Attorney General is authorized and directed to record the lawful admission for permanent residence of the said Wilma Ann Schilling and her daughter, Ingertraud Rosalita Schilling, as of the date of the payment by them of the required visa fees.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

LIESELOTTE BRODZINSKI GETTMAN

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 1522) for the relief of Lieselotte Brodzinski Gettman, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (9) and (12) of section 212 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Lieselotte Brodzinski Gettman may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence if she is found to be otherwise admissible under the provisions of such Act: *Provided*, That these exemptions shall apply only to grounds for exclusion of which the Department of State or the Department of Justice had knowledge prior to the enactment of this act.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

RAYMOND GEORGE PALMER

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H. R. 3359) for the relief of Raymond George Palmer, which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment, on page 2, line 6, after the word "except", to strike out "medical expenses shall" and insert "hospital and medical expense actually incurred shall."

The amendment was agreed to.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time and passed.

BILLS PASSED OVER

The bill (S. 1644) to prescribe policy and procedure in connection with construction contracts made by executive agencies, and for other purposes, was announced as next in order.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be passed over.

The bill (S. 609) to provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States of special nuclear material and atomic weapons, was announced as next in order.

Mr. ERVIN. Over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be passed over.

The bill (S. 636) to revise the Federal election laws, to prevent corrupt practices in Federal elections, and for other purposes, was announced as next in order.

Mr. ERVIN. Over.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be passed over.

This completes the call of the calendar.

COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 586, Senate Joint Resolution 21, to establish a Commission on Government Security.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A joint resolution (S. J. Res. 21) to establish a Commission on Government Security.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Texas.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 21) which had been reported from the Committee on Government Operations with amendments.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] wishes to make a brief statement which does not apply to the joint resolution under consideration.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Did the Senator from Minnesota intend to suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall do so after the Senator from Montana has made a brief statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the junior Senator from Montana for the purpose of permitting him to make a brief statement, without losing my right to the floor, before the Senate proceeds with the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 21.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LAOS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Kingdom of Laos can hardly hope to compete for world attention with Big Four conferences and other major international developments. Nevertheless, what happens to the kingdom, 1 of the 3 successor states in Indochina, ought not to be overlooked. To its million and a half inhabitants and to the nations of southeast Asia which borders on Laos, developments in that country are of the utmost importance. I take this occasion, therefore, to point out the serious situation which now exists in that remote land, which borders on Communist China and on Communist Vietnam. In the extreme northern part of that wedge are two provinces of great significance at this time in the history of the Far East.

Before the Geneva agreement last year, Laos was invaded several times by the Viet Minh Communists from northern Vietnam. In addition, a small band of Communist-inspired dissidents numbering not more than several hundred men, called the Pathet Lao, was attempting to overthrow the Government.

Under the terms of the Geneva agreement, the Viet Minh Communists agreed to withdraw entirely from Laos, and the Pathet Lao were to regroup and concentrate in the two northern Provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua.

In a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations after my return from Laos las year, I noted that:

The Laotian dissidents in the northern provinces are interpreting the Geneva accord to mean that they may exercise full powers in Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Compulsory political indoctrination is being enforced in the villages which they control. Young men

from all over Laos are being brought to the provinces for training and some are being sent to north Vietnam for the same purposes.

As a result, the Pathet Lao have increased in number from several hundred to several thousand, and they have refused to permit the Government to restore its authority over the two northern provinces. They have attacked Government army contingents which have attempted to penetrate Phong Saly and Sam Neua.

All reports from Laos suggest that the Communists are acting in utter disregard of the Geneva armistice.

Mr. President, in recent days a startling development, with little or no publicity, has taken place in north Vietnam. Radio Hanoi, the voice of Ho Chi Minh, has been broadcasting information about the formation of an autonomous Thai-Meo zone in the northwestern sector of the Viet Minh territory. That, Mr. President, is the area in which these two provinces are located. In December 1954, Ho Chi Minh's council of ministers adopted a resolution to establish an autonomous state of Thai and Meo peoples. The fourth session of the National North Vietnamese Assembly held in March of this year, rubberstamped this an extremely important resolution. The Communists' decision was, of course, unanimous.

At the time of the Bandung Conference, Ho Chi Minh issued decree 230–SL, which formally set up the new autonomous area. At the time this decree was issued, it was also stated in an annex to it that the Thai zone would have the authority to organize its own militia, including guerrillas, and also the right to use the Thai language and script in its administrative territory. At approximately the same time Gen. Vo Ngyuen Giap, commander in chief of the Communist forces in North Vietnam, advised the people in a separate message "to push forward in the Thai-Meo zone with the building of a local army, guerrilla forces, and militia in order to protect the autonomous area, protect its frontiers, smash all enemy sabotaging maneuvers, and contribute a worthy part to the struggle for peace, unity, independence, and the democracy of all our people."

Following that statement, that exhortation by Gen. Vo Ngyuen Giap, the state-controlled press in North Vietnam got into the act and began an editorial campaign of warm welcome to the autonomous region.

The Communists agreed at Geneva to recognize the territorial integrity of the kingdom of Laos. The refusal of the Pathet Lao dissidents to permit the government authorities to reoccupy the northern provinces, however, has the effect of dividing the country into two states.

In the second place, the Viet Minh agreed to withdraw from Laos in 120 days. A year later, however, Viet Minh cadres are stationed with Pathet Lao units, and Viet Minh contingents are reported operating in the northern provinces of the kingdom.

Finally the Geneva agreement provides for a cessation of hostilities. Pathet Lao forces, in flagrant violation of this provision, however, have attacked government troops at Houei Thao, Muong Peun, and Nong Khang, and Pakha in Sam Neua Province.

There is an International Control Commission supervising the carrying out of the Geneva armistice in Indochina. It consists of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland. By unanimous vote, the Commission has recognized that the Geneva agreement affirms the territorial integrity of the kingdom of Laos and the government's right to administer the two northern provinces.

Yet this ruling continues to be ignored by the Viet Minh and the Laotian dissidents. When these violations of the Geneva armistice in Laos are added to those in Vietnam, where thousands of people have been prevented from quitting the Communist-held areas, serious doubt is cast upon the sincerity of Communist professions of peace in the Far East.

If we are going to have a worldwide relaxation in tensions, then even remote Laos must share in it. The Soviet Union is a guarantor of the Geneva accord. The Russians have the influence with the Communists in Indochina. They can remove one more cause of tensions by using that influence to end the defiance of the Geneva agreement in Laos.

I wish to thank sincerely the Senator from Minnesota for yielding to me at this time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me before he yields the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The distinguished Senator from Montana has done a distinct service in bringing this matter to the attention of the Senate. Last week I discussed the same subject with the State Department because I was concerned, as is the Senator from Montana, about this obvious disregard of the Geneva agreement. In view of the fact that the International Control Commission has apparently looked into the matter, and has taken the position that the attitude of the Laotian Government is correct, it seems to me there is a situation in the northernmost provinces not in keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the Geneva agreement. It would seem to me that if that situation is allowed to go unchallenged, pretty soon there will be a fait accompli, and as the Senator from Montana has pointed out, there will be two Laotian governments. While in fact there will not be quite the same kind of division which exists in Korea or in Vietnam, nevertheless practically the result will be an amputation of the two northernmost provinces.

If the Soviet Union is not prepared to honor its commitment under the Geneva agreement, then it seems to me we should know that now. We should know it prior to the Geneva meeting of the chiefs of state.

I think the situation is at least so fraught with danger to the peace of that area of the world that unless there is a very prompt compliance with the terms of the Geneva agreement, the whole matter ought to be called forthwith to the attention of the Geneva conference and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it should be made plain what is taking place in the northern provinces of Laos is disturbing the condition of peace in the world; that there is an obvious disregard of the Geneva agreement; that the machinery of the Geneva agreement is apparently not working; and that if the situation is allowed to go unchallenged, the whole letter and spirit of that agreement may be vitiated.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What the distinguished minority leader has said is certainly entitled to the most serious consideration. I know he speaks from firsthand knowledge of the situation, because he visited Laos, and discussed conditions there with the highest officials and with people in that country. It is true that there is a similarity, and that there might occur in Vietnam itself such a division as happened in Korea, in Germany, and elsewhere. The difference is in degree, but the intent and the procedure are very plain for all to see. In the case of Laos, a country which probably is the most remote—and, by the way, it is a beautiful country, peopled by a very kindly, courageous, and lovely race—the situation should be brought to the attention of the great powers. Certainly the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese, both of which are signatories to the Geneva Convention, should be required to live up to the articles of agreement they signed a year ago at Geneva. It should also, as the distinguished minority leader recommends, be brought before the United Nations for prompt and effective action.

It is my hope—and in this respect, I join the distinguished minority leader—that the Government of the United States will continue to exert every effort in behalf of the Laotian people. Our Government has been consistently doing its best in past months to lend every bit of assistance it can to help the Government of Laos and preserve its freedom and independence of action.

Furthermore, Mr. President, this situation, which indicates an attempt by Ho Chi-Minh and his cohorts to take over other parts of Laos, through an autonomous Thai-Laos state, should be watched very carefully, and the rights of these people should be upheld by every means possible.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills of the Senate:

S. 391. An act to provide for the bonding of certain officers and employees of the government of the District of Columbia, for the payment of the premiums on such bonds by the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; and

S. 666. An act to extend the period of authorization of appropriations for the hospital center and facilities in the District of Columbia.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 4904) to extend the Renegotiation Act of 1951 for 2 years; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. COOPER, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. MILLS, Mr. JENKINS, and Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 6239) making appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. RABAUT, Mr. PASSMAN, Mr. NATCHER, Mr. CANNON, Mr. WILSON of Indiana, Mr. JAMES, and Mr. TABER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 6367) making appropriations for the Department of Commerce and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes: agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. PRESTON, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. ROONEY, Mr. YATES, Mr. SHELLEY, Mr. FLOOD, Mr. CANNON, Mr. CLEVENGER, Mr. BOW, Mr. HORAN, Mr. MILLER of Maryland, and Mr. TABER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. 6992) to extend for 1 year the existing temporary increase in the public debt limit, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

H. R. 1142. An act for the relief of Capt. Moses M. Rudy;

H. R. 1825. An act creating a Federal commission to formulate plans for the construction in the District of Columbia of a civic auditorium, including an Inaugural Hall of Presidents and a music, fine arts, and mass communications center;

H. R. 3659. An act to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act;

H. R. 4221. An act to amend section 4004, title 18, United States Code, relating to administering oaths and taking acknowledgments by officials of Federal penal and correctional institutions;

H. R. 4954. An act to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws, establishing a uniform statute of limitations, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 6499. An act making appropriations for the Executive Office of the President and sundry general Government agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H. R. 6992) to extend for 1 year the existing temporary increase in the public debt limit, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Finance.

COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 21) to establish a Commission on Government Security.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, Senate Joint Resolution 21 calls for the establishment of a Commission on Government Security.

The passage of the joint resolution represents an indispensable first step in the direction of establishing a well-reasoned, effective, orderly, uniform, and consistent security program which reconciles the needs of security with the protection and preservation of basic American traditions, rights, and privileges. I am pleased and gratified that, to date, the legislative history of this joint resolution is one of unanimity and nonpartisanship.

Senate Joint Resolution 21 was introduced on January 18, 1955, by the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] and myself, after a great deal of careful study, consideration, and discussion with our colleagues. The joint resolution was intended to provide a basis for a comprehensive reexamination and reevaluation of the entire security mechanism of the United States Government. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Government Operations, and in turn was referred to the Subcommittee on Reorganization of that committee. In view of the illness of the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], who was chairman of the subcommittee, I served as acting subcommittee chairman, and arranged for a series of hearings which lasted about 2 weeks. The Senate is indeed fortunate in the composition of the subcommittee. In addition to those mentioned, the members were: The junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the junior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], the junior Senator from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN], and the junior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON]. These Members gave many hours of their time to the task assigned by the Senate to them. The hearings were well attended by the members of the subcommittee. The questioning was, I believe, intelligent and perceptive; and the meetings we held following those hearings demonstrated the highest degree of patriotism and public service that it has been my privilege to experience. We looked upon our task, not as one of finding fault with the past, but as one of intelligently and constructively attempting to establish a path to the future, one which would contribute to the national security and national prestige of our country.

The need for internal security is a relatively new phenomenon for us. We became fully aware of the necessity for a stringent security program only when our Nation became aware of the imminent perils of Soviet imperialism and Soviet subversion. We were almost totally unprepared as a nation to deal with this dangerous enemy, which utilized fiendishly unique techniques of subversion and espionage to accomplish its purposes. Without experience and without the time to undertake an exhaustive study and definition of the perils we faced, we were forced to adopt stopgap security measures. The Congress enacted statutes and the President issued Executive orders and regulations in a series. The result was an uncoordinated conglomeration of laws, orders, regulations, and practices which do not add up to an effective, efficient, and sound security system. Our hearings demonstrated beyond any doubt an unfortunate state of confusion, overlapping, duplication, and loopholes in the overall security mechanism, as well as an unfortunate lack of confidence, expressed by an important segment of the public, in the security program and its administration. In my opinion, the present security mechanism is not affording our Nation as effective and efficient security protection as can be achieved.

It is important to an understanding of the anatomy of the security program that there be an appreciation of the extent to which the security mechanism permeates our society today. It is a well-known fact that some 2 million employees of the Federal Government are subject to a program for security investigation and clearance, and that similar programs exists for investigation and clearance of Americans employed by the United Nations. It is not as well known that at least an equal number of employees of Government contractors are subject to similar, or even identical, programs; and that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, many thousands of employees of private industries entering the atomic-energy industry as licensees, with no connection with national-defense programs, will also be subject to security investigation and clearance. In addition, several hundred thousand merchant seamen and waterfront workers are subject to security investigation and clearance, under the port-security program. Moreover, considering the problems of turnover in Government and industrial employment, it is apparent that additional millions of our citizens have been or will be subject to security risk standards. In addition, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of private employers to refrain from employing, even in positions without any relation to Government security requirements, individuals concerning whom a security question has been or may be raised.

It is important also for all of us to appreciate the dollar costs of our security programs. Complete statistics are not readily available, but the fragmentary data available reveal the magnitude of the costs. Since 1946 the Atomic Energy Commission alone had over half a million full background investigations conducted for it by the Civil Service Commission and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the present time,

the costs of such investigations are $210 for each FBI investigation and $265 for each Civil Service Commission investigation. This means, taking the FBI figure alone, that over $100 million has been expended for personnel security investigations in the atomic-energy program alone, in the past 9 years. The Department of Defense has furnished information indicating that its costs for security investigations in 1954 for military, civilian, and contractor personnel amounted to almost $29 million. These costs do not reflect the other costs of security, such as salaries of personnel who administer the security programs, expenses of handling the substantial paperwork necessary in the program, and expenses of other trappings of the security mechanism, such as fences, guards, weapons, and so forth. It is apparent that all told the costs of security reach astronomical proportions.

It is imperative that a security mechanism of these dimensions and far-reaching implications, with life-or-death importance to our national defense, be operated as a matter of conscious, well-considered national policy, and not as a matter of haphazard or stopgap expedients.

Again, Mr. President, I desire to point out that our subcommittee found, from its investigation, that the development of the security program had been on a more or less touch-and-go basis, from one project to another, one rule to another, one act to another, without any overall coordination or study of the interrelationship of the many particular projects and programs of a security nature which had been launched.

The subcommittee's study of the overall security mechanism has brought to light a number of important problems or difficulties in the present system, which in themselves warrant and demand immediate and intensive study of the security structure by a high level, nonpartisan body which will command public confidence and respect. These problems and difficulties are, however, only illustrative examples, and do not represent a complete catalog of the aspects of the present mechanism which afford cause for concern:

First. There is under the present security mechanism a decided and unwisely uneven treatment to areas of like security importance. The degree of statutory protection does not depend necessarily on the actual security importance of the particular area to be protected, but more on the type of national secret and the particular department or agency involved. Thus the Atomic Energy Act protects atomic energy secrets with far more elaborate protection and restrictions than, let us say, apply to the protection of Defense Department national secrets which are just as sensitive. At the same time our hearings uncovered that in some cases atomic energy secrets have less than full statutory protection afforded other secrets. This multiplicity of statutory security standards does not seem justified, and I believe it is difficult to defend.

Second. There are today three separate and distinct espionage laws which duplicate and overlap one another and provide varying penalties for what is in essence the identical offense. Testimony before our subcommittee indicates that this duplication and overlapping may involve serious loopholes and difficulties in our overall national defenses against espionage. No witness before the subcommittee was able to justify the existence of three separate espionage laws or to explain why a uniform espionage law of universal applicability to all national secrets would not be preferable.

Third. There are multiple standards for security investigation and clearance of Government employees. Executive Order 10450 applies to all Government employees and to all agencies and departments. Nevertheless, a number of agencies and departments are subject to special statutory requirements for investigation and clearance which are at variance with those of the Executive order. Practically speaking, this frequently means duplicate investigations and security determinations under varying standards. These duplications are meaningless from the standpoint of effective security, and are in fact a waste of taxpayer funds.

Fourth. Considerable evidence was presented to our subcommittee demonstrating that security requirements have impeded the flow and interchange of information necessary for effective and efficient conduct of Government operations and for the maintenance of the national security. Up until the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it is clear that the unnecessarily cumbersome special security clearance requirements delayed the stockpiling of atomic weapons. Even with the passage of the 1954 act, however, there remains what has been characterized by the Department of Defense as a "dual system of security," which imposes "a formidable administrative burden." Furthermore, the 1954 act did not deal with identical problems involving other agencies and departments which are concerned with the implications of atomic energy. Evidence before our subcommittee indicated that our Nation's civil defense efforts have been hampered as a result of unnecessary duplication requirements and bad liaison developing out of those special requirements.

Fifth. It is clear that our present Government employees' security program needs a fresh look with specific reference to affording Government employees the maximum procedural opportunities and procedural rights consistent with the effective operation of a sound security program. This need is underlined by the recent Supreme Court decision in the Peters case. To answer that no person has a right to a Government job is not a realistic or satisfactory solution to the problem of establishing a standard of procedural rights for Government employees. An individual discharged as a security risk has thereby a substantial stigma attached to himself and to his family, and such a discharge affects his future employment opportunities. As a practical matter, an employee found to be a security risk in any position becomes disqualified for any Government position in any Government agency. He also finds many private firms refusing to employ him in nonsensitive positions. Indeed, there is reason to believe that some private employers are reluctant to employ individuals who have encountered long delays in obtaining clearance, even when there is no distinct indication that a question of security eligibility is involved. Furthermore, derogatory information developed in the course of an investigation will follow that individual wherever he seeks employment within the Government, and in large areas of the private economy regardless of whether the information is true or false, new, raw or refined, evaluated or unevaluated.

Sixth. Even in Government agencies and in departments whose security programs are based entirely upon Executive Order 10450, there are substantial variations in the administration of those programs. Evidence before our subcommittee and statistical data that was made available to us clearly demonstrated a lack of any pattern or correlation or uniformity or consistency of application of the security standards. Furthermore the subcommittee was unable, despite diligent effort, to obtain clear information as to who was responsible for coordinating the security program and how such coordination is really effected. It appears likely that there is in fact very little effective coordination.

Seventh. There is not only a lack of uniformity in the standards applied by the various agencies and departments under the security program; there is also a lack of uniformity with regard to procedural rights affecting applicants for employment, and probationary employees. The Atomic Energy Commission affords applicants and probationary employees precisely the same procedures for resolution of security questions as are available to its regular employees. The Department of the Air Force extends its procedures to all probationary employees, and occasionally to applicants. Our subcommittee was unable to find a satisfactory answer to the question of why other agencies and departments do not adopt similar procedures for handling the cases of applicants and probationary employees, especially in view of the impact of the security programs upon such persons. It may be that there are sound reasons for this lack of uniformity, but the problem does warrant an objective impartial analysis and appraisal in the light of security realities.

Eighth. Our subcommittee was aware of the fact that the problem of confrontation in personnel security is a difficult one, in view of the unquestionable necessity for protecting the FBI's methods and devices for infiltrating the Communist conspiracy. Yet the difficulties in a program which uniformly does not allow for confrontation of witnesses is not quite as apparent to all. We, therefore, need a fresh objective study to delineate the precise limits within which confrontation is possible without adversely affecting the security information. The Department of the Army's regulations on confrontation seemed adequate to many who studied the problem, and yet other Government agencies have different standards and different requirements.

Ninth. The security program extends beyond the realm of Government employees. The industrial security program affects millions of privately employed American citizens in all of our 48 States. Many of these individuals through no initiative of their own, without seeking positions of public trust, and in most instances without seeking positions involving access to classified information, now find themselves propelled into the security pattern. They, and their friends, and relatives are investigated. All of us in the Congress would agree that there is a necessity for an industrial security program, but a program of this magnitude which operates upon the employment, livelihood, and reputation of millions of our private citizens must be carefully designed, controlled, and administered. If our Government is to act in a responsible manner toward its citizenry, such a program must be established as a matter of considered national policy, and not as a matter of haphazard growth. Yet, our subcommittee was surprised to learn, from testimony by the Assistant Attorney General, that there has apparently been no attempt whatever to coordinate this industrial security program on a Government-wide basis. In fact, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice which has the basic responsibility for all security matters believes that it does not have the authority to deal with industrial security matters, and that it does not have jurisdiction to review or consider these industrial security programs. In view of the importance of this program, in view of its profound effect upon labor and management, and in view of its apparently wide implications to every city, town, and hamlet in our country, the program needs a careful, objective coordinated study by a bipartisan commission along the lines suggested by Senate Joint Resolution 21.

There can be no doubt that the security mechanisms viewed as a whole—including the espionage laws and other criminal statutes relating to security protection, the laws and regulations relating to classification, control, and protection of national-defense secrets, and the programs for security investigation and clearances of personnel generally—are less effective and efficient than they can and should be; cost far more than they should for actual security achieved; and afford far less protection for individual rights than is possible without jeopardy to security.

The time has come to take stock, to face the problem of security, not with histrionics, but with the maturity with which our democratic Government and our people have faced grave issues of national policy in the past. Let us assess the peril which faces us and decide upon a coordinated, cohesive, rational security system which will protect our national secrets and our way of life.

Security is not a partisan issue. The present deficiencies have not been caused or nurtured exclusively by either party, by either this or past administrations, or by either Congress or the executive branch. Rather, they have been thrust upon us by the threat of Soviet imperialism and subversion at a time when we were, as a Nation, not fully prepared to meet the threat with complete wisdom and reason.

There is much work to be done before the security problem can be brought under rational control. It requires extensive and objective study and analysis. A commission form of inquiry, patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government is the ideal means for coming to grips with the problem, since it would enable representation by the executive branch, the Congress, and eminent public citizens. It would also enable the calm, dispassionate consideration and recommendation, removed from the area of political controversy, which would command public respect and confidence, and provide needed reassurance to the American public in this era of security obsession.

It is most reassuring to the sponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 21 and to our subcommittee which unanimously reported the joint resolution favorably that the full committee, which likewise unanimously reported the joint resolution favorably, were all pleased that the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service of the Hoover Commission recently called for an official inquiry and appraisal of the personnel security problem by a panel of distinguished citizens whose judgment cannot be questioned. Senate Joint Resolution 21 meets the demands of that Hoover Commission task force.

We are also pleased that in the other body a companion measure to Senate Joint Resolution 21 seems to be meeting with favorable and unanimous approval. A companion measure, House Joint Resolution 157, introduced by the distinguished Member from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALTER], the chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, has within the last few days been unanimously reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee.

All of this portends a growing consensus in support of a broad approach to the study of all phases of the security mechanism and to the submission of appropriate recommendations.

Senate Joint Resolution 21 would establish a 12-member nonpartisan commission, patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The President would appoint 4 members to the Commission, 2 from the executive branch and 2 from private life; the President of the Senate would appoint 4 members, 2 from the Senate and 2 from private life; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would appoint 4 members, 2 from the House and 2 from private life. No more than two appointees of each could be from the same political party.

The Commission would, on the basis of the study made by it, submit reports and recommendations on desirable changes, on the adequacies or deficiencies in the present situation from the standpoints of internal consistency of the overall program, and on effective measures for the protection and maintenance of the national security, and the protection and preservation of basic American rights.

The joint resolution provides that the final report of the Commission shall be submitted by December 31, 1956.

Mr. President, I have attempted in these brief minutes to summarize for the Senate the motivations of the sponsors of this resolution and the evidence and conclusions which guided the committee charged with the responsibility of studying the resolution to support it unanimously. For a more detailed analysis of the hearings we held, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the conclusions of these remarks a statement I have prepared.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in conclusion, I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for their diligence and conscientiousness, and for their perceptive comments and suggestions.

I can say that the subcommittee truly worked as a group, not as individual members, in hearing the testimony, in the preparation of the final form of the resolution, and in the consideration of the report and its submission to the Senate.

I understand that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who is a cosponsor with me of the joint resolution, also wishes to make a statement.

I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUMPHREY

I present a statement in support of Senate Joint Resolution 21, a bill introduced by the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] and myself, and unanimously supported by the Senate Committee on Government Operations.

THE SECURITY PROBLEM

Senate Joint Resolution 21 is intended to provide a basis for a comprehensive reexamination and reevaluation of the entire security mechanism of the United States Government. The necessity for such a reexamination and reevaluation appears to be well established in the light of the present state of confusion, overlapping, duplication, and loopholes in the overall security mechanism, as well as in the widespread concern and lack of confidence expressed by important segments of the public in the manner in which our Government security programs are being administered.

It is important that there be a clear understanding as to the manner in which the present security mechanism has evolved. It can be demonstrated that the present mechanism is replete with anomalies, loopholes, inconsistencies, anachronisms, and lack of coordination without pointing a finger of criticism or blame at any political party, at any national administration, or at any person or group of persons.

Our present security mechanism, which to so large an extent dominates our political life in 1955, is almost entirely a phenomenon of the past decade. It does not strain the facts to point out that through the close of World War II we had no security mechanism in any way comparable to what we have today. It is true that there was some awareness of the need for security in the Government, and that a few departments of the Government had established security programs which, measured by current standards, must be regarded as rather primitive.

There was, however, no effort to construct any kind of comprehensive program for protecting the national security and national defense against acts of subversion, indiscretion, or carelessness.

We became fully aware of the necessity for a stringent security program only when we became aware of the imminent perils of Soviet imperialism and Soviet subversion. We were almost totally unprepared, as a Nation, to deal with this dangerous enemy who utilized fiendishly unique techniques of subversion and espionage to accomplish its purposes. Our first and most urgent concern was to erect adequate security defenses. We did not then have the time to undertake exhaustive study and definition of the perils we faced or to formulate a comprehensive, sound program for meeting these perils. We were forced to adopt stopgap security measures. This resulted in a series of uncoordinated congressional enactments and Executive orders and regulations which have accumulated into our present security mechanism. Although each one of the individual enactments, orders, and regulations may have been reasonable and effective in meeting the immediate problems faced when it was adopted, the resulting conglomeration of security laws, orders, regulations, and practices does not add up to an effective, efficient, and sound security system. Nor does it add up to a security mechanism which reflects careful effort to reconcile the needs of security with protection and preservation of basic American traditions, rights, and privileges.

The security problem is not only one of assuring that our citizens are fairly and justly treated in their dealings with their Government in the area of security considerations. Another, and at least equally important aspect of the present security problem, is to assure that we have a security mechanism which will effectively protect the national security. There can be little doubt that the present security mechanism, with all its deficiencies—some of which I shall discuss—is not affording our Nation as effective and efficient security protection as can be achieved. There can also be little doubt that a security mechanism which fails to command the full respect and confidence of Government employees and large, responsible segments of the public cannot succeed in providing maximum security for a freedom-loving nation.

Our major task in the security field today must be to bring well-reasoned and effective order, uniformity, and consistency out of the existing jerry-built security structure. Senate Joint Resolution 21 represents the indispensable first step in this direction.

SUMMARY OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 21

Senate Joint Resolution 21 would establish a 12-member nonpartisan commission, patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, to study all phases of the Government's security programs and procedures, and to submit appropriate recommendations. The President would appoint 4 members to the Commission, 2 from the executive branch and 2 from private life; the President of the Senate would appoint 4 members, 2 from the Senate and 2 from private life; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would appoint 4 members, 2 from the House and 2 from private life. No more than 2 appointees of each could be from the same political party. The Commission would elect its chairman and vice chairman from among its members.

The Commission's function would be to study the entire Government security program, including the various statutes, Presidential orders, regulations, and directives under which the Government seeks to protect the national security, national defense secrets, and public and private defense facilities against loss or injury from espionage, disloyalty, subversive activity, sabotage, or unauthorized disclosures, together with the actual manner in which these statutes, orders, regulations, and directives are being administered, to determine whether the overall security program is in accord with the policy of the Congress, stated in section 1, that there shall exist a sound Government program—

(a) Establishing procedures for security investigations and clearance for Government employees and persons privately employed or occupied on work requiring access to national secrets or affording significant opportunity for injury to the national security;

(b) For vigorous enforcement of effective and realistic security laws and regulations; and

(c) For a careful, consistent, and efficient administration of this policy in a manner which will protect the national security and preserve basic American rights.

The Commission would, on the basis of this study, submit reports and recommendations on desirable changes, and on adequacies or deficiencies in the present situation from the standpoints of internal consistency of the overall program, effective protection and maintenance of the national security, and protection and preservation of basic American rights.

The Commission would be empowered to hold hearings, to administer oaths, and to subpena attendance, testimony, and production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers and documents, as it deems advisable. All agencies and departments would be authorized and directed to cooperate fully with the Commission and to furnish such information as the Commission may request, except for such information as the President may determine might jeopardize or interfere with pending or prospective criminal prosecutions, with the carrying out of investigative or intelligence responsibilities, or with the interests of national security.

THE COMMITTEE'S METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations, to whom Senate Joint Resolution 21 was referred for consideration, held extensive hearings over a two-week period in the effort to obtain a clear view and understanding of the anatomy of the Government's overall security mechanism, and to delineate any problems which might be found to exist in the overall security mechanism which would indicate the necessity for further study by a commission, such as is contemplated in Senate Joint Resolution 21, or by some other body. The Department of Justice specifically endorsed the subcommittee's broad approach to the security question. The subcommittee did not seek, however, to explore in detail each and every phase of the security mechanism, since this did not appear feasible from the standpoint of its resources and the practical considerations of time. Such an effort would, moreover, duplicate the work of the commission which would be established if Senate Joint Resolution 21 is approved. Consequently, attention was focused on a few areas of the overall security mechanism which appeared on the surface to present substantial problems.

The subcommittee requested testimony of those governmental agencies which appeared to have the principal responsibilities or greatest experience in the security field, or in connection with whose activities significant security problems seemed to exist. The agencies requested to appear were the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, the Civil Service Commission, the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the District of Columbia Office of Civil Defense.

In addition, in recognition of the fact that the Government security mechanism has substantial implications beyond the area of purely governmental activities, the subcommittee requested testimony from representative private organizations with special experience or interest in security matters. To represent the experience and point of view of American industry, the subcommittee requested the testimony of Douglas Aircraft Co. and General Electric Co. A representative of the former testified.

To represent the experience and point of view of American universities, the University of Chicago and Harvard University were requested to, and did, testify. To represent the experience and point of view of organized labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor were requested to testify. The former appeared, and the latter submitted a written statement. To represent the experience and point of view of scientific and engineering groups, the subcommittee invited the testimony of the Federation of American Scientists. The Fund for the Republic and the American Civil Liberties Union were also invited, in view of their special interest in phases of the security program. To represent the experience and point of view of American information mediums, the subcommittee requested the testimony of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In addition, a number of other organizations requested an opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to present their views.

Written statements have also been submitted by a number of other organizations.

THE ANATOMY OF THE SECURITY MECHANISM

The hearings before the subcommittee, and consideration of the pertinent statutes, executive orders, regulations, and procedures, reveal a pattern of confusion permeating all phases of the security mechanism. The American people have felt, especially within the past decade, an increasing need for security against the very real dangers of subversion, and the Congress and the executive branch responded to this need with a series of separate and often unrelated statutes and orders. This resulted, perhaps necessarily, in a mass of uncoordinated, random, haphazard legislation and administrative action. There is no evidence whatever that the present security mechanism has evolved with rational control or direction. There is little question that the present situation involves considerable waste of money and valuable time, that it is not as effective or efficient as it might be in protecting our national security, and that substantial improvements can be made to assure better protection of individual rights without any diminution of security.

It is important to an understanding of the anatomy of security that there be an appreciation of the extent to which the security mechanism permeates our society today. It is a well-known fact that some 2 million employees of the Federal Government are subject to a program for security investigation and clearance, and that similar programs exist for investigation and clearance of Americans employed by the United Nations. It is not as well known that at least an equal number of employees of Government contractors are subject to similar, or even identical programs, and that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 many thousands of employees of private industries entering the atomic energy industry as licensees, with no connection with national-defense programs, will also be subject to security investigation and clearance. In addition, several hundred thousand merchant seamen and waterfront workers are subject to security investigation and clearance under the port-security program. Moreover, considering problems of turnover in Government and industrial employment, it is apparent that additional millions of our citizens have been or will be subject to security-risk standards. In addition, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of private employers to refrain from employing, even in positions

without any relation to Government security requirements, individuals concerning whom there has been or may be a security question raised.

It is important also to appreciate the dollar costs of our security programs. Complete statistics are not readily available, but the fragmentary data available reveal the magnitude of the costs. The Atomic Energy Commission alone since 1946 had over half a million full background investigations conducted for it by the Civil Service Commission and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the present time, the costs of such investigations are $210 for each FBI investigation and $265 for each Civil Service Commission investigation. This means, taking the FBI figure alone, that over $100 million has been expended for personnel security investigations in the atomic energy program alone in the past 9 years. The Department of Defense has furnished information indicating that its costs for security investigations in 1954 for military, civilian, and contractor personnel amounted to almost $29 million. These costs do not reflect the other costs of security such as salaries of personnel who administer the security programs, expenses of handling the substantial paperwork necessary in the program, and expenses of other trappings of the security mechanism such as fences, guards, weapons, etc. It is apparent that the costs of security, all told, reach astronomical proportions.

It is imperative that a security mechanism of these dimensions and far-reaching implications, with life or death importance to our national defense, be operated as a matter of conscious, well-considered national policy, and not as a matter of haphazard or stopgap expedients.

THE MAJOR PROBLEMS

A number of obvious specific difficulties and possible deficiencies in the present security mechanism came to light in the course of the subcommittee's hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 21, and are discussed in this report. These difficulties alone demonstrate the existing state of confusion and lack of rational planning and coordination in the security field, and would fully justify adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 21 as the first step in a careful reexamination of the present security mechanism looking toward possible overhaul or corrective measures. It must be pointed out, however, that these are merely illustrative examples, and do not represent a complete catalog of those aspects of the present mechanism which affords grounds for concern. Many other difficulties came to light in the specific areas of the security program on which the subcommittee concentrated its attention, and there is little reason to doubt that similar difficulties are to be found in other areas which the subcommittee explored only superficially.

THE UNEVEN TREATMENT OF AREAS OF LIKE SECURITY IMPORT

One of the most troubling aspects of the overall security mechanism is the variation in degree of security protection presently afforded by statute to the various areas of security import in our national defense effort. This is most dramatically demonstrated in the present dichotomy between atomic energy matters on the one hand, and all other defense areas on the other, insofar as concerns the protection and control of national-defense secrets.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contained, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 reenacted, provisions establishing a self-contained and autonomous system of information control. The cornerstone of this system is the concept of restricted data, broadly defined in the act to embrace all national-defense secrets in the atomic energy field. No affirmative act by AEC is required to bring information within the scope of the restricted data concept and, therefore, within the protected sphere; rather, all information falling within the restricted data definition is automatically subject to the act's provisions for protection and control. National-defense information of other kinds becomes "classified defense information" only by the affirmative act of the department or agency in classifying the information pursuant to Executive Order 10501. Similarly, unlike the situation prevailing with respect to "classified defense information," which is subject to declassification by purely administrative discretion, the Atomic Energy Act prescribes specific statutory standards and criteria for declassification.

Restricted data is automatically subject to a complex of statutory provisions for protection and control:

1. Restricted data is subject to the special espionage provisions of the Atomic Energy Act which closely parallel the provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended. These special provisions are generally regarded as more stringent than those of the Espionage Act, although in actual fact they are less stringent in some important respects.

One provision of the Atomic Energy Act, section 227, is wholly unique in that it provides a penalty for communication of restricted data information to any unauthorized person, regardless of the communicator's intent and regardless of whether he has reason to believe that the information will or could be used to injure the United States or benefit another nation, if the communicator knows or has reason to believe the information is restricted data and that the communicant is not authorized to receive it. This is in sharp contrast to the analogous provisions of the espionage act which provide for penalties only if the communicator has at least reason to believe the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the benefit of another nation, and if the communication is willful.

2. The Atomic Energy Act specifically establishes standards for determining those individuals who will be authorized to have access to restricted data. Only individuals appropriately "cleared" by AEC, generally on the basis of a specified investigation by the FBI or the Civil Service Commission, may have access to restricted data. In the other areas of Government security, heads of departments and agencies have complete discretion to make their own determinations as to who will be permitted to have access to classified information, and the conditions under which such access will be afforded.

3. The Atomic Energy Act contains express and specific limitations upon the communication of restricted data to other nations. There are no comparable restrictions or limitations with respect to any other kind of classified defense information.

4. The Atomic Energy Act expressly authorizes AEC to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. AEC is expressly authorized, also, to promulgate regulations or orders to protect restricted data received by any person in connection with activities authorized under the act. Violation of such regulations constitutes a criminal offense carrying heavy penalties. AEC has, moreover, authority to enjoin violations of the act and violations of its regulations.

The scope of this authority to control information warrants careful note. The AEC general counsel expressed the view, in testimony before the subcommittee, that AEC may impose its security controls upon activities, wholly outside the sphere of Government programs, in the course of which a scientist might independently, and on his own, develop information falling within the restricted data definition. An individual who develops an idea of this sort could, according to the general counsel's testimony, be cautioned that he must safeguard the information and not pass it on to unauthorized persons. He would, presumably, require AEC security clearance to work further on his idea. Major complications would arise if he refused to be cleared, or if he were found ineligible for clearance. The AEC's injunctive authority, as well as the possibilities of criminal prosecution, exist to enforce AEC's control machinery. The implications of this authority are extremely broad and far-reaching, particularly in view of the recent opening of the atomic energy field to American industry. Existence of such broad authority raises basic questions of national policy warranting careful consideration and rational determination.

The information control machinery of the Atomic Energy Act has no parallel elsewhere in the overall security mechanism. Other agencies vitally concerned with protection of other types of national secrets operate without express statutory authority to control the dissemination of classified information, without authority to issue security regulations with effective teeth, and without authority to enjoin security violations. Indeed, such authority as they may attempt to exercise in controlling the dissemination of national-defense secrets is almost wholly administrative in nature, with virtually no clear statutory foundation. The practical effect is that the Government has two separate systems of information control. One is based upon requirements established by the President for classification and safeguarding of national defense information in Executive Order 10501; the other is based upon Atomic Energy Commission's regulations for control of restricted data pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.

These unique statutory provisions applicable to atomic energy restricted data represent the first attempt to establish a comprehensive system for protection of national secrets, although the system operates within only a small area of the Government's total security interest. Its existence raises the fundamental question why, if these elements of the atomic energy security system have worked well in their limited sphere, they are not extended to other, or all, areas of security interest. If this were done on a Government-wide basis, we could then have a single security program and security standard of universal applicability. There has been no indication that this step has been seriously considered. Rather, it appears to be the general assumption that atomic energy secrets are a breed of secrets separate and apart from, and more sensitive than, other national defense secrets, thereby warranting special statutory protection.

This assumption of ultra-sensitivity in the atomic energy field cannot be sustained. Executive Order 10501 provides for the classification of national-defense secrets as "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential," and establishes exclusive definitions for each of these categories. Atomic energy restricted data is also classified as "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential," and AEC had adopted definitions for these categories equivalent to those specified in Executive Order 10501. Thus, "Confidential" restricted data is, by definition, equivalent sensitivity to "Confidential" defense information; "Secret" restricted data is, by definition, of equivalent sensitivity to "Secret" defense information, and "Top Secret" restricted data is, by definition, of equivalent sensitivity to "Top Secret" defense information. But under the Atomic Energy Act, all restricted data is subject to all of the special security provisions, regardless of whether it is "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret." Thus, "Confidential" restricted data is entitled, under our laws, to far more elaborate statutory protection than is afforded our most vital "Top Secret" defense information in areas other than atomic energy. This is not only incongruous, it is also wasteful of time, money, and energy.

But even though atomic energy secrets are given more elaborate statutory protection than other national defense secrets in the respects covered in the Atomic Energy Act, it is an astonishing fact that in some important respects they get much less protection. For example, atomic energy areas of security concern have no statutory protection against trespass, or unauthorized photography or sketching, such as is available with respect to areas within the cognizance of the Department of Defense under sections 795, 796, and 797 of title 18 of the United States Code, sections 781, 782, and 783 of title 50, appendix, of the United States Code, and section 797 of title 50 of the United States Code. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act does not include some penalty provisions of the type found in the Espionage Act relating to willful communication of defense information to unauthorized persons and to loss of defense information through gross negligence, such as are found in sections 793 (d), (e), and (f) of title 18 of the United States Code.

There appears to be no justification whatever for this uneven treatment of matters of like security import on the basis of the type of information involved and the particular agency concerned. It would appear desirable and essential, in the interests of national security, that all national defense secrets and all areas of security concern of like importance be protected uniformly under laws determined to be adequate.

THE ESPIONAGE LAWS

Another problem is presented by the present state of our espionage laws. The basic statute establishing criminal penalties for improper acquisition, handling, or communication of national-defense secrets is the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended, sections 793 and 794 of title 18 of the United States Code. These provisions clearly embrace all national-defense secrets of whatever kind or character. Nevertheless, when Congress created the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 it saw fit to adopt separate, parallel criminal penalties with respect to atomic energy restricted data. And then, in 1951, another separate statute was enacted establishing parallel criminal penalties with respect to cryptographic data. The coexistence of these three statutes of varying scope and with varying penalty provisions for like offenses gives rise to substantial questions as to whether the United States at the present time has a wholly effective structure for criminal enforcement of its programs for protection of national-defense secrets.

These questions can be most effectively demonstrated by reference to the relationships between the Espionage Act provisions and the analogous provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.

Sections 224 and 225 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (secs. 10 (b) (2) and 10 (b) (3) of the 1946 act) establish criminal penalties for wrongful acquisition or communication of restricted data. There appears to be no conduct defined as an offense under these provisions which would not also be subject to prosecution under sections 793 or 794 of title 18, in the absence of the special atomic energy provisions. On the other hand, there are some offenses defined under 793, which are not offenses under the Atomic Energy Act. For example, the Atomic Energy Act does not contain a "gross negligence" provision such as is found in section 793 (f) of title 18. Similarly, it does not contain provisions comparable to sections 793 (d) and (e) making it an offense, punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years and/or a fine of up to $10,000 for "willfully," regardless of intent or reason to believe, transmitting national-defense secrets in tangible or documentary form to unauthorized persons, or "willfully" transmitting information to unauthorized persons with reasons to believe the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of another nation. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, did, however, incorporate a new provision, making it an offense, carrying a maximum penalty of $2,500, with no provision for imprisonment, for any person who has been associated with the atomic energy project, knowingly to communicate restricted data to unauthorized persons. This would, presumably, embrace all conduct of the type proscribed in sections 793 (d) and (e) except that section 793 (e) would apply as well to individuals who have not been associated with Government activities. The penalty under the Atomic Energy Act for such offenses, however, is only nominal as compared with that specified under sections 793 (d) and (e).

There are, moreover, significant differences in the degree of penalty provided under the two laws for conduct which constitutes substantially the same offense under both. In some instances the penalties under the Atomic Energy Act would be more severe; in other instances they would be less severe.

This situation gives rise to two principal questions. Do the provisions of the Espionage Act remain applicable to offenses involving restricted data where the conduct in question is also an offense under the Atomic Energy Act, so as to permit prosecution under the Espionage Act where this act provides for heavier penalties than apply under the Atomic Energy Act? Do the provisions of the Espionage Act which have no parallel in the Atomic Energy Act remain applicable so as to enable prosecution under the Espionage Act for conduct which does not constitute an offense under the Atomic Energy Act?

It seems clear that the special espionage provisions of the Atomic Energy Act had their origin in the desire of the Congress to remove atomic scientists from the coverage of the Espionage Act. This point of view was succinctly stated by James R. Newman, who was counsel to the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy which drafted the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

"In the earliest stages of drafting legislation for the development and control of atomic energy, it was realized that the provisions of the Espionage Act were unsuited in several respects for dealing with the secret data of theoretical and applied nuclear physics. The control of information provisions of the Atomic Energy Act were not merely designed to plug certain gaps in the Espionage Act; they were designed with the object of satisfying as far as possible the desires of scientists to escape the stultifying restrictions on the exchange of information to which they had been subjected by the Manhattan District. Although in certain respects more comprehensive and more stringent than the Espionage Act, the Atomic Energy Act provided a framework within which the scientists felt they had some chance of operating effectively, however hazardous their personal lives might become. On the other hand they were convinced that an extension of the information practices of the Manhattan District, based on the Espionage Act, would in the long run smother all creative activity in the field of nuclear research." [1]

At the same time, however, the Congress included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 a provision, section 10 (b) (6), reading:

"This section shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any other laws."

This provision appears unmistakably to be intended to preserve the operation of the Espionage Act in the atomic energy field, and was so interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Rosenberg case. Moreover, when this provision was reenacted as section 229 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressly referred to this provision as continuing the applicability of the espionage law.

This situation demonstrates the present confusion in the field of security. In enacting the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, we apparently removed atomic energy from the ambit of the Espionage Act with one hand, while with the other hand we brought atomic energy back within its ambit, at least to some extent. As Mr. Newman pointed out, if the Espionage Act remains applicable to atomic energy matters, "the scientists have, indeed, sustained a crushing defeat and the more moderate and enlightened information provisions of the Atomic Energy Act are little more than pietisms." [2] Moreover, even if the Espionage Act remains applicable to conduct involving atomic energy matters which are not offenses under the Atomic Energy Act, there are still serious difficulties in reconciling the provisions of the two statutes in cases involving conduct which are offenses under both. These difficulties are discussed in Mr. Newman's article published in 1947,[3] and also in a Legal Analysis of the Adequacy of the United States Laws With Respect to Offenses Against National Security, prepared by the Library of Congress in 1953 and published as a committee print by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,[4] under the direction of the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin.

This is, of course, another example of the uneven and illogical treatment of matters of like security import which pervades our security mechanism. There appears to be no reason why this state of uncertainty and difficulty, with possibilities of loopholes in our espionage laws, should persist. No Government witness before the subcommittee was able to justify the existence of the three separate espionage laws, or to explain why a uniform espionage law of universal applicability to all national-defense secrets would not be preferable. Indeed, there is reason to believe that this situation has not even been, at least until recently, a matter of concern to the executive branch. Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, who testified before the subcommittee, expressed the view that the fact that improper disclosure of restricted data is punishable under the Atomic Energy Act does not preclude the Government from prosecuting the same activity under the espionage laws "when appropriate." When questioned as to the justification for three separate espionage laws applicable to what is essentially the same offense, and as to the desirability of consolidating these statutes into a single statute of uniform applicability, he replied that the matter is now being studied, but that a "thorough research job would have to be done" before he could speak with accuracy. It would seem that such study is long overdue, particularly in the light of the testimony of the general counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission that there was doubt as to the applicability of the Espionage Act to offenses involving restricted data until enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

MULTIPLE STANDARDS FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATION AND CLEARANCE

Although it is customary to speak of the Government apparatus for security investigation and clearance of personnel as though it were a single, unified program, the fact of the matter is that there is considerable diversity in even the basic standards for investigation and clearance.

Consider, first of all, the standards for determination of eligibility for clearance. The basic requirement is that of Executive

[1] Newman, Control of Information Relating to Atomic Energy, 56 Yale Law Journal 769 at 790 (1947).

[2] Ibid., at 790.

[3] Ibid., 791–801.

[4] 83d Cong., 1st sess.

Order 10450 which requires a determination that employment of the individual is "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." But there are additional statutory standards for clearance applicable with respect to certain groups of personnel. For example:

1. The Atomic Energy Act requires a determination that permitting the individual to have access to restricted data will not endanger the common defense and security, and this standard must be employed even if the AEC employee will not in fact have access to restricted data in his particular position.

2. The National Science Foundation Act requires a determination, before any employee may be permitted to have access to information or property with respect to which security restrictions have been established, that permitting such access will not endanger the common defense and security.

3. The Federal Civil Defense Act provides that no employee may have access to information or property with respect to which security restrictions have been established until it has been determined that there is no information in the files of investigative agencies indicating that the employee is of "questionable loyalty or reliability for security purposes," and, if such information does appear, until further investigation has been conducted and a report thereon is evaluated in writing by the Administrator.

4. No employee may be assigned to duties under the Mutual Security Act or the Act for International Development until a certification has been made by—

(a) the Foreign Operations Administrator or the Secretary of State, if the individual was investigated by the Civil Service Commission, that based upon consideration of the report of investigation he believes the individual "is loyal to the United States, its Constitution, and form of government, and is not now and has never been a member of any organization advocating contrary views"; or

(b) the Secretary of Defense, if the individual was investigated by a military intelligence agency, that the individual is "loyal to the United States."

In view of section 10 of Executive Order 10450, which provides that nothing in the order "shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security which may be required by law," it is not clear what the relationship is between the various statutory standards applicable to particular agencies and the standard provided under Executive Order 10450. It is noteworthy that the Atomic Energy Commission, in the case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, proceeded under both standards simultaneously.

Similar multiplicity exists with respect to responsibility for investigations. There is a statutory requirement in the case of many agencies that security investigations be conducted in the first instance by the Civil Service Commission, with referral to the investigation to the FBI if derogatory information with loyalty implications is developed. But some of these agencies are subject to a further statutory requirement that they designate those positions within their agency which are "of a high degree of importance or sensitivity," and the FBI, rather than the Civil Service Commission, has primary responsibility for conducting the security investigations in the cases of employees occupying such positions. Other departments and agencies are free, under Executive Order 10450, to use their own investigative staffs or to make arrangements for Civil Service Commission investigations. Numerous agencies, such as the State Department, the Agriculture Department, the Treasury Department, the Post Office Department, the military departments, and the CIA, utilize their own investigative forces for personnel security investigations.

Agencies which are required by law to base their clearance determinations upon investigation by a specific investigative agency such as the Civil Service Commission or the FBI are apparently precluded from basing their clearance determination upon any other form of investigation. Thus, an individual who has been subject to a full background investigation by, for example, investigative staffs of the State Department or Treasury Department, may not be cleared by the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, or other agencies with a statutory requirement for Civil Service Commission or FBI investigations, without having an additional background investigation conducted by such investigative agency. Presumably, if all investigative agencies are of equal competence, as has been asserted, such additional investigations are meaningless and a waste of money from the standpoint of effective security. It would be interesting to know what percentage of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent for personnel security investigations, are attributable to such duplicate investigations.

IMPEDIMENTS TO FLOW OF INFORMATION

One of the most important problems brought to light in consideration of the operation of the security mechanism is that of impediments to adequate dissemination of information. It must be accepted as axiomatic that stringent controls be exercised over the dissemination of our national secrets to avoid their transmission or leakage to our enemies. At the same time, it appears to be equally axiomatic that limitations on the dissemination of such information, and compartmentalization of such information, deprive the Nation of cross-fertilization of ideas and restrict the degree of scientific and technological achievement. There are undoubtedly many competent individuals who do not have security clearance and who have not been engaged in defense activities who could make important contributions to our national defense effort if they had ready access to data now classified. Excessive concern with secrecy could well retard our own achievement in building an effective national defense complex, and scientific groups have consistently advanced the view that the balance presently prevailing between secrecy and accomplishment is unduly weighted in favor of the former.

There is no indication that our Government has ever systematically and comprehensively come to grips with the question of the price being paid for security in terms of the loss to achievement. It is true that there are mandates in the Atomic Energy Act and in Executive Order 10501 that information should be declassified as promptly as possible, but there is considerable question whether these mandates suffice. This appears to be an area which requires objective consideration in the national interest.

A much more serious and immediate difficulty is apparent, however. There is considerable reason to believe that the compartmentalization of security within the Government is adversely affecting the operations of the Government itself, particularly in our national defense effort. Much of this difficulty seems to flow from the statutory security autonomy of the Atomic Energy Commission, and from the special security requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.

Commissioner Thomas E. Murray of the Atomic Energy Commission expressed concern in an address delivered in December 1953 that top officials of the United States Government were inadequately versed in atomic energy matters, and he advocated a policy of "candor" with our Government officials. One of the impediments to understanding of atomic energy within the Government has undoubtedly been the special requirements for security clearance. The Atomic Energy Act specifically requires special clearance by AEC, based upon investigation by the Civil Service Commission or the FBI, before any person may be permitted to have access to restricted data. The only exception to this requirement, found in section 145 (b) of the 1954 act, is that the Commission itself or the General Manager may waive this requirement upon a determination that such action is clearly consistent with the national interest. This exception has been characterized by AEC as clarifying its authority to "permit Cabinet officers, for example, to receive restricted data" without the necessity for regular Q-clearance based upon investigation.

The practical effect of the special requirement for clearance is that individuals employed in other Government agencies with appropriate security clearances granted by such agencies must have an additional clearance, perhaps based upon an additional full background investigation, before they will be permitted to have access to restricted data essential in the performance of their work in such other agencies. An additional consequence would appear to be that such agencies must also take appropriate physical security measures to assure that other individuals employed in the agency who do not have Q-clearance, will not be able to come into contact with restricted data. The illogical nature of this requirement is demonstrated by the fact that an employee of another agency with top secret clearance who has daily access to the most critical top secret matters affecting his agency, must have special AEC clearance for even momentary access to restricted data of only marginal security significance bearing the lowest security classification.

It is apparent that this situation prior to the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, created substantial difficulties with respect to programs of the Department of Defense. Representatives of the Department of Defense, in testifying before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1952, in support of legislation (such as was eventually adopted in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) modifying the security clearance requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, stated:

"We are prepared to cite specific instances where the present law, because of its inflexibility, has slowed down important atomic projects of the Army, Navy, and Air Force," and that if the amendments were adopted:

"Much valuable time will be saved in design, procurement, and development work in the weapons program with the result that weapons will enter stockpile at an earlier date."

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 apparently rectified this situation by permitting AEC to authorize personnel engaged in programs of the Department of Defense to have access to restricted data on the basis of their regular Department of Defense clearances, without necessity for special AEC clearance. It is noteworthy, however, that representatives of the Department of Defense testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy during consideration of the 1954 act that even with these amendments, the "dual system of security" imposes "a formidable administrative burden."

But even though the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 resolves the problem of interchangeability of AEC and Department of Defense clearance, which, concededly, was a particularly serious problem because of the number of individuals involved and the necessity for close working arrangements between AEC and the Department of Defense it leaves unresolved the similar problem with respect to other Government agencies performing vital national-defense work such as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Coast Guard, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and the

National Bureau of Standards, which remain subject to the special clearance requirement for access to restricted data.

A case in point is that of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator in testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee referred to the fact that AEC security requirements made it "extremely difficult" for his agency to take effective steps to prepare to meet the "fallout" problem. He pointed out that because of the classification of the information, it could not be discussed, presumably from the standpoint of evacuation, with the Bureau of Public Roads, and that even within his own agency, the scarcity of Q-cleared personnel made it difficult to handle the situation. Subsequently, a representative of the Federal Civil Defense Administration appeared before the subcommittee considering Senate Joint Resolution 21, and testified that the shortage of Q-cleared personnel was attributable to loss of personnel in the administration's move to Battle Creek rather than to any lack of cooperation by AEC. He conceded, however, that the requirement for Q-clearance was a fairly substantial burden in terms of delay and inconvenience.

The Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in subsequent testimony on this matter before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on March 24, 1955, reiterated that the difficulty in question had been caused primarily by the move to Battle Creek. He pointed out, however, that under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, primary responsibility for civil defense rests with the States and localities, and that the AEC security requirements are an impediment to getting vital information into the hands of governors and mayors. He also pointed out that the Administration was precluded, because of security restrictions, from discussing important matters with other Federal agencies playing a vital role in civil defense, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

The overall pattern of this testimony indicates clearly that security restrictions have encumbered and delayed our civil defense effort. It is not unlikely that similar encumbrances and delays are to be found in other areas of our national defense effort. At the very least, it is apparent that the special security requirements in the atomic energy field are quite cumbersome administratively, and quite costly to the taxpayers. As the Federal Civil Defense Administrator pointed out in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

"If the regular security system were also applicable to access to 'restricted data' this would expedite our work."

The Atomic Energy Commission stated in 1952, in connection with the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act which would permit it to honor Department of Defense clearances:

"We see no reason why the AEC should have to determine whether military personnel who are already cleared by their own agency, are good security risks to get restricted data for use in connection with work assigned them by the military. And, in our opinion, it is wrong from the point of view of the overall defense and security of the United States to raise unrealistic barriers to vital cooperation by all the members of our team in the field of atomic weapons."

There is no readily apparent reason why the same should not be true with respect to all other components of the Government. It is strange, indeed, that the Federal Civil Defense Administration, with a total employment roll of about 600, all of whom are cleared for access to "secret" defense information, has only 109 employees eligible for access to "secret" restricted data, necessary to accomplish the vital mission of that agency. It may be that the requirement for special AEC clearance is justifiable despite the costs, burdens, delays, and impediments to national security, but no such justification has been advanced. The time has come to consider this matter rationally and objectively, and to reach some definite conclusions of national policy concerning this situation.

Another problem in the civil defense field was raised by Dr. George V. LeRoy of the University of Chicago who had had extensive experience in connection with the effects of atomic weapons upon living organisms. Dr. LeRoy testified that there is a considerable amount of classified information relating to treatment of the effects of atomic weapons which is not available to American physicians, and that American physicians are not, for this reason, as adequately equipped as they might be to treat the casualties of an atomic attack. He related that a Japanese doctor who recently visited the United States was able to discuss with him information (about the cases of the Japanese fishermen injured by fallout as a result of last year's Pacific tests) which is presently regarded as classified by our Government. Dr. LeRoy pointed out also that the medical chief of the Illinois civil defense group, who is responsible for planning the medical care and warning system for the State, was unable to obtain from him, because of security restrictions, adequate information about the fallout problem.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, however, has characterized Dr. LeRoy's testimony in this respect as "irresponsible" and the Director of AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine has stated that no medical information relating to this problem is presently classified. This conflict between responsible and knowledgeable individuals emphasizes the difficulties presently faced in attempting to evaluate and reach sound conclusions about the operation and impact of the security mechanism. It is another indication of the need for a high-level, systematic, objective study of the security mechanism to assure that it is operating soundly and effectively, and to reinforce public confidence.

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Much of the subcommittee's attention was devoted to consideration of the security requirements for Government employment, and the manner in which the program has been and is being administered. It is this aspect of the Government's security mechanism which has aroused most public interest and discussion, and it has also evoked considerable comment on the part of the public, the press, and responsible Government officials.

Although a number of agencies had previously developed programs of their own for security investigation and clearance of their employees, particularly for access to classified information, and Congress had established security requirements for employment in a few agencies on a fairly random basis, the present security program as applied throughout the Government and to all Federal employees is based primarily upon Executive Order 10450 promulgated by President Eisenhower on April 27, 1953. The purpose and philosophy of the security program was succinctly stated by the Assistant Attorney General in his testimony before the subcommittee, as follows:

"Thus the basic objective of the present employee security program is to make sure that there is no employee on the Federal payroll, nor any applicant appointed, who can, because of his position endanger the national security. President Eisenhower insists that all Federal employees be persons of integrity, high moral character, and unswerving loyalty to the United States. At the same time, the President has cautioned all heads of the executive establishments that in the American tradition all employees should receive 'fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of Government.' This is the spirit which prevails in the administration of the present personnel security program.

Executive Order 10450 requires security investigation of every employee of the executive branch of the Government, and establishes a list of categories of attributes which, if found to exist in the case of a person investigated, would at least raise some question as to his suitability for employment on security grounds. The Executive order does not in itself prescribe procedures, even in general terms, for carrying out the President's direction, as stated in the preamble to the Executive order, that:

"All persons should receive fair, impartial and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government * * * [and] that all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures."

Rather, the President, simultaneously with his promulgation of Executive Order 10450, advised the heads of all departments and agencies that the Attorney General had, at his direction, prepared "sample regulations" designed to establish "minimum standards" for implementation of the security program. Each department and agency is, therefore, responsible for promulgation of its own procedures for handling, considering, and determining security cases, subject, according to testimony before the committee, to review of these procedures by the Attorney General to assure that they meet the minimum standards of the "sample regulations."

It must be borne in mind that there is a close relationship between the security program and the ordinary processes of selection, retention, and dismissal of Government employees in accordance with sound principles of personnel management. Thus, although a person may be a security risk in the particular Government position which he occupies or seeks because of derogatory information developed in the course of a security investigation, the very same derogatory information may indicate that even aside from security considerations, he is not suitable for employment in that position. For example, a drug addict, a chronic alcoholic, or a person with definite criminal tendencies would clearly be an undesirable employee in a position of public trust.

According to figures released by the Civil Service Commission covering operation of the personnel security program under Executive Order 10450 from May 28, 1953, to September 30, 1954, a total of 3,002 employees were fired because of security questions falling within the purview of the Executive order, and an additional 5,006 employees resigned before determination was completed in cases where the file "was known to contain unfavorable information" under the security program. The Civil Service Commission's use of the word "known" in this context is unfortunate and misleading, since it connotes that these employees resigned with knowledge that there was derogatory information concerning them without availing themselves of the opportunity of seeking a final judicious determination. Under questioning before the subcommittee, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated with respect to these 5,006 employees that the information was "known" to the Government, and not necessarily to the employees who resigned.

These figures warrant further analysis to place the security program in proper perspective. The fact that 3,002 employees are listed as "fired" does not mean that each had been determined to be a security risk.

The bulk of these were, according to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, dismissed as unsuitable employees under civil service regulations and procedures, rather than under Executive Order 10450. Nor does this mean that these employees were dismissed after some kind of adjudication process in which they were apprised of the derogatory information and given a formal hearing with opportunity to clear the record. Those employees dismissed under civil service regulations had only such opportunity to defend themselves as is given in the discretion of their agency heads, and the procedures in such cases vary widely from agency to agency and fall far short of the procedures established for security hearings. In addition, a large proportion of the total number of security dismissals listed are undoubtedly of probationary employees who are not given an opportunity for hearing prior to dismissal on security grounds. Statistics furnished by the Department of Defense reflect that, although the Civil Service Commission's figures of employees fired for security reasons through September 30, 1954, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force were 302, 638, and 371, respectively, only 71, 27, and 16 of these cases, respectively, involved dismissals effected subsequent to a security hearing.

Similarly, it cannot be assumed that the 5,006 Government employees who are listed as "resigned" all possessed attributes which would have required denial of clearance or employment had their cases been prosecuted to conclusion. It would appear that this total would include all Government employees who resigned, whatever the reason and whether or not they were even aware of the existence of derogatory information, whose files contained any derogatory information, of whatever quantity or significance, falling within the Executive order. Thus, the 2,096 cases in which information about "subversion" was present would undoubtedly include many cases in which only the rawest, unevaluated derogatory information was found, indicating some remote connection with left-wing activities or relatives with some possible interest in suspect groups recently or in the remote past.

It is apparent, therefore, that the total figure of 8,008 security separations (3,002 fired plus 5,006 resigned) should not be interpreted as indicating that this number of security risks have been weeded out of the Government service. The actual number of security risks is apparently very much smaller than this figure; the precise number cannot be ascertained, principally because the Civil Service Commission's reporting system is evidently not set up to produce this statistic.

THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SECURITY PROGRAM

The fundamental assumption underlying the security program, insofar as concerns procedural rights of individuals subject to the program, is that no individual has any "right" to a Government job and that, therefore, such procedural protection as has been afforded under Executive Order 10450 should be gratefully received and not criticized as inadequate. As the Assistant Attorney General stated before the subcommittee:

"When we recall that for over 120 years we permitted our Government to fire without notice and without specifying reasons, it must, it seems to me, be conceded that the present program grants to the employee many substantial and protective rights—in fact, the most that have ever been afforded to a Federal employee."

Three groups of individuals are affected by the security programs: (1) permanent and indefinite employees who have survived their probationary period; probationary employees; and applicants for Government employment. The degree of procedural protection available under the security program varies, depending upon the particular category in which the individual may be.

1. Applicants for Government employment: Applicants for Government employment are, of course, subject to security investigation under Executive Order 10450. Applicants are, however, not afforded any procedural rights of any kind, except in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, to explain or clarify derogatory information which may be developed in the course of the investigation. This means, as a practical matter, that applicants concerning whom significant derogatory information is developed will be denied Government employment almost automatically, even though the derogatory information might be wholly dissipated or its significance greatly minimized if the applicant were afforded an opportunity to learn the nature of the derogatory information and to have some kind of objective adjudication of the charges. In some instances the department or agency may discuss the derogatory information informally with the applicant, but this procedure does not give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to clear the record and his name.

It appears that the Atomic Energy Commission alone has adopted formalized procedures for handling security cases involving applicants. Under those procedures, all applicants for AEC employment are entitled to a formal hearing to resolve doubt as to eligibility for clearance and employment resulting from derogatory information uncovered in the course of the security investigation. They are, moreover, entitled to precisely the same procedural privileges as incumbent employees, since the very same procedures apply equally in both cases. The regulations of the Department of the Air Force specifying the types of situations in which the privilege of a security hearing will be afforded are sufficiently broad to embrace cases of applicants, but representatives of the Air Force testified that there is no general practice of affording hearings to applicants. They did indicate, however, that in exceptional cases involving uniquely qualified applicants who are regarded as essential for certain projects a hearing may be afforded "to clear up the acceptability of this man." The General Counsel of the Department of Defense testified that a similar practice prevails in the Army and Navy Departments, but the regulations of those Departments do not expressly provide for situations of this kind.

2. Probationary employees: Government employees who have not completed their 1-year probationary period are generally not entitled to a security hearing to resolve derogatory information which may be developed in the course of security investigations, although, under Public Law 733 and the Department of Justice sample regulations, they are entitled to written notice as to the reasons for suspension, as specific and detailed as security considerations permit, and to submit a written defense to these charges. Even this privilege, however, applies only if the individual is suspended under the security program, and would not apply if the individual is terminated as unsuitable under the ordinary Civil Service regulations. Some agencies apparently attempt to handle as many cases as possible under Civil Service regulations rather than as security cases. In the case of the Air Force, for example, it was indicated that a case is processed under the security regulations only if it is not possible to remove the employee under Civil Service regulations. This procedure may have considerable merit in that it spares the employee the burden of a security-risk label, but at the same time it denies him an opportunity to clear his name and establish his eligibility for Government employment, since probationary employees may be dismissed at the discretion of the agency head without any notice or hearing.

Again, the Atomic Energy Commission's procedures constitute an exception to the general rule, since AEC grants precisely the same privileges to probationary employees as in the cases of employees who have survived the probationary period. It should be pointed out, however, that this is probably required by section 161 (d) of the Atomic Energy Act which requires that the Commission "make adequate provisions for administrative review of any determination to dismiss any employee." Representatives of the Department of the Air Force testified that that Department also affords hearings to probationary employees "in order that we might insure proper safeguards."

3. Incumbent employees who have survived the probationary period: Permanent and indefinite employees who have survived their probationary period are entitled under the Executive Order 10450 security program, to a formal adjudication of the question of security risk before they are terminated as security risks under the provisions of the Executive order. The procedures to which they are entitled must meet the minimum standards of the Department of Justice's sample regulations. If, however, the derogatory information brought to light by a security investigation required under Executive Order 10450 raises a question of suitability for employment, as well as of security, the individual may be deprived of his procedural privileges under Executive Order 10450 if the agency head decides to dismiss him under civil-service regulations rather than under the security order. In such an event, the procedures available to the individual for clearing the record vary greatly from agency to agency, with no apparent minimum standards, and such procedural safeguards as are available would generally provide much less protection than those afforded under the security program.

HOW MUCH "RIGHTS" SHOULD THE INDIVIDUAL HAVE UNDER THE SECURITY PROGRAM?

The question of the degree of procedural rights which should be afforded to individuals subject to the security program is a complex one. There can be no doubt that the Government should seek to establish the highest level of standards for the Federal service, and that undesirable, unsuitable, unreliable, and untrustworthy employees should be weeded out. It cannot be disputed that the Government should have effective procedures for making inquiry concerning the background, competence, experience, and character of its employees and applicants for employment, and that it should be able, as in the case of private industry, to refuse to employ applicants who do not meet its standards, and to discharge, without cumbersome procedures, employees who are undesirable.

There is, however, an important distinction between a sound personnel administration program and the present security program. The security program mobilizes the entire investigative machinery of the United States Government to probe into every facet of the individual's background. The investigation is not, like the ordinary personnel inquiry, designed to elicit an objective report on the individual's experience, training, personality, and other characteristics pertinent to a decision as to his suitability for employment. It is designed, rather, to use the words of section 8 (a) of Executive Order 10450, "to elicit information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." Section 8 (a) then goes on to enumerate the types of information to be developed in the investigation, and the entire enumeration consists of categories of derogatory information, with no reference at all to the desirability of obtaining a balanced, objective picture of the individual's suitability, including favorable

information about him. It should also be recognized that the security investigation, unlike the personnel inquiry, is designed to turn up information about the individual's relatives, and friends, and his and their political beliefs, activities, and associations, some of which does not necessarily have a direct bearing upon whether or not he will be a good, reliable, and trustworthy employee. There is, moreover, no effort to confine the investigation to sources of information which are presumed to be sound and free of personal bias. Rather, the investigators go to anyone who can tell anything about the individual, and many of the informants, even if they are free of malice or prejudice toward the individual being investigated, have highly questionable competence to interpret his political or moral characteristics.

There is a further important distinction. In the case of a true personnel inquiry, the results are interpreted and evaluated, and a determination made, by individuals who are free to weigh and decide objectively in terms of whether or not the individual is capable of doing a job in a reliable and trustworthy manner. In the case of the security program, however, the individuals who evaluate are expected to have the rather parochial function of protecting against possible risk, and the security criteria and procedures place little emphasis upon evaluation of the degree of risk arising from derogatory information, as balanced against the individual's meritorious attributes, in the context of the particular Government position involved.

Still another distinction lies in the impact of the security program upon the individual who is fired as a security risk, or who is denied employment as a consequence of the existence of derogatory information. Once the Government conducts a personnel security investigation which results in the production of significant derogatory information, a situation is created which may have the most profound consequences upon the life of the individual concerned. The impact of the security program is not limited, as has been suggested, to a determination as to whether or not an employee may be a security risk in a particular position in the Government. As a practical matter, an individual who has been determined to be a security risk in a particular position is, by this determination, virtually ineligible for further Government employment. It is true that section 7 of the Executive Order 10450 provides a basis for reemployment of the individual in the same agency upon a determination by the head of the agency that this is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Indeed, although the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission conceded that an employee found to be a security risk "may be a first-rate Federal employee in some other position," he was not able to inform the subcommittee when he testified as to whether there had been any such reinstatements. Section 7 also makes an employee, who has been suspended or terminated as a security risk, ineligible for employment in any other Government agency, unless the head of such other agency determines such employment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security and the Civil Service Commission gives its consent. Of 54 cases of this kind which have been brought before the Civil Service Commission to date, only 9 have been found eligible for reemployment in another agency by the Commission. Information furnished to the subcommittee by Mr. Young since conclusion of the hearings reflects that for the period October 1, 1953, to September 30, 1954, only 5 employees terminated under the security program have been reemployed by Government agencies. The most that can be said is that a man found to be a security risk has a remote possibility of reinstatement in a Government job, but even if he is reinstated, his opportunity for advancement would be severely circumscribed by the earlier security determination.

But the impact of the program does not end there. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission conceded that a security file on an individual who has been denied clearance will follow him like a shadow throughout the Government, and into private industry if he seeks employment with firms doing Government work involving security considerations. Indeed, Mr. Young indicated that section 7 was written into Executive Order 10450 for this very purpose. The consequence is that a large area of private employment, embracing upward of 2 million positions in our present private economy, involving access to classified matters would be barred to this individual.

Moreover, it is apparent that many American firms would regard an individual who has been found to be a security risk as wholly ineligible for employment by them in any position whatever, even in positions with no security significance whatever. The representative of Douglas Aircraft Co. who testified before the subcommittee stated that his firm would not hire, and would forthwith fire, any individual who had been found to be ineligible for "Secret" and "Top Secret" clearance by the Department of Defense. Additional information received by the subcommittee indicates that similar practices are followed by many industrial firms, even firms engaged to only a minor extent in defense work.

The same situation prevails with respect to probationary employees and applicants who are fired or refused employment on security grounds without a final adjudication as to whether or not they are security risks. Once significant derogatory information is developed in a security investigation, and is not resolved by a favorable security clearance determination, it will operate as an impediment to employment of the individual elsewhere in the Government and in wide areas of the private economy. Agencies are required to report to the Civil Service Commission on form 73 whether or not an applicant is denied employment as a result of security determination made on the basis of a full field investigation. The ready availability of the national agency check serves to make the derogatory information known, and it is unlikely that an employing officer would knowingly select for employment an applicant concerning whom there is an ostensible unresolved security question over an applicant concerning whom there is no apparent cause for doubt. In a day in which even private employers inquire as to whether or not an applicant for employment has ever been cleared, has ever been denied clearance, or has ever executed a personnel security questionnaire for security clearance, it is readily apparent that unevaluated and unresolved derogatory information developed in the course of a prior security investigation may effectively bar an individual from getting even a toehold in future employment sufficient to permit a security hearing which might resolve the derogatory implications. Indeed, information submitted to the subcommittee indicates that even a long delay in processing a security clearance application to a final conclusion—without any indication that derogatory information has been developed—may make potential employers skeptical of the wisdom of employing an applicant for even those positions in the private economy which are in no way of security significance.

It is apparent that the security program causes substantial deprivations to many thousands of Government employees subject to it, and that these deprivations are not limited merely to loss of a particular Government job. It is callously unrealistic to define the procedural safeguards available to Government employees and applicants for Government employment in terms of the concept that "there is no right to a Government job," or by assuming that no "stigma" attaches to denial of clearance to an applicant or to discharge of a probationary employee. There is little indication that representatives of the Government who are responsible for implementing Executive Order 10450 have an adequate awareness of the impact of the program upon the individual subject to it, or that they have considered what the Government's responsibilities to its citizenry should be in this area. There is an urgent necessity for thorough reexamination of the impact of the security program, and for consideration, as a matter of national policy, of the degree of procedural safeguards which can and should be afforded individuals subject to this impact. It would be well to consider, specifically, the feasibility of affording to all individuals subject to the security program the maximum opportunity to resolve questions of security risk consistent with effective operation of the security program.

A number of specific problems appear to warrant special attention. These are the major problems revealed in the subcommittee's consideration of the personnel security programs, but they are only illustrative of other problems which may exist.

1. Notice to the individual: The sample regulations of the Department of Justice provide that a written statement of charges shall be furnished, and that the statement shall be as "specific and detailed as security considerations, including the need for protection of confidential sources of information, permit." This standard appears to be satisfactory, but there is reason to believe it is not being consistently applied by the various agencies and that some agencies are not complying with the spirit of the standard in formulating the statement of charges. There appears also to be a need for more careful and precise definition of "confidential sources of information."

2. Opportunity to answer the charges: The present minimum standard procedures as found in the sample regulations of the Department of Justice appear, in the main, to provide adequate opportunity for the individual to make his defense if all agencies observe their spirit. In at least one area, however, study might be given to the possibility of improvement. This area concerns the problem of "confrontation."

There can be no question as to the necessity for protecting the FBI's methods and devices for infiltrating the Communist conspiracy. If protecting such sources of information represents a compromise with traditional American concepts of justice and fair play, it is a price which we should be willing to pay, in times of national peril, for an effective security program. But it appears that information from such sources is involved in only a very small proportion of security cases. Mr. Ernest Angell, chairman of the board of directors of the American Civil Liberties Union, who served for several years as Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board for the Second District, testified before the subcommittee on the basis of his experience with hundreds of FBI investigative reports under the loyalty program:

"I could say with confidence that the proportion of those [cases] in which there was any genuine derogatory information against the employee that came from the personal knowledge of the FBI agent or the genuine undercover agent, as distinguished from the great mass public of the so-called casual informant, was very, very low and small. There was no question about that."

The real question of confrontation is whether such casual informants—landlords, neighbors, classmates, business associates, and the like—who furnish derogatory information, and who are usually identified in the investigative reports, should be identified to the individual and subject to confrontation. Discussion of this problem heretofore has been confused by injecting into

it the question of the actual FBI intelligence apparatus, and it is now necessary to consider the problem of confrontation strictly in terms of these casual informants. At the present time the security procedures place a premium on and encourage irresponsible and malicious gossip and information. It may be that broadening the area of confrontation in this manner may dry up sources of derogatory information to a degree which would hamper the security program. Even if this were a consequence, there would still be a basic-policy question requiring balancing of principles of fairness, justice, and responsibility against the requirements of security. It appears to be most desirable that a fresh, objective examination of this problem be undertaken by an independent body.

There is considerable reason to believe that present practices with respect to confrontation are less than adequate and less than would be feasible without detriment to the security program.

The Department of Justice sample regulations provide merely that hearing boards may, in their discretion, invite any person to appear at the hearing and testify, and that the hearing board shall take into consideration the employee's handicap by reason of nondisclosure to him of confidential information or lack of opportunity to cross-examine confidential informants. They provide also that the board shall consider the refusal of an invited informant to appear, as well as the fact that the Government cannot pay witnesses' travel expenses. In addition, the President recently approved the Attorney General's recommendation that every effort should be made to produce witnesses at security board hearings to testify in behalf of the Government so that such witnesses may be confronted and cross-examined by the employee, so long as the production of such witnesses would not jeopardize the national security.

The regulations of the Department of the Army go farther than any others in providing a right of confrontation. Paragraph 37 of Special Regulations 620–220–1 provides:

"Government witnesses: All boards are instructed to invite, as a matter of standard procedure, each nonconfidential witness who has been personally identified, who has given information adverse to the employee and who has not indicated expressly an unwillingness to appear. Geographic distances will be no bar to extending invitations except that invitations need not be issued to witnesses in noncontiguous overseas areas. Such witness will be asked to appear at the hearing to testify in the employee's presence and be subjected to cross-examination. They will also be asked whether they wish to appear privately before the board, whether they would submit a signed statement, permit their names to be disclosed as the source of the information given, and whether their statement previously given may be read to the employee with or without the witness' name being disclosed. The invitation will state that the board cannot pay witnesses fees or reimbursement for travel or other expenses. A suggested invitation to qualified witnesses is contained in appendix II. Whenever a witness signifies a desire to appear before the board in private, the executive secretary will arrange such a meeting, preferably before the hearing. The witness will be heard under oath and a verbatim confidential transcript of his testimony will be made and added to the complete file. A copy of that transcript will not be supplied the employee unless the witness agrees. If the witness agrees to release the transcript, it will be regarded unclassified and the witness' agreement should be included in the questions and answers in the transcript, usually at the end. Adverse witnesses who are employees of the Army Establishment should be urged to attend and commanding officers should be requested to permit such employees to attend. Necessary time to attend a hearing would be recorded as official duty and no charge made to leave."

Although it may be questioned whether even this broad language goes as far as is possible and desirable in affording the right of confrontation, there can be no question that it goes far beyond most agency regulations which provide only that every effort shall be made to produce informants. If the privilege of confrontation on this broad scale is feasible for employees of the Department of the Army without adverse effect upon national security, there is no reason why all departments and agencies should not adopt regulations going at least this far.

A related question is that of subpena. At the present time agencies and departments, with the exception of possibly a few with specific statutory authority, do not have authority to subpena individuals to testify in security proceedings. If it is concluded upon further study that the right of confrontation should be broadened, consideration might also be given to whether the power to subpena informants should be granted. Some Government witnesses before the subcommittee, when asked whether the subpena power should be provided, responded in the negative. They did not say, however, that providing such subpena authority would be detrimental to the national security. Their replies were predicated upon the conceptual notion that security proceedings are not adversary in nature and are administrative rather than judicial. The tendency to discuss security problems in terms of these conceptual labels, rather than in terms of actual impact and effect upon individual rights and Government security, should be arrested. Sufficient it to say that some security cases which have received wide public attention have had many trappings of an adversary proceeding, and, indeed, Government witnesses were subpenaed by the Atomic Energy Commission in the Oppenheimer case.

3. Objective evaluation and determination: There are significant indications that the security program under Executive Order 10450 may, in some respects, lack objective balance, and weight the scale too heavily on the side of finding security risk. Even though the test of eligibility for Government employment under Executive Order 10450—that it be determined that employing the individual is "clearly consistent with the interests of national security"—may be an ideal standard, refinement of the standard so as to reflect the necessity for careful evaluation of degree of security risk in the light of all the individual's attributes would add considerable balance and objectivity.

The most striking evidence of this lack of balance is to be found in the manner in which security hearing boards are instructed to evaluate the evidence and prepare their findings and recommendations for the agency head. The Civil Service Commission's handbook entitled "Guides for Members of Security Hearing Boards Under Executive Order 10450" provides that a memorandum of reasons is to be prepared by the Security Hearing Board in support of its conclusion and decision in each case, for incorporation into the file and use by the head of the agency making the final decision. The handbook states:

"The amount of detail necessary will depend upon the facts and complexity of the case. In some instances it will be necessary or desirable to explain the board's reasoning and conclusion concerning each charge. This probably will be done in every case in which the board reaches a decision favorable to the individual."

The import of this is obvious. A recommendation in favor of the individual must be justified and supported, but a recommendation adverse to the individual need not be. The agency head may fire an employee as a security risk without being convinced, but he must be convinced before he finds in the employee's favor. This language, if it has any meaning at all, necessarily must have some intimidating effect upon members of hearing boards, who, regardless of their integrity, objectivity, and good faith, are well aware of the fate which may befall Government employees who are "soft" on communism and subversion.

This unbalanced language has seeped through to the security regulations of some departments and agencies. The Navy Department, for example, adopted this language in toto. When this language was brought to the attention of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense during his testimony before the subcommittee, he expressed some concern, and the result has been amendment of the Navy Department's regulations so as to require an explanation of the Board's reasoning and conclusions concerning each charge, whether the decision is favorable or unfavorable to the individual.

4. Hearings for applicants and probationary employees: Another problem worthy of study is whether a greater degree of procedural protection should be afforded probationary employees and applicants concerning whom security doubt arises as to eligibility for employment. No convincing reasons have been advanced as to why probationary employees should not have the privilege of a hearing before a security hearing board prior to dismissal on security grounds. In testimony before the subcommittee there were, of course, the conceptualistic arguments that security hearings for such employees are not authorized by statute and that there is no right to a Government job. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission indicated that granting hearings for probationary employees runs counter to the whole "theory and system of having a probationary year for Federal employees * * * to provide an opportunity to see whether or not that person is a qualified, worthwhile Federal employee." He also expressed the view that "good personnel management" dictate against such hearings. But the fact of the matter is that at least the Department of the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission, among the various departments and agencies, do afford probationary employees the opportunity for a security hearing, and there is no indication of any adverse consequences.

Similarly, there have been no convincing reasons offered for not extending the privilege of security hearings to applicants who would otherwise be barred from Federal employment for security reasons. The only real argument against such hearings was offered by the representative of the Department of State who testified that if applicant procedures were adopted, one of the dangers would be immediately all the Communists would come in to apply for a Federal job just to find out whether the Federal Government knew about them or not. But this concern appears to have been articulated without knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission's satisfactory experience in affording hearings to applicants during the past several years. Indeed, the State Department representatives were unaware, prior to the subcommittee's hearings, that any agency afforded security hearings to applicants and probationary employees.

LACK OF UNIFORMITY, CONSISTENCY, AND COORDINATION

The Government programs for investigation and clearance of personnel are characterized by considerable confusion and few evidences of uniformity, consistency, or even coordination.

Even within those agencies whose security programs are based in whole upon Executive Order 10450, there are substantial variations. The general structure of the security program under Executive Order 10450 is that each de-

partment or agency head is to establish his own security program within the broad minimum standards established under Executive Order 10450 and the Department of Justice's sample regulations. The only effort at coordination appears to be the review of each agency's regulations by the Department of Justice to assure that the minimum standards are met. But the minimum standards are extremely vague and general, and permit wide variations in substantive and procedural aspects of security proceedings. As an example of these variations, we may consider the regulations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, three Departments which are subject to some unifying pressures, and which are probably as similar to each other in makeup, personnel, and special problems as any three agencies of the Government could be.

The principal representative of the Department of Defense in the hearing before the subcommittee, its General Counsel, insisted that the employee security programs of the three subdepartments were substantially uniform. The respective regulations, however, do not bear out this contention. A number of significant variations appeared:

(a) Hearings: The Army Department and Navy Department regulations contemplate hearings only for permanent or indefinite employees who have survived their probationary periods. The Department of the Air Force regulations provide hearings as a matter of right only to such employees, but contemplate that hearings for other individuals subject to the security program will be afforded at the discretion of the Central Review Board, which, it is stated, has the policy "to grant such a hearing in all such cases except where the national security would otherwise be immediately affected." Pursuant to this policy, the Air Force grants security hearings to probationary employees as a matter of course.

(b) Confrontation: As discussed above, the Department of the Army regulations require, as a matter of standard procedure, that all nonconfidential informants who have been personally identified in the investigative report, and who have not expressly indicated an unwillingness to appear, be invited to testify, or to submit a signed statement, or to be identified to the employee. The Air Force regulations are almost as broad, but require that such invitations be extended "whenever practicable," and not as a matter of "standard procedure." The Navy Department regulations provide merely that the "Security Hearing Board, in its discretion, may invite any person to appear at the hearing and testify."

(c) Report of Hearing Board: As discussed above, the Navy Department regulations, which have been amended to remedy this deficiency since the hearings before the subcommittee, provided that a full statement of the Hearing Board's reasoning ought to be included in every case in which the Board reaches a conclusion favorable to the individual, but not when the conclusion is adverse to the individual. The Air Force regulations require an analysis of the information and a detailed statement of the reasoning upon which each finding is based, regardless of the outcome. The Department of the Army regulations are silent on this point, but state that complete instructions on preparation of the Board's findings and the memorandum of reasons "will be provided in other media," presumably the Civil Service Commission's Handbook, which, as discussed above, contains a provision similar to that found in the Navy Department's regulations prior to their amendment.

(d) Criteria for determining security risk: The Department of the Army's regulations contain no statements reflecting that the criteria of security risk are to be applied in terms of the specific position occupied by the employee. Nor do the regulations contain any standards for evaluating the derogatory information, weighed against favorable information, to establish the degree of security risk. In sharp contrast, the Navy Department regulations specify that the Board will consider "the nature of the position occupied by the employee and in the light of the derogatory information" and that "a fair decision will be reached only after all the facts, favorable and unfavorable, have been analyzed impartially and have been given due weight in their proper perspective." The Air Force regulations go even further in specifying that derogatory information of the various types included in the criteria are all "relevant to the question of whether because of his * * * employment in the position involved [the individual] might, either intentionally or inadvertently, disclose to unauthorized persons classified security information * * * or otherwise act against the security interests of the United States."

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense suggested that such discrepancies are merely variations in language without substantive significance, but this is not a satisfactory answer. Government officials are to be commended for extending desirable procedural advantages to their employees over and above those required by their regulations, but in the last analysis the individual must look to the published regulations for his procedural safeguards, and there is no reason why the procedures cannot be wholly uniform, selecting the best provisions of each.

It must be recognized that such variations in procedures of the agencies of the Department of Defense, where there is some unification, are found in greatly magnified form among the other agencies' security programs, where the only pressure for consistency comes from the necessity for meeting the minimum standards of the sample regulations of the Department of Justice.

Additional evidence of lack of consistency and coordination may be found in the testimony of the Department of Justice before the subcommittee.

Assistant Attorney General Tompkins testified unequivocally that Executive Order 10450 does not apply to employees occupying nonsensitive positions concerning whom derogatory information about character and habits has been developed. He stated, for example:

"A drunk in a nonsensitive position would not be subject to 10450.

"The gentleman in the nonsensitive position whose habits are not good * * * would not come within the scope of 10450."

But despite this interpretation by a high official of the Department responsible for interpreting Executive Order 10450 for the various departments and agencies, and for assuring that their security regulations meet certain minimum standards, it is apparent that other agencies and departments have been dismissing employees in nonsensitive positions under Executive Order 10450 on the basis of derogatory information as to character and habits. Thus, representatives of the Department of Defense testified that a drunk occupying a nonsensitive position could be dismissed under Executive Order 10450, and statistics for the Department of the Army (the only agency of the Department of Defense for which these figures are available) reveal that of 182 Army employees occupying nonsensitive positions who were dismissed under Executive Order 10450, 143 were dismissed on the basis of derogatory information as to character and habits. Similiarly, according to figures furnished by the Civil Service Commission for the period May 28, 1953, to September 30, 1954, the Department of Agriculture reported that 101 of 102 employees terminated because of security questions were in nonsensitive positions, but only 32 cases involved information relating to subversion; the Department of Commerce reported that 32 of the 77 employees terminated were in nonsensitive positions, but only 12 cases involved information relating to subversion; and the General Services Administration reported that 105 of the 154 employees terminated were in nonsensitive positions, but only 20 cases involved information relating to subversion.

Another example of lack of common understanding of security concepts under Executive Order 10450 may be found in the inability of the State Department witness before the subcommittee to state categorically that other agencies of the Government interpret Executive Order 10450, as he does, as permitting employment of a security risk when necessary to get a job done.

This lack of common understanding as to what security is all about under Executive Order 10450 is reflected in available statistics on the operation of Executive Order 10450.

It is apparent that there is no pattern of statistical correlation. The most complete statistics available are those furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission which, since 1946, has had approximately 504,000 full background investigations conducted for it. AEC, which presumably has a rather stringent security program, indicated that of these investigations, only 5,532, or about 1.1 percent, raised any question as to eligibility for AEC security clearance, and of this number 1,622 were finally granted clearance. Of of the remaining 3,910, 3,416 were not processed to conclusion for one reason or another, and only 494, or just under 0.1 percent, were actually denied clearance. These figures may be compared with figures furnished by the State Department which indicate that 30 applicants were rejected for employment on security grounds under Executive Order 10450 in 1954 out of a total of approximately 2,075 applicant investigations. This would indicate that the State Department would deny clearance to approximately 1.45 percent of all individuals investigated, as compared with AEC's figure of only 1.1 percent which even raise the question of security risk. It would appear likely, on the basis of these figures, that radically different security standards are being employed from agency to agency.

Variations in the security programs are of considerable importance from the standpoint of the individuals subject to the programs. An individual employed by a relatively nonsensitive agency, such as the Department of Agriculture, which apparently has very stringent standards of security risk (as may be judged from the facts of the Ladejinsky case), may find himself fired as a security risk with all the serious deprivations involved, although if he had been employed in more sensitive agencies, such as the State Department or the Foreign Operations Administration, a question of security eligibility might never have been raised. Similarly, an employee whose security status is adjudicated under less adequate or enlightened procedures than would be available in another agency may, for this reason, be severely prejudicated. This does not appear to be the "fair, impartial, and equitable treatment" through "mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures" ordered by the President in Executive Order 10450.

Testimony before the subcommittee revealed a disturbing pattern of lack of awareness of and interest in these problems. None of the Government witnesses indicated an awareness or interest in the manner in which agencies other than his own were operating under Executive Order 10450. Indeed, some of them did not appear knowledgeable concerning aspects of even their own programs. It was extremely difficult for the subcommittee to elicit useful information as to the manner in which the security program under Executive Order 10450 is being coordinated and controlled to assure "fair, impartial, and equitable treatment" through "mutually consistent and no

less than minimum standards and procedures."

Assistant Attorney General Tompkins stressed the need for coordination in stating:

"All of these efforts in the internal security field must be carefully coordinated. In order to achieve maximum coordination without interfering with the responsibility and authority of any department or agency, interdepartmental liaison has been formalized."

The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is responsible, according to Mr. Tompkins' testimony, for planning and coordination in the field of internal security, other than intelligence matters. But he testified further that ICIS exercises no supervision over security screening of Government employees and does not review the various screening methods and activities.

When asked whether there is any organization in the Government which attempts to ascertain whether the various departments follow a uniform security system, Mr. Tompkins replied that the Civil Service Commission is responsible for reporting to the National Security Council on divergent security procedures, so that this could be brought to the attention of the President for remedial action. He indicated that this is the only method for coordinating the various agencies in the security field. In January 1955, however, the Department of Justice was asked to review Executive Order 10450 and the operation of the security program. Mr. Tompkins distinguished between the Department's role and that of the Civil Service Commission by pointing out that the latter merely "audits" the various agencies, while the former looks for weaknesses in the security structure. Although Mr. Tompkins did not assert that the Department of Justice has any special responsibility for coordinating the security programs of the various agencies, and seemed to avoid assuming such responsibility, he did indicate that he has met personally with security officers and legal counsels of various agencies to "gain more uniformity and to improve the program as much as humanly possible." The representatives of the Department of Defense expressed the view that the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice "heads up the administration's effort in that regard," and that the Department of Justice and the Civil Service Commission are both responsible for review and coordination. It is doubtful, however, on the basis of his testimony, that Mr. Tompkins would agree that the Department of Justice has a primary responsibility for coordination and achieving a greater degree of uniformity among the various agencies. In any event, representatives of the Department of Justice appeared, in their testimony, to lack knowledge of many of the basic aspects of implementation of the security programs of the various agencies which would be essential to the role of coordination. Mr. Tompkins was not, for example, immediately aware of the scope of Civil Service Commission investigations under Executive Order 10450; he was not aware of the fact that some agencies regard Executive Order 10450 as applicable to cases involving employees occupying nonsensitive positions concerning whom there is derogatory information about character and habits; he was not aware of "what the Civil Service Commission is doing about recommendations or administration of Executive Order 10450," and he was not aware of which agencies conduct their own personnel security investigations rather than use the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission.

Mr. Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, disavowed that his agency had any "direct coordinating authority" or any "major responsibility in terms of coordination." The role of the Civil Service Commission is confirmed, according to Mr. Young, to inspecting and appraising the application of the program, but he did indicate that discrepancies in the way various agency heads were conducting their programs might be called to their attention, although the Civil Service Commission lacks authority actually to effect changes.

The role of the Civil Service Commission in this respect stems from section 14 of Executive Order 10450, which directs the Commission to make a continuing study of the manner in which the order is being implemented to determine whether there are—

1. Deficiencies in the various security programs which are inconsistent with the interests of, or directly or indirectly weaken, the national security; and

2. Tendencies to deny employees fair, impartial, and equitable treatment, or rights under the Constitution, laws of the United States, or under Executive Order 10450.

Information as to such deficiencies or tendencies is to be brought to the attention of the agency head concerned, and is to be reported by the Commission, with recommendations for corrective action, to the National Security Council.

It is obvious, regardless of whether or not it was the intention of the Executive order that the Civil Service Commission be responsible for coordination, that in fact the Civil Service Commission has not played this role. It has not yet completed even one full cycle of auditing implementation of the security program by the various departments and agencies. Moreover, the Commission apparently is construing its responsibilities under section 14 as narrowly as possible, as is evidenced by its position that it is of no concern to the Civil Service Commission whether personnel security investigators of the agencies of the Government which conduct their own personnel investigations meet the exceptionally fine standards established by the Commission for its own investigators. The Commission apparently would not regard less than adequate investigative staffs as creating any deficiency or tendency within the meaning of section 14 of the Executive order.

The Civil Service Commission has, however, furnished information about the coordinating role of the Department of Justice, which could not be elicited from the Department itself. Mr. Young testified that there is a great deal of active coordination between all of these agencies and departments of Government on this program. He testified that the Department of Justice interprets Executive Order 10450 for the various agencies and departments and reviews their security regulations to ascertain whether agency regulations meet prescribed minimum standards, and is constantly thinking and analyzing the whole basic elements in this program in terms of subject matter and content.

Mr. Young described the machinery for coordination as follows:

"This question of coordination of this program between departments and agencies is a very interesting one, Mr. Chairman. The basic coordination, of course, arises from the fact that you are starting out and working from a basic law, a basic Executive order, and a basic set of sample regulations. Each department and agency then issues its own set of internal regulations pursuant to Executive Order 10450 in line with the sample regulations proposed by the Department of Justice.

"Variations from the sample regulations issued by the Department of Justice are approved by the Department of Justice; so at least there in terms of the basic documents you do have coordination, a coordinated starting point, let us say, at the base of this program.

"Then as you go along on this program and it goes into operation, the Civil Service Commission under section 14 is making these appraisal inspections of the departments and agencies, and if we find that a particular agency has a variation from either its own regulations or the sample regulations, approved by the Department of Justice, so that where we do find things of that sort, you get an additional amount of coordination.

"Mr. Brownell, in his recent letter that you referred to, Mr. Chairman, pointed out the fact that he was holding continuing conferences with security officers of agencies and departments, and in addition, you have the security officer of the Civil Service Commission as well as the Department of Justice, who is in constant touch with these departments and agencies most of the time."

It is obvious that coordination is the top secret of the security program. No one will accept responsibility for it, and everyone seeks to pass off the responsibility to someone else. It is difficult to understand how there can be effective coordination when responsible officials of the Government cannot agree on who is responsible for coordination. It is obvious also that only an absence of effective coordination of and supervision over the present security program could produce a conclusion by a responsible Government official, such as Mr. Young, that the security program has gone exceedingly well over the last 2 years. Quite aside from the pattern of confusion and lack of consistency revealed in the hearings before the subcommittee, and quite aside from the doubts concerning administration of the program voiced almost universally by responsible private groups, the proof of the inadequacies in the program during the past 2 years comes from its principal architect, the Attorney General.

On March 4, 1955, the President approved certain recommendations submitted by the Attorney General to improve the security program, which recommendations were based upon a study of the actual operating practices under the program. Among the recommendations of the Attorney General were the following:

1. The statement of charges "should be drawn as specifically as possible, consistent with the requirements of protecting the national security" in consultation with the chief legal officer of the agency.

2. "Meticulous care should be exercised in the matter of suspension of employees against whom derogatory information has been received."

3. A legal officer should be present at hearings to advise the Board on procedural matters and to advise the employee, if he is not represented by counsel, as to his rights.

4. Each agency head should periodically and personally review the list of persons made available by his agency for service on security hearing boards to assure that they are "persons possessing the highest degree of integrity, ability, and good judgment."

5. "Every effort should be made to produce witnesses at security board hearings to testify in behalf of the Government so that such witnesses may be confronted and cross-examined by the employee, so long as the production of such witnesses would not jeopardize the national security."

6. All violations of law as disclosed in the investigations or proceedings under the program should be reported immediately to the Division of Internal Security, Department of Justice."

Most of these principles reflect fundamental elements of any well-conceived security program, and it would be shocking to find that any security program in the United States has been operating for 18 months without full acceptance of and implementation of at least these elemental safeguards. Indeed, these principles are in some instances expressly stated in the Department of Justice's sample minimum standard regulations, while in other instances they are implicit in these regulations. If operation of the security program during the first year and a half actually

indicated a necessity for issuance of these new recommendations, there is indeed cause for great concern about operation of the security program, and it is difficult to conceive how any responsible Government official could say that the program has gone exceedingly well.

THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

In addition to the security program for Government employment, there are other programs for the security investigation and clearance of individuals employed in private industry who require access to classified material. These programs affect even more individuals than are affected by the Government employees' security program.

The Department of Defense program, which affects some 2 million employees of private industry, does not rest upon express or firm statutory foundation, but primarily upon the Department's contracting authority. Defense Department contractors are required to agree in their contracts to establish and maintain a system of security regulations. The system includes provision that only appropriately cleared personnel will have access to classified matter, and the Department of Defense has established requirements for security clearance for access to confidential, secret, and top-secret material. A top-secret clearance is predicated upon a background investigation, and a secret clearance upon a national agency check. Confidential clearance is granted for United States citizens by the contractor, rather than by the Department of Defense, on the basis of a determination that the individual's employment records are in order as to United States citizenship and that there is no information known to the contractor which indicates that the employee's access to confidential information is not clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. The Department of Defense does not, however, establish more specific standards or criteria for use by the contractors in carrying out this responsibility. If, however, the individual is an alien, a background investigation is required, and if access to confidential restricted data is involved, clearance can be granted only by the Department of Defense on the basis of a national agency check. Where a contractor finds, before granting a confidential clearance, that there is derogatory information raising a question as to whether the employee's access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, the contractor apparently has the option of simply not employing the individual in a position involving access or of referring the case to the Department of Defense for a determination as to eligibility for clearance. The ultimate standard for determination of eligibility for clearance is the same for all three categories of clearance, and is identical to the standard for determining security eligibility for Government employment under Executive Order 10450, i. e., that it is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. Moreover, the same criteria for making the determination as are employed under Executive Order 10450 are also employed in the industrial security program.

Where doubt arises as to eligibility for clearance, the employee is entitled to a hearing before a regional hearing board and to review by a central review board if his case presents novel questions or if the hearing board arrives at a divided opinion. The entire program is to be coordinated and supervised, under recently adopted procedures, by a director, who in turn is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Although security clearance determinations by the Department of Defense are explicitly stated by the Department to affect only the individual's right to access to classified information, and not his right to employment by the contractor, it is apparent that many employers will regard denial of security clearance as warranting discharge of the employee, just as the representatives of Douglas Aircraft Co. testified it would do. This means that the industrial security program has a definite impact, directly or indirectly, upon the individual's opportunity to earn a livelihood. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that employees receive the maximum opportunity, consistent with the operation of an effective security program, to defend themselves and to establish their eligibility for clearance. We find, however, that employees subject to the industrial security programs have been afforded no greater procedural protection, aside from the centralized review in some cases, than is afforded Government employees under Executive Order No. 10450. It would appear, therefore, that consideration should be given to broadening the privileges available to these individuals at least to the extent suggested for consideration with respect to Government employees.

The Atomic Energy Commission has statutory responsibility and authority for security clearance of employees of its contractors and licensees, and all others, who are to have access to restricted data. AEC criteria and procedures for determining eligibility for security clearance draw no distinction between such employees and AEC employees, and all cases are considered under the same AEC regulations.

Although the Department of Defense has apparently achieved a highly coordinated and unified industrial security program, there is no indication that there is any coordination in this respect between the AEC and Department of Defense programs. In cases in which the AEC and the Department of Defense both have a security interest in a particular plant, both would exercise independent security control and supervision. There is, moreover, no indication that there is any Governmentwide attempt at coordination of industrial security activities. The Assistant Attorney General testified that the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice does not deal with these activities, and does not have jurisdiction to review or consider these programs. It is difficult to understand why this is so, in view of the similarities between the Government employees' security programs and the industrial security programs, and the fact that individual rights may be even more substantially affected by the latter programs than by the former.

Another industrial security program of a sort is conducted by the United States Coast Guard in screening merchant seamen and waterfront workers under the port security program. Approximately 370,000 persons have to date received port security cards reflecting their security clearance.

It should be borne in mind that the millions of our citizens who have been, are, and will be subject to the industrial security program are not in any sense Government employees. They have not sought positions of public trust and in most instances have not even sought positions in industry involving access to classified information. They are ordinary working people in the 48 States who just happen to be employed by firms doing classified work, and who require security clearance in order that they be of use to their private employer. Through no initiative of their own, save the desire to hold a job or obtain advancement, they may find themselves propelled into the security vortex. They are required to execute a personnel security questionnaire. They, and their relatives and friends, may be subjected to searching security investigation resulting in the formation of dossiers which may follow them for the rest of their lives, even if some information in the dossiers is wholly unreliable or false. Their eligibility for clearance, and their very employment, may be threatened by vague allegations about themselves, or their relatives and friends, which they may have an opportunity to refute and effectively dissipate only if the industrial security programs are operated in a manner calculated to permit this. They are subject to precisely the same difficulties in defending their reputations and livelihoods as the Government employee. They face the same difficulties as Government employees in learning the charges against them, the identities of their accusers, and in obtaining the privilege of confronting their accusers. Their cases are adjudicated under much the same standards and procedures as prevail in the Government employees' security program, are subject to the same diversities of administration and interpretation.

There is clearly a necessity for an industrial security program, and it is probably also necessary that such a program operate with many of the compromises with basic American tradition which characterize the present Government employees' security program. But a program of this magnitude which operates upon the employment, livelihood, and reputation of millions of our private citizens must be carefully designed, controlled, and administered. It should, if the Government is to act in a responsible manner toward its citizenry, be established as a matter of considered national policy, and not as a matter of haphazard growth.

CONCLUSION

The picture of the overall security mechanism developed in the course of the subcommittee's consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 21 is a disturbing one. Most of the mechanism has been constructed only within the past decade, and in the same period of time the security problem has become almost a national obsession. In response to the very real peril to our national security stemming from the nature of the Communist conspiracy, which stands ready to take advantage of the slightest weakness in our security armor, we have acted almost unconsciously, and certainly without considered judgment, in trying to reinforce and strengthen this armor. We have constructed a security mechanism almost at random without regard to duplication and overlapping, without regard to dollar cost, without any effort really to appraise the nature of the peril and the appropriate defense against it, and without any real effort to achieve a logical, consistent pattern of effective security. As pointed out above, the fact that the security mechanism has evolved in this manner does not furnish cause for criticism of any person, persons, groups, or organizations. We were attempting to cope with a new and unique peril, against the pressures of time, and the resulting security structure probably represented the best which could be accomplished under the circumstances.

There can be no doubt that the security mechanism viewed as a whole (including the espionage laws and other criminal statutes relating to security protection, the laws and regulations relating to classification, control, and protection of national defense secrets, and the programs for security investigation and clearance of personnel generally) are less effective and efficient than they can and should be; cost far more than they should for actual security achieved; and afford far less protection for individual rights than is possible without jeopardy to security.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this situation is that all representatives of the Government defend the status quo even though they cannot justify its duplication, loopholes, anomalies, inadequacies, discrepancies, inconsistencies, and costs. Indeed, most of the Government witnesses appeared to learn of many of these problems for the first time when they were questioned about them before the subcommittee. There is little indication of any genuine awareness of or concern about these problems. It is

doubtful, on the basis of testimony received by the subcommittee, that any single official of the Government is today capable of even describing, let alone understanding, the present conglomeration of security laws, regulations, and procedures found throughout the Government.

It is imperative that the United States have a stringent, realistic, effective, and fair security system. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that any security program, if it gets out of control, carries with it a threat to democratic, intellectual, and humanitarian principles. While there is no indication that our present security mechanism has gotten out of control, there is also no indication that it is under effective and rational control.

The time has come to take stock, to face the problem of security with the maturity with which our democratic Government and our people have faced grave issues of national policy in the past. Let us assess the peril which faces us and decide upon a coordinated, cohesive, rational security system which will protect our national secrets and our way of life.

Security is not a partisan issue. The present deficiencies have not been caused or nurtured exclusively by either party, by either this or past administrations, or by either Congress or the executive branch. Rather, they have been thrust upon us by the threat of Soviet imperialism and subversion at a time when we were, as a nation, not fully prepared to meet the threat with complete wisdom and reason. It is not too late, however, to remedy our past errors.

There is much work to be done before the security problem can be brought under rational control. It requires extensive and objective study and analysis. A commission form of inquiry, patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, is the ideal means for coming to grips with the problem, since it would enable representation by the executive branch, the Congress, and eminent public citizens. It would also enable that calm, dispassionate consideration and recommendation, removed from the area of political controversy, which will command public respect and confidence, and provide needed reassurance to the American public in this era of security obsession. This would implement, and be wholly consistent with, the recommendation of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government that an official inquiry and appraisal of the personnel security problem be undertaken without delay by a panel of distinguished citizens whose judgment cannot be questioned. The Commission which would be established under Senate Joint Resolution 21 would, however, have a broader function than the study recommended by the task force since it would study all phases of the security mechanism and not only the personnel security program.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak briefly on the pending joint resolution. I know that the Senator from Minnesota will permit questioning at a later time. I have a pressing engagement which I must meet off the floor.

First, I wish to congratulate the entire membership of the subcommittee, which so diligently and seriously considered this far-reaching and perplexing problem, as well as the full committee, which also studied the matter and submitted the report to the Senate.

I believe this is one of the most complicated and far-reaching subjects which the American Government has ever had before it. The seriousness of the problem will continue for decades. I am very glad that this perplexing question was considered impartially and from a nonpartisan standpoint, and that a basic and fundamental study of it was made by the subcommittee and by the full committee.

It is my privilege to be, with the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota, a cosponsor of a joint resolution to establish a Commission on Government Security.

I should like to state that my purpose, and the purpose of the junior Senator from Minnesota, in introducing Senate Joint Resolution 21 was wholly nonpartisan. I am delighted by the fact that consideration of this resolution to date by the Committee on Government Operations has also been nonpartisan and that there is substantial support, from both sides of the Chamber, for its enactment.

All Members of the Senate have in the past had occasion to consider various aspects of the security problem. As I look back upon my own experiences in connection with security matters, it seems to me that we have been primarily concerned with peripheral rather than essential phases of the security mechanism. We have never come to grips with the fundamentals of Government security. We have been attempting to deal expeditiously with important problems of security as they became apparent without any real effort to articulate a national policy or approach to these problems.

I must confess that I have found many aspects of the security mechanism to be confusing and incomprehensible. This is not because I have not diligently endeavored to acquire a knowledge and understanding of security. Rather, it is because the development and growth of the security mechanism has been such as to make comprehension impossible. There is little doubt in my mind that most of the members of this body have had similar difficulties. Nor is there any doubt in my mind that even within the executive branch of the Government responsible officials concerned with administration of the security mechanism have not completely understood the force which they are wielding. Indeed, it has been difficult for me to find anyone who is capable of really explaining what security is all about and how the security mechanism operates.

The report of the Committee on Government Operations on this resolution points out, with considerable understatement I am sure, that our security system has developed in a gradual and piecemeal manner over the past decade. As an American and as a United States Senator, I have been deeply troubled by the fact that so many serious questions of justice, morality, and fundamental decency have been raised in almost every security case which has come to public attention. Many of these cases have involved actions by this Government which appear to be at best inexplicable. I am deeply troubled, moreover, by the many indications that, despite all intensive security efforts of the past decade, we still do not have a truly effective security structure which affords adequate protection in vital areas.

The problem of security should not be in any sense a matter of partisan politics. I cannot conceive that there can be any real difference of opinion between Democrats and Republicans in this area, and I do not think there is any difference. I believe it behooves us to enact a basic law on the subject, so that in a presidential election it cannot be dragged in by irresponsible people. I do not believe that the candidates themselves would do it, but it could be done by irresponsible persons, to confuse the people and to destroy their confidence in their own form of government—not merely in the temporary office holders, but in the very form of our Government.

We all recognize the importance of protecting our Government, our institutions, our national secrets, and our defense facilities against subversive depredation. The time has come for us to remove the security problem from the political arena and to construct an effective, realistic, and just security system which will provide the necessary protection against subversion with the minimum possible compromise of the basic rights and privileges of our citizens.

If I may make a personal reference, I served several years as a prosecuting attorney and, later, was honored by serving several years on the bench, and I can fully appreciate the zeal and enthusiasm of a prosecuting attorney, or one acting partly in that role, which may cause him to run by some of the danger signals marked in the Bill of Rights, or in other fundamental principles of our Government. I can fully appreciate the zeal of some legislator or some investigating group, but I am fully cognizant of the absolute necessity of our keeping daily before us the fundamental safeguards which have proven many times over that they are essential to individual liberty and justice. So, while we are protecting our Government we must also ever keep in mind the importance of absolutely protecting the basic rights of the citizens of the Republic.

Let us recognize in all candor that Democrats and Republicans, the former Democratic administration and the present Republican administration, the Congress, and the executive branch, have all made mistakes in the field of security. Let us recognize that these mistakes have not been caused by evil motivation or inept discharge of public responsibilities, but rather were the necessary and inevitable consequence of the necessity to erect immediate defenses, unique in our history, against the insidious and imminent perils of Communist imperialism. Let us all resolve to wipe the slate clean of past fumbling with security issues and of past recriminations in order that we may decide as a matter of considered national policy what security is and how a realistic and effective security program should be conducted.

It is regrettable that so much attention has been focused upon Senate Joint Resolution 21 in connection with the problem of investigation and security clearance of Government employees. This is only one phase, although an important one, of the overall security problem. The resolution provides not only for study of this phase of the

security mechanism, but also for comprehensive study of other phases of the problem as well—our espionage and sabotage laws, the classification of information, the control and dissemination of classified information, and the so-called industrial security programs. The hearings held on Senate Joint Resolution 21 before the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations clearly demonstrate the inadequacies, confusion, and lack of comprehension in these areas. But even without the hearings, it is obvious to any thoughtful person who has been exposed to the security problem that corrective action in these areas is long overdue.

In my judgment, passage of this joint resolution by the Congress will be one of the most significant events of recent years. It will provide for consideration of the fundamentals of security for the very first time in our Nation's history. It will lay the groundwork for intelligent reconstruction and rational planning of our security mechanism. It can have no consequence other than to strengthen our national security, to enhance the welfare of the people of the Nation, and to reenforce public confidence in our national effort to maintain security.

Mr. President, I am indeed grateful for the opportunity of joining with the Senator from Minnesota, who has done such splendid work, together with his colleagues on the subcommittee, in connection with this fine resolution. It is my privilege to commend the resolution to the favorable consideration of the Senate.

Let me again thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding to me. I also wish to thank the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], who is waiting for the floor.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, as a minority member of the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations, I wish to take this opportunity to say a few brief words regarding the pending measure, and regarding the hearings and deliberations of the subcommittee which led up to its action in recommending the joint resolution to the full committee and to the action of the full committee in reporting it to the Senate.

In the first place, Mr. President, as a minority member of the subcommittee who attended nearly all the hearings and followed the resolution with care, I should like to express to the acting chairman of the subcommittee, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], my appreciation for the spirit and the manner in which he conducted the hearings and for his approach to the problem.

When he stated on the floor today that he acted, not in a partisan spirit, and not with a desire to create a political issue, I think he was stating the exact truth. He conducted the hearings in a completely fair manner. It was obvious from the start that his purpose, and that of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the cosponsor of the joint resolution, was to create a commission which would make a real contribution to the solution of a most perplexing problem which involves necessarily the functions of our Government.

I also wish to thank the Senator from Minnesota on behalf of the minority members of the subcommittee for meeting us in a very fine spirit, and for accepting certain amendments to the joint resolution which we felt should be incorporated in it.

Briefly, for purposes of the record, one of the amendments provided that subcommittees of the proposed commission should consist of three members. It limited to either the chairman of the entire commission or to a majority of one of its subcommittees the power to hold hearings and issue subpenas, thus making it impossible for one member of the commission to travel about the country, summon witnesses, and hold hearings.

Another amendment would protect the investigative agencies of the Government and make it very plain that the executive department, the President, and the investigative agencies, such as the FBI, would not be required to furnish records or to disclose information which would in any way hamper or cripple their activities in the matter of protecting the Nation from subversives and subversive activities.

These amendments were adopted without any opposition and, I think, in accordance with the unanimous desire of the full committee to furnish added safeguards. We also appreciate that fact, Mr. President.

It is a privilege for a comparatively new Member of the Senate and a new member of the committee to work with the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], and the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]; and also, Mr. President, on our side, to work with the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]. I particularly wish to express my appreciation to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN], who spent a great deal of time with me listening to the hearings and then in considering the evidence adduced.

Mr. President, I wish to comment very briefly upon and invite the attention of the Senate to some facts which were brought out in the testimony of Chairman Philip Young, of the Civil Service Commission, who was one of the witnesses before the subcommittee. Mr. Young's testimony indicated that the present program is making good progress. His testimony also developed some important points about the program which were not publicly known or which in the past have been so frequently overlooked.

Mr. Young's testimony showed that a security screening job of enormous magnitude has now been virtually completed by the Government. Approximately 2,200,000 of the Government's 2,300,000 employees have been measured against the security standard of Executive Order No. 10450, and all but a relative handful of those measured have successfully met the test. Still to be completed, at the time of Mr. Young's testimony, were roughly 100,000 additional cases, and they will be finished soon. For all practical purposes, the security program from this time forward will be conducted primarily for the purpose of preventing the employment of any applicant whose employment would not be clearly consistent with the national security.

The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission also testified that the large bulk of investigations required in the process of screening this huge number of employees was performed by the FBI and by investigators of the Civil Service Commission. He described at length the careful selection of and the training given to civil service investigators, and referred to the fact that the competence of these investigators is generally acknowledged.

During the past year, he said, 40 percent of the full field investigations under the security program were performed by the Civil Service Commission, 25 percent by the FBI, and the remainder by other agencies—chiefly the Department of Defense and the Post Office Department—which have their own, long-established investigative staffs. He cited an average cost to the Civil Service Commission of from $217 to $265 for a full field investigation.

The results of the program, as summarized by Mr. Young, completely explode one of the popular fallacies which have been given such wide circulation, namely, that all or most Federal dismissals have been made for security reasons. Mr. Young pointed out that only 3,002 separations based on security grounds have been recorded; while, during the same period of operation of the Federal employee security program, a total of 28,531 Federal employees were dismissed for cause. Thus only a very small percentage of the total number removed was in the security category.

On the question of confrontation of accused employees by witnesses, Mr. Young cited in detail the steps which have been taken within the Civil Service Commission, in the operation of its internal employee security program, to assure that such confrontation is arranged in all possible instances. He showed that out of 12 cases where hearings were held, witnesses were identified in reports of investigation in 5 cases. A total of 15 witnesses were invited in those 5 cases. Six witnesses appeared in 4 of the cases and were cross-examined.

Mr. Young's testimony also brought out the provision under Executive Order No. 10450 which permits an employee dismissed under the security program to appeal to the Civil Service Commission for clearance of his record. Fifty-four cases have been completed under that procedure, Mr. Young said, and the Commission rendered a favorable decision in 9 cases and an unfavorable decision in 29 cases. Sixteen cases were closed without action, and 11 are pending at the present time.

These are just a few of the specific points of information presented by Mr. Young to the subcommittee concerning matters on which there has been frequent misunderstanding and misstatement.

Mr. President, it was, and I believe is, the unanimous opinion of the subcommittee which considered the measure that it would be greatly for the good of the Nation to have a commission review, dispassionately and without partisanship, the entire security system of the Government, and to recommend to the President and to Congress such measures and steps as in their opinion, would coordinate and solidify it, and make it even more effective than it now is.

However, in the opinion, at least, of the junior Senator from New Hampshire, who listened carefully to the evidence, much progress has already been made, and the revelations made before the subcommittee indicate that both the last and the present administrations have been earnestly and honestly seeking to improve, perfect, and coordinate the security system.

Of the many matters which the evidence before the committee brought to our attention, there are two points I should like to leave with the Senate. I hope Senators will read the evidence. But, boiled down, one of the matters which appealed to me, at least, as worthy of careful consideration was the coordinating of the whole security program.

There is not a shadow of doubt, in my opinion, that steps should be taken, including proper legislative action, to coordinate, fit together, and make more uniform our security activities. However, in justice to the executive branch, it should be remembered that one reason why progress has been difficult in this matter is that Congress itself, in enacting the law, provided that the head of each department should have supreme authority to organize and to operate the security activities of his own department. Congress having enacted the present law, it is more difficult to be certain that uniform practices are pursued in all the departments.

In the second place, in justice to those at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue who are working on the program, I wish to point out that, as a matter of fact, a coordinator, unofficially selected from the Department of Justice, and attached to the White House, has been working for many months, seeking, so far as possible under the present law, to coordinate the security activities of the Government. Among the accomplishments of Mr. Donegan, who was especially assigned to the task, has been the formation of a committee upon which the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other departments have representatives, and which has been meeting weekly, trying to encourage and to bring about so far as possible, coordination of the security program.

I believe that much has been accomplished, and that the country should not be given the impression that no effort is being made to coordinate the present program, although I freely admit and agree with the other members of the committee that there is much left to be done.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COTTON. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I congratulate the junior Senator from New Hampshire and the other members of his committee on their constructive approach to the continuing problem of security. I include in the congratulations my distinguished neighbor, the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] and his associate in the introduction of the joint resolution, the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

As the time the matter came before the whole committee, of which I was a member, I reserved my vote, because I had not had an opportunity to read the rather voluminous hearings and to confer with the members of the subcommittee about exactly what they had in mind. Having done both, I can say unreservedly I am a strong supporter of this approach and this resolution. I think history has demonstrated this Hoover type approach to a government problem is the best Congress has been able to devise. In the past the method has succeeded in eliminating partisanship. The resolution provides for adequate staffing, time, and concentration on the problem, and should have good results.

I can concur in what the Senator from New Hampshire has said, that much progress has been made in recent months in coordinating security problems; but, on the other hand, security of the Government is a continuing problem, and we cannot be too careful and cautious in setting up the various elements of Government machinery to accomplish a good result, both from the standpoint of the security of the country and the protection of the rights of individuals. I believe the Senator will agree——

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCOTT in the chair). Will the Senator please suspend? The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, S. 1713, which the clerk will state by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1713) to amend the act of July 31, 1947—61st United States Statutes at Large, page 681—and the mining laws to provide for multiple use of the surface of the same tracts of the public lands, and for other purposes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Hampshire yield?

Mr. COTTON. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. As I understand, we have a most unusual parliamentary situation. Since, as of last Friday, there was a motion to adjourn rather than recess, therefore now the unfinished business of Friday has been brought up after the morning hour, the hour of 2 o'clock.

I am not too familiar with all the minute details of parliamentary procedure, but if it is in order I should like to ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside and that the Senate proceed with the business which was being discussed up to the hour of 2 o'clock, namely, Senate Joint Resolution 21.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Such a request is in order. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Now we may proceed with the colloquy between the Senator from New Hampshire and the Senator from South Dakota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has the floor.

Mr. MUNDT. Continuing from where I left off at this timely interruption at the hour of 2 o'clock, I should like to ask the Senator from New Hampshire a question. Does the Senator not feel that the problem of security in government is certainly of sufficient importance to justify the small expenditure of money and the great expenditure of effort which will be devoted to the problem by this Commission?

Mr. COTTON. I will say to the Senator from South Dakota most emphatically that I agree with everything he has said, and I appreciate his contribution, because I know of his experience in this field. We on the committee felt that the creation of the Commission and the expenditures which would be incident thereto were worthwhile.

As I said before, and I think the Senator from South Dakota expressed exactly the same thought much better than I expressed it, I was trying to point out we did not uncover some terrible situation or neglect which would shock the country. On the contrary, we found the matter has been progressing well, and has received the earnest, careful, and painstaking attention of the present administration, and of the preceding one, to a large degree. But we did come to the inescapable conclusion that, from the long-time standpoint, it would be wise to go after the problem "man fashion." The time which was devoted to the problem and the money which was spent in connection with it were worthwhile, because security is one of the most vital and necessary factors we must protect in order to save our Government.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. COTTON. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I am sure what the Senator has stated is correct. The senior Senator from South Dakota has had the unusual, and I sometimes think the unhappy, distinction of having served longer on investigating committees than has any other Member presently in office either in the House or the Senate. That experience started under the chairmanship of Mr. MARTIN DIES, in the Un-American Activities Committee, and continued until the time I came to the Senate. In the Senate I have served on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of which I am still a member. I have become increasingly aware of the situation, because security procedure in the legislative and executive branches has grown like Topsy.

I recall, for example, during the long and heated debate which took place during the consideration and passage of the Mundt-Nixon bill, which today comprises the first 17 sections of our Internal Security Act, in the give-and-take of parliamentary debate and in the effort to secure sufficient votes to override a presidential veto of the bill, it was necessary to accept several amendments which were drawn hastily on the floor of the Senate, and which today comprise a part

of the law of the land. Some of those were amendments which I would have ordinarily opposed, such as the one provision in the law which provides for concentration-camp type punishment for certain individuals. I am one who abhors all types of concentration camps, but that provision is part of the law of the land. It represents part of the increasing need for study, and it is hoped that as a result of studies on the part of the Commission there will come forth recommendations that will result in a recodification of the security laws so far as they have emanated from Congress, a careful weighing and a careful study to determine which are needed, which are necessary, and which might be replaced, in view of our later experiences, by new legislation. I would hope there might also come about a recodification of executive edicts, orders, and regulations, which are still in effect, to the extent, insofar as possible—I do not envision that it would be completely possible—of establishing similar criteria to meet similar conditions among our various Government departments and agencies. I am aware that in the FBI, the CIA, or the Atomic Energy Commission different standards and criteria would be needed than would be needed in a department such as the Department of Agriculture or a similar department. I do not say or imply we should let down the bars to permit subversives to work in the Government. We have to be more careful about the record of our Government employees who work in the CIA, the FBI, and the Atomic Energy Commission, than was Caesar about his wife.

I think there was an abundantly clear need shown for a constructive approach to the problem, which I think is going to flow from this type of commission. I congratulate those who offered the resolution and the subcommittee who have urged that it be passed. I support it enthusiastically. I hope it is unanimously adopted.

Mr. COTTON. I thank the Senator from South Dakota. I have only 2 or 3 more observations, and then I shall relinquish the floor.

Before the Senator from South Dakota made his fine statement, I had just stated that there were two points which, from the standpoint of the Senator from New Hampshire, seemed to loom large in the hearings. The first was the matter of cognation, on which I have touched.

The second is the matter of the protection of the rights of individuals, to which I wish to refer before I close, because, in my opinion, it is one of the most controversial questions involved in this matter, and one which will challenge the best consideration of any commission or group of individuals who may be called upon to act upon the security question.

Many of the witnesses who came before the committee seemed to be more deeply concerned—although I say very frankly to the Senate that that is not my feeling—about the possibility under the present program of the rights of citizens being in some way trampled upon, than they were in the question of whether the present program is effective in protecting the United States of America from espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities.

In the first place, Mr. President, let me say that I served for 5 years on the Subcommittee on Independent Offices appropriations, of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. During those 5 years, which were critical ones with respect to our security program, we were working on appropriations for—among other agencies—the Civil Service Commission. Each year, we received from the Civil Service Commissioners a complete report about the workings of the security program.

It should be recalled that during those years the work was largely one of screening those who already were employed by the Government when the question of security arose. At that time there was a rather expensive, rather cumbersome, complex and complicated system of investigators, boards of inquiry, and appeals boards by districts and regions. The appeals boards were provided in order that every Government employee who found himself or herself under scrutiny and investigation, and labeled as a security risk, would have every right of appeal and every right to clear his or her name and to demonstrate his or her innocence.

I think everyone concedes that was entirely necessary, because we were dealing with persons who had served the Government for years, most of whom had reached middle life, who had children and families to maintain, who were wedded to their jobs, and who, if thrown out of employment, particularly under such circumstances that a stigma of disloyalty or of being security risks would attach to them, would be ruined, in that they would be unable to obtain new employment. Thus, they and their families would receive a grave blow.

However, at the present time, to all intents and purposes, that phase has been completed. During the past years the persons who have been working for the Government have been tested and screened; at least, that is true in the case of those who in any way are in key positions and handle classified information. From now on, the problem is one of how to deal with the applicant—for instance, the young college graduate or other person—who wishes to work for the Government.

If we are to assume that a person who applies to Uncle Sam for a job, and is told there is no job for him, has placed upon him a stigma which will continue on him for the rest of his days, perhaps there may be good reason for an expensive, cumbersome, unwieldy, complicated and slow system of boards of investigation, appeals boards, and other types of tribunals.

On the other hand, it is contended by many persons—and I am frank to say that I find myself among them—that we should follow a security procedure whereby there would be a screening of all persons entering the employment of the Government, and not merely those who apply for jobs in the performance of which, on the face of things, they might have to do with classified information. Even a young man who seeks employment in the Department of Agriculture, or in some other Government agency, in the most innocuous kind of job which could not by the wildest stretch of the imagination be regarded as one in which he would be in the possession of information which, if improperly used, would hurt this country, should be carefully screened. The situation is such that if every Government employee or applicant for Government employment is not screened, and his habits, his associations, and his loyalty carefully checked, then perhaps 10 years later it will be found that he has gradually risen on the ladder of Government employment until he is in a position in which he handles delicate subjects. In short, we must be sure of all Government employees. Then we shall not find ourselves in the situation of having to discharge from the Government service a man who has been employed for 10 years, and has a family, and has no other means of livelihood except the Government service. After all, Mr. President, when a person has established a long record of Government service, and finds himself in the position to which I have referred, in simple justice we must go the whole way in protecting all his rights.

So, Mr. President, I submit for the consideration of the Senate and of the country that if we are to spend money and to train investigators and to check, at the threshold, any applicant for employment in the Government service, all of them should be checked.

So long as they are not publicly tried, or so long as nothing to cast discredit upon them is done, it is not necessary for us to spend money and time in providing tribunals to enable such persons to appeal again and again, as if such persons will have a constitutional right to work for the Government.

So, Mr. President, we are confronted with these two problems: First, that of coordinating a loose system which, in the words of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] and other Senators, has grown up like Topsy; and, second, the question of determining what should be our policy, and how far we should go in protecting the individual. Each of us agrees that a fundamental duty rests upon us to see to it that the individual is protected. But the question is how far we should go in doing that and how far we should go in screening all new employees, regardless of whether they are to serve in sensitive positions. Those are some of the questions which developed at the hearings, and which should be considered most carefully and dispassionately and thoroughly by the proposed Commission.

Mr. MUNDT rose.

Mr. COTTON. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. First, let me congratulate the Senator from New Hampshire for stating very vividly, clearly, and dramatically the challenge which lies ahead in the case of Government employment, if the proposed commission is established. We can work out machinery which will provide that careful, meticulous screening be done of all new Government employees.

I could not agree more with the Senator from New Hampshire, when he says that regardless of whether a young man enters the Government originally in a low echelon or whether he begins in a highly sensitive position, it is imperative that he be screened as an official or as a Government employee, because then we can follow very carefully the doctrine that whenever there is any benefit of doubt to be given, it should be given to the Government and to those who are peaceful, honest, God-fearing, and loyal, who live under the machinery of the administration of that Government.

In earlier days, there were long debates in Congress as to whether a person who already was on the job, and about whom an element of doubt had developed, should have that doubt resolved from the standpoint of having the benefit of the doubt go to the individual or go to the Government. In the first instance, the former administration tried to follow a theory under which the doubt would be resolved for the benefit of the individual concerned. But that did not work, because although it safeguarded a few innocents who were in the Government service, and who otherwise might have been embarrassed, it jeopardized millions of innocent Americans who thus found themselves living under a system in which infiltration could easily be carried on.

So we tried the other philosophy, namely, that of resolving the doubt in favor of the Government, rather than the individual. Under that arrangement, on occasion there was an opportunity for cumbersome practices, and for injustice to the individual employees.

But, Mr. President, certainly at the threshold of Government service we can afford to follow carefully a formula to the effect that if there is any doubt whatever, it shall be resolved for the benefit of the Government, and that those about whom there is any doubt should be screened out.

We should establish the clear concept that association in the form of employment by the Government is not a right but a rare privilege, and that any person who is employed by the Government should be entirely faithful and loyal in that service. Such service is a privilege which comes to the few—the few who seek it, the few who deserve it, and the few who will perform it faithfully.

I should like to suggest one thing further. It is possible that those who read the RECORD—and we are writing here legislative history which is certain to govern the deliberations of this Commission—may sense, in something which the Senator from New Hampshire has said, an impression which I am sure he did not wish to convey when he stated—and stated correctly—that the big problem now is the problem of what to do about screening employees who enter the service of the Government in the future. The impression should not be created that, in the main, the job of screening, investigating, and checking those at present employed has been largely completed.

I simply wish to register the fact—with which I am sure the Senator from New Hampshire will agree—that while the job of checking those now employed has in fact been largely completed, it has not been entirely completed, and it will never be entirely completed. It is a continuing problem. It seems to me that we must always have machinery for checking those already on the job, because individuals may change. We have seen individuals in public life switch from one major political party to the other, as is their right. There is nothing wrong in that, so far as loyalty to country is concerned. But we also have sent subversives to the penitentiary as a result of facts developed in committees with which the present speaker has been associated. Certain cases involved young men who undoubtedly originally came to the Government with stardust in their eyes and loyalty in their hearts, but whose connections and associations changed, and who later switched to subversive attachments because of temptations. We must, therefore, always have machinery for weeding out such persons and detecting them, if, as, and when changes take place among those already on the payroll.

Mr. COTTON. I thank the Senator. I wish to make it crystal clear that I did not mean we should ever relax our vigilance in dealing with the vast number of Federal employees. However, I was reviewing the mechanics, the technical machinery of the original screening, and bringing out the point that the first step in the screening of present employees had been completed, and that the method of approaching the second step was now before us.

Let me close with one further observation. In the first place, I believe that every member of the subcommittee who listened to the evidence and studied the problem is in agreement that the pending joint resolution is a meritorious measure. None of us has any desire to bring about a duplication of the work of other committees of the Congress, or the work of the executive departments. However, I think we all reached the conclusion that a careful review of this problem, which has grown to be one of our most vital problems, and which will be with us perhaps as long as the Government lasts, should be undertaken by a commission along the lines of the Hoover Commission, outside the Congress. We all commend the distinguished Senator from Minnesota for his activities in seeking to create such a commission.

In the second place, I wish to make it very clear that, for my part, at least, the evidence indicated that in the past few months tremendous strides have been made by the Government, under the leadership of President Eisenhower, in attacking this problem and in improving the efficiency of the agencies dealing with it.

In the third place, I express the hope that if the joint resolution is passed, there will be appointed a commission which will study this problem from the most dispassionate standpoint possible, recognizing that they are reaching into the most intricate mechanism of the entire Government, involving the rights and privileges of individuals, as well as the safety of our country. There is no subject which requires more meticulous, incisive, clear-cut thinking, and dispassionate justice. It is in the hope of establishing such a commission that we who are members of the committee have joined unanimously in recommending the passage of the pending joint resolution.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COTTON. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. First of all, I wish to express my personal gratification and thanks to the Senator from New Hampshire for his words of commendation and kindness.

I wish to make it crystal clear that the Senator from New Hampshire was most diligent in his attendance upon the sessions of the subcommittee. He is a helpful and informed member of the subcommittee.

I think the Senate should clearly understand that the only conclusion our subcommittee reached was that this area of security needs the kind of study recommended. I want that made clear, because the subcommittee did not consider, point by point, differences of opinion among various witnesses, or even among various members of the subcommittee.

We held hearings. As the Senator from New Hampshire has stated, the printed hearings are rather voluminous. This is the first time in the history of this Government that all the security rules, regulations, Executive orders, public laws, and statutes have ever been brought together in one comprehensive volume, along with the pertinent inquiry and investigation which took place during the hearings, which covered a rather wide range of governmental activity.

If we have done nothing else, we have at least provided a volume of information for lawyers and students, and others who are concerned with the problem of security regulation or who are keenly interested in it.

I believe that what we have done is to indicate, by the hearings, the urgent necessity of two things: First, the best protection humanly possible of the national security; secondly, equating such protection with what we call basic American traditional rights insofar as it is humanly possible to do so consistent with the interest of the national security.

I wish to thank particularly my friend the Senator from New Hampshire, who has done so much in this field. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN] is also present. He was very helpful to the subcommittee.

I think I should also say that the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] was exceedingly helpful, particularly in the concluding stages, when we were drafting amendments and reaching an agreement on the report.

I thank each and every one.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, before relinquishing the floor, let me thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota for his observation.

I wish to add to the hope which I expressed with respect to the conduct and work of the proposed Commission the hope that the Commission will be able and careful in its work, and will follow

the same program as that followed by the subcommittee under the able leadership of my distinguished friend from Minnesota.

It was not a question of trying to select individual cases, or digging into this case or that case, or trying to find political ammunition in the treatment of individual cases. At all times we tried to keep our eyes on the main problem.

I make the following statement with some apprehension, but I think it should be in the record: Of course, the Commission cannot study the security system of the Government without knowing something of the individual cases and how they have been administered. But I am sure the Commission can proceed in such a manner that there will be no question of trying to get into its record information which, in the interest of future security, should not be divulged. At the same time, there should be a general, overall, clear-cut presentation of how the security program is being administered and how it ought to be administered.

I hope the joint resolution will pass, and I urgently trust that the Commission, when and if appointed, will do one of the best jobs ever done in this Government, because this is a field which calls for such service.

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. President, first I wish to join with the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON] in expressing appreciation for the good work done by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] in the conduct of the hearings and in the deliberations of the committee on the pending joint resoluton. I was very proud and pleased to join with the other members of the committee in making a study of what I consider to be one of the most important activities and responsibilities of our Government.

Senate Joint Resolution 21 would establish a 12-member Commission of which not more than 6 members could come from the same political party. It would study all phases of the Government's security programs and procedures, and submit appropriate recommendations, with a final report to the Congress and the President not later than December 31, 1956, possibly at an earlier date, if it is agreed upon.

The Commission is patterned after the so-called Hoover Commission, and is designed to be nonpartisan in its approach and implementation.

Under the joint resolution, 4 members would be named by the President, of whom 2 would be from the executive branch and 2 from private life; 4 would be named by the President of the Senate, 2 of whom would be Members of the Senate and 2 from private life; and the remaining 4 would be named by the Speaker of the House—2 from the House membership and 2 from private life. No more than two of those appointed by the President, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker, respectively, could be from the same political party.

The Commission would study not only the entire Government security program, including the statutes and regulations, but would also have the duty of ascertaining whether the overall security program is in accord with the policy of Congress, that there shall be a sound Government program affecting security, including investigations and clearances for Government employees and persons privately employed or occupied in work requiring access to national secrets.

Basically, the problem or assignment which the Commission is given under Senate Joint Resolution 21 is to find out whether our Federal security program is working well or whether there is need at this time to look it over and revise and amend it.

The approach taken by the joint resolution is by no means the only one; other techniques could be equally appropriate. The important thing is to get the job done and to have it done well.

It is probably not realized, with respect to the present Federal security program, that during the period 1789 to 1911 there were no general limitations whatsoever on the power of the Executive to dismiss Federal employees—hearings, page 103.

In 1912 the Lloyd-La Follette Act was passed. It provided that—

> No person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answering the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the officer making the removal; and copies of charges, notice of hearing, answer, reasons for removal, and of the order of removal shall be made a part of the records of the proper Department or office, as shall also the reasons for reduction in rank or compensation; and copies of the same shall be furnished to the person affected upon request, and the Civil Service Commission also shall, upon request, be furnished copies of the same. (Chart, p. 103 of hearings.)

There were no further additions to the law in this field until the Hatch Act was passed in 1939. Section 9 (A) of that act provided that—

> (1) Membership of Government employees in political parties or organizations advocating overthrow of our constitutional form of government is unlawful; and (2) the penalty for violation shall be immediate removal from one's job; no subsequent appropriation for the position filled by the violator shall be used to pay for his compensation (chart, p. 103).

During World War II the Lloyd-La Follette Act was amended by Public Law 808, of the 77th Congress, in 1942, to provide that protections afforded under the act shall not apply to any civil-service employees of the War or Navy Departments or the Coast Guard whose immediate removal is warranted by the demands of national security. Persons thus summarily removed may, if in the opinion of the Secretary concerned, subsequent investigation so warrants, be reinstated and also be allowed compensation for all and any part of the period of such removal. A removed person has the right to appear personally and be fully informed of reasons for removal within 30 days and to submit within 30 days thereafter a statement and affidavits to show why he should not be removed—chart, page 103.

Then, came the Truman loyalty order, Executive Order No. 9835, dated March 21, 1947. It provided that the standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States—chart, page 103.

The act of August 26, 1950, Public Law 733, 81st Congress, contained the provision that certain heads of agencies—State, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, AEC, Defense, National Security Resources Board, and National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics—

> May in its absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interests of national security, suspend without pay, any civilian officer or employee. * * * The agency head concerned may, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security of the United States, and such determination by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final (chart, p. 103).

Then came a change in the Truman loyalty order. It was brought about by Executive Order 10241, dated April 28, 1951, and provided:

> The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States (chart, p. 103).

Starting in 1942, every appropriation act has contained a standard rider as follows:

> No part of this appropriation shall be used to pay the salary or wages of any person who advocates, or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence (chart, p. 103).

The appropriation act rider has provided as a penalty that a violator who accepts employment, the compensation for which is paid by this appropriation, is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to 1 year or both. The penalty clause is in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law—Chart, p. 103.

Finally, there is the Eisenhower security order, Executive Order No. 10450, dated April 27, 1953. Section 2 of the Eisenhower security order provides that—

> The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security (chart, p. 103).

As one who has been a Member of the House and the Senate over a period of years, I desire to make it unmistakably

clear that when the Truman loyalty program was inaugurated, I supported it. When the Eisenhower security program was developed and substituted for the Truman loyalty program, I supported that. I am now supporting Senate Joint Resolution 21, which I have already described and which would establish a "Hoover-type" Commission to study all phases of Government security and submit recommendations.

This approach is a logical one in our efforts to achieve an adequate and complete program affecting security and to carry it out fairly.

I believe that no one has stated the essence of the difficulties involved in a Government security program better than did Governor Brucker, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, when he appeared before our subcommittee last March to testify on this resolution. He said:

> Achieving a proper balance between the demands of security for all of the people and the traditional rights of individuals is one of the most difficult problems of our age. There is no panacea. It calls for the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job and presents a challenge which all must strive to meet (p. 224).

I would note parenthetically that the choice of Governor Brucker to replace Secretary of the Army Stevens is merited recognition of his outstanding personality and abilities, as well as recognition of his substantial contributions as a public servant over a period of many years.

In the same connection I should also like to call attention to the comments of another witness before the subcommittee, Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins, who is in charge of the Division of Internal Security, Department of Justice. He stated:

> The difficulty of establishing and maintaining a personnel security program now as always has been the problem of striking a balance between authority and liberty because of our historic insistence upon due process of law for the protection of civil rights. National security and individual liberty are the same and one without the other is, in the words of J. Edgar Hoover, "a mockery" (p. 81).

While each has stated the difficulties in his own way, I heartily subscribe to these comments by both of these distinguished witnesses to whom I have referred. They assisted greatly in the work of the subcommittee, as did the many other witnesses who appeared before it.

We have examined briefly the historical background of the Federal security program. A glance at its present structure—the statutes, regulations, and directives under which the program operates—reveals a complex of laws and regulations which concern espionage, unlawful disclosure of information, employee loyalty and security, industrial plant security, and port security.

A further glance at this program reveals a complex of activities which affect not only the whole of Government, but also a large segment of non-Government operations.

There are, for example, the activities of the Defense Department in screening, for security purposes, its military personnel and its civilian personnel.

The latter comprise about 1,150,000, or 49 percent, of all the civilian employees of the Government—page 171. There are also the industrial-security and port-security programs under the Defense Department.

Taking still another look, we find increasingly large numbers of Federal employees engaged in carrying out security programs. To be sure, not all of these employees have assignments which are limited solely to Government security, but to a large extent their assignments are so directed. The Civil Service Commission, according to recent information, has 1,713 employees on its investigative staff—page 502 of hearings. It has been stated that at least 19 Federal departments and agencies have some direct responsibility in the field of internal security—page 10.

With respect to investigation of Federal employees and applicants for Federal employment, the Civil Service Commission in 1954 conducted about 40 percent of the total number of full-field investigations. The FBI conducted 25 percent, and the remaining 35 percent was carried on by other agencies, including the Post Office Department—page 521. These other agencies included the military intelligence units of the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, and others. There is a separate statutory program, for clearance and the like, for the Atomic Energy Commission.

On the subject of costs there was testimony that each full field investigation made by the Civil Service Commission cost the taxpayer $217.76, on the average, in 1954—page 521.

The foregoing recital, although necessarily quite sketchy, indicates somewhat the vast scope of the assignment which is to be given to the commission proposed to be created for Senate Joint Resolution 21.

But, Mr. President, make no mistake about it, the present Federal security program, in the main, is a good program. It is well conceived and it has been well implemented, especially in the recent past. Chairman Young, of the Civil Service Commission, stated to the subcommittee, as follows:

> This security program within the Federal Government on Federal employees has gone exceedingly well over the last 2 years. In fact, when you consider the difficulties in the size of the operation and getting this sort of thing off the ground and getting it functioning within a relatively short time, with 2,300,000 employees, many of them in all corners of the world, and getting uniform application and interpretation on it, I think it is a great tribute, not only to the Federal administrators, but to everyone who has had anything to do with the application of this program within each department and agency to make the kind of record which they have (p. 519).

I am in complete accord with the views expressed by Mr. Young.

Senate Joint Resolution 21 was introduced last January 18 under the joint sponsorship of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

The resolution was referred to the Subcommittee on Reorganization, whose members are: the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], chairman, and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY]; the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]; the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]; the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]; the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON]; and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN]. In the regretted and enforced absence of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] served as acting chairman of the subcommittee ably and admirably in connection with this legislation.

Without any intended reflection upon the other subcommittee members, I feel I would be remiss if I did not make special mention of the effective and conscientious work of our colleague, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON] throughout the entire period the measure was before the committee.

Hearings on the resolution were held between March 8 and March 18, inclusive. The hearings were well attended by committee members, and testimony was received from various well-informed and responsible Government officials, as well as some representatives of industry, of labor, of the press, and from other interested groups and individuals.

The printed hearings, with appendix, comprise more than 1,300 pages. Much of the information in the hearings is available nowhere else.

The proceedings have had careful study by the entire subcommittee.

It was agreed from the beginning that the subcommittee would keep political considerations to a minimum. In the main, that understanding has been adhered to. During the hearings, no study was made of individual cases of alleged abuses or alleged maladjustments of the security program. It was understood that individual cases were not to bear on the subcommittee assignment, except as they might bear upon procedures or methods or systems. This understanding was adhered to.

The hearings established, among other things, the need to delve further into questions asked of the various witnesses and into the subject matter of many of their responses. The further study contemplated by the resolution is clerly beyond the scope of the subcommittee's assignment and, if properly complied with, the study of the proposed Commission on Government Security should aid in developing and maturing our security system.

It is a matter of personal gratification to me, not only as a member of the subcommittee, but as a citizen of the United States, that each member of the subcommittee demonstrated a sincere desire to help attain the objective of a mature and complete Federal security program—always, of course, with proper safeguards for individual rights. This objective is the natural evolution or development called for by the greatly expanded Government personnel and the greatly expanded governmental activity in the field of restricted information in a time of worldwide tension.

The safeguards provided in the bill regarding the composition of the Commission justify some emphasis and stress. It is to be a bipartisan Commission and every effort has been made to insure that its study will have the benefit of the thinking of all interested and affected groups and individuals, both in the Government and outside it.

It will be a part of the task of the Commission on Government Security to ascertain the effectiveness of the security program, both in its structure and in its administration. It is to be hoped that the program, when examined in detail, will be found to have a minimum of defects; but I, for one, will wish to assist in remedying any defects which may be found at the earliest possible moment. There are two compelling reasons for this: First, we cannot in the interest of national security have any but the best security program. Second, we cannot tolerate any abuses being perpetrated upon individuals to whom a program may be applied, either because of its structure or its administration.

In closing, I express the hope that the Commission will perform the task assigned it as a patriotic duty to all the people, that Democrats and Republicans alike will dedicate themselves as citizens first and partisans last toward achieving a proper balance between the interests of the State in its fight for survival against its enemies within and without our shores, and the interests of the individual in preserving the very freedoms which are the only justification for the survival of the State itself.

The enactment of this resolution conforms to that objective and is worthy of the support of the Senate.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I wish to pay tribute to the chairman of the subcommittee, the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], and to the members of the committee for their work on and study of the question of security, and for reporting the joint resolution which is before the Senate for consideration.

I happen to be a member of a committee which was created under Senate Resolution 20, which authorized and delegated the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service to make a study and investigation of the administration of the internal security program of the Government. The chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], and I are members of that subcommittee.

From the hearings which have been held, it is my firm opinion that our committee, which is really making an investigation of individual cases, and will continue to do so, can well receive the benefit and advice which would come from a commission such as the one proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 21. After hearing some of the witnesses and some of the testimony, it seems to me that such a study is needed; in fact, I am convinced that the present internal security program is not infallible. The job of protecting America from subversion, without violating the traditional and constitutional rights of individuals is a difficult one. It is for that reason that I shall favor and support the resolution, which provides for such a study. It seems to me that the importance of the program to our Government and to those who are working for the Government is such that we need a searching and thorough study, and need it promptly.

On the basis of the pending joint resolution, which provides for a high-level commission, nonpartisan and bipartisan in character, we can expect a well-considered and helpful report, which will be of value to the Government and to the country.

However, I am concerned about the provision in the joint resolution with respect to the date when the report shall be made to Congress. Under the measure now being considered, the Commission must report to Congress not later than December 31, 1956. I am convinced that a report should not be delayed that long. It is my sincere hope that the Commission may report early next year, in order that the next session, the second session of the 84th Congress, will be in a position to deal with some of the recommendations. I think the questions involved are so urgent and important that the report should not be delayed until December 31, 1956, and be left for consideration by the 85th Congress.

Therefore, I shall offer an amendment which I sincerely hope the chairman of the subcommittee will accept. If it be in order, I should like to offer the amendment now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee amendments have not been disposed of.

Mr. CARLSON. I shall be glad to withhold my amendment until the committee amendments have been acted upon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The committee amendments will be stated.

The first amendment of the Committee on Government Operations was, on page 4, line 1, after the word "quorum", to insert "Each subcommittee of the Commission shall consist of at least three members of the Commission."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 6, line 19, after the word "subcommittee", to strike out "or member."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was on page 7, line 1, after the words "subcommittee", to strike out "or member."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 3, after the word "Commissioner", to strike out "of such committee, or any duly designated member", and insert "or the chairman of any subcommittee with the approval of a majority of the members of such subcommittee."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 7, after the word "Chairman", to strike out "or member."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in the subhead, in line 22, after the word "Prosecutions", to insert "And Investigative."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was on page 8, line 2, after the word "the" where it appears the second time, to strike out "premature."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 5, after the word "intelligence", to insert "or investigative."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 6, after the word "agency", to insert a comma and "or would jeopardize or interfere with the interests of national security."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 9, after the word "Commission", to strike out "shall" and insert "may."

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was in line 12, after the word "than", to strike out "January 15" and insert "December 31."

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to the committee amendment just stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas to the committee amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 8, line 13, it is proposed to strike out "December 31," and insert in lieu thereof "March 1."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment to the committee amendment offered by the junior Senator from Kansas.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I have discussed the amendment, not only with the Senator from Kansas, but also with other members of the subcommittee, with the exception if the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], who is unavoidably absent on official business.

May I ask the Senator from Kansas if he will engage with me for a few minutes in some good, old fashioned American horsetrading, so to speak?

I think the date of March 1, 1956, is a little too short a time. It is my hope that the Commission might be provided with at least an additional month in which to submit its final report, namely, on March 31, 1956, so that there could be a target date for the Commission to make its report.

I think we have faced up to the fact that an extension of time might be needed, but I agree with the Senator that the work should be expedited. In fact, I was desirous of having the report submitted earlier, but I acceded to requests from other members of the subcommittee that the time be extended to December 31, 1956, as provided in the joint resolution. It will be noted that that was a subcommittee amendment.

If the Senator from Kansas, in his spirit of fair play, and also in his good Yankee horsetrading spirit, would like to make the date March 31, as I walk over toward him and get just a little more affable and amicable, perhaps we can settle the question.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I am afraid I am going to be out-traded. However, I notice that in the original joint resolution the commission was to have reported by January 15, which I assume would be January 15, 1956.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct; but the subcommittee hearings and the study which the subcommittee made took such a length of time that we were unable to report the joint resolution as soon as we had hoped.

As I look back over what I believe was our original plan of action in order to have the joint resolution reported, as it relates to the original date of January 15, 1956, I am led to say that I think March 31, 1956, would be a fair and reasonable compromise between fair and reasonable men.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I realize at what a great disadvantage I am when it comes to horsetrading with the junior Senator from Minnesota. I remind him that the committee had earlier thought of January 15, 1956, as an appropriate date. Having that in mind, I first thought of suggesting February 1. I thought I might reach a compromise on that date. I have now offered my amendment providing for March 1, 1956. Now the chairman of the subcommittee, the junior Senator from Minnesota, has asked me to make the date March 31. I wonder if he would be willing to compromise on March 15.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The trouble with March 15 is that it used to be income tax day. It was always a sad day.

Mr. CARLSON. The Senator knows that the date for filing income tax returns has now been changed to April 15.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In view of the fact that the country thought the date for the payment of income taxes should be moved back to April 15, I feel that the date on which the proposed Commission should report should be moved back to March 31. I know the Senator from Kansas is doing what he believes is right and honorable. I think March 31 would fill the bill.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I assume that I shall have to yield, early or late, so I ask unanimous consent that I may modify my amendment to make the date March 31, 1956.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the modified amendment of the junior Senator from Kansas to the committee amendment.

The amendment, as modified, to the amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is on agreeing to the committee amendment, as amended.

The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the junior Senator from Kansas for his spirit of cooperation.

Mr. President, we are approaching the concluding moments of the consideration of the joint resolution. I assure the Senate that the preliminary hearings which were held on the joint resolution were most informative. I believe they will be helpful to the Commission in its study. The members of the subcommittee were attentive to their responsibilities. I believe the subcommittee extracted information which will be of great help in the judicious consideration of whatever recommendations the special Commission may wish to make.

I concur in the expressions made today of the urgent importance of the matter. Our first responsibility is the protection and security of this great Republic.

We also have as our responsibility the protection of the citizens of the United States in their constitutional liberties and privileges. It is a most difficult assignment to equate security with liberty. I point out that the word "liberty" has great historical meaning in America. The word "security" is of imminent importance in an hour of crisis and difficulty, such as we have been experiencing in the past years, and will continue to experience for years to come.

I commend to the attention of the Senate and to those who are students of government, particularly those who are students of the law, the hearings, which comprise approximately 740 pages.

From my attendance at the subcommittee hearings I received a very valuable education in the field of development and preparation of our security and investigative apparatus.

I also wish to call to the attention of my colleagues the appendix of the hearings, which represents, as I said earlier, the first full compilation of all the Executive orders, regulations, administrative orders, statutes, and rules and regulations in reference to espionage and sabotage, classified information, the whole program of Government employee security investigations and clearance, industrial security—indeed, all the dimensions of the security problem and program in the United States of America.

I feel today we are performing a real service for the Republic. I for one have felt that bickering and argument in a partisan spirit over the security program yield little or no good. At the same time I believe the committees of Congress have a continuing responsibility to look into security matters as supplementary to the work of the Commission.

Since I see the chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee in the Senate at this time, I wish to say we have had very good cooperation. There was a clear-cut understanding. We did not go into cases. We concentrated on procedure, law, and regulations.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and ask for a vote on the joint resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further amendment to be offered, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and to be read the third time.

The joint resolution was read the third time.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question now is, Shall the joint resolution pass?

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 21), was passed, as follows:

Resolved, etc.—

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. It is vital to the welfare and safety of the United States that there be adequate protection of the national security, including the safeguarding of all national defense secrets and public and private defense installations, against loss or compromise arising from espionage, sabotage, disloyalty, subversive activities, or unauthorized disclosures.

It is, therefore, the policy of the Congress that there shall exist a sound Government program—

(a) establishing procedures for security investigation, evaluation, clearance, and, where necessary, adjudication of Government employees, and also appropriate security requirements with respect to persons privately employed or occupied on work requiring access to national-defense secrets or work affording significant opportunity for injury to the national security;

(b) for vigorous enforcement of effective and realistic security laws and regulations; and

(c) for a careful, consistent, and efficient administration of this policy in a manner which will protect the national security and preserve basic American rights.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY

SEC. 2. (a) For the purpose of carrying out the policy set forth in the first section of this joint resolution, there is hereby established a commission to be known as the Commission on Government Security (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall be composed of twelve members as follows:

(1) Four appointed by the President of the United States, two from the executive branch of the Government and two from private life;

(2) Four appointed by the President of the Senate, 2 from the Senate and 2 from private life; and

(3) Four appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 2 from the House of Representatives and 2 from private life.

(c) Of the members appointed to the Commission not more than two shall be appointed by the President of the United States, or the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives from the same political party.

(d) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(e) Service of an individual as a member of the Commission or employment of an individual by the Commission as an attorney or expert in any business or professional field, on a parti-time or full-time basis, with or without compensation, shall not be considered as service or employment bringing such individual within the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, 434, or 1914 of title 18 of the United States Code, or section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U. S. C. 99).

(f) The Commission shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its members.

(g) Seven members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Each subcommittee of the Commission shall consist of at least three members of the Commission.

COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 3. (a) Members of the Congress who are members of the Commission shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as Members of Congress; but they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary ex-

penses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission.

(b) The members of the Commission who are in the executive branch of the Government shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services in the executive branch, but they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission.

(c) The members of the Commission from private life shall each receive $50 per diem when engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission, plus reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of such duties.

STAFF OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 4. (a) (1) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable, without regard to the provisions of the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

(2) The Commission may procure, without regard to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized for the departments by section 15 of the act of August 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 810), but at rates not to exceed $50 per diem for individuals.

(b) All employees of the Commission shall be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to character, associations, and loyalty and a report of each such investigation shall be furnished to the Commission.

EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 5. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this joint resolution.

DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 6. The Commission shall study and investigate the entire Government security program, including the various statutes, Presidential orders, and administrative regulations and directives under which the Government seeks to protect the national security, national defense secrets, and public and private defense installations, against loss or injury arising from espionage, disloyalty, subversive activity, sabotage, or unauthorized disclosures, together with the actual manner in which such statutes, Presidential orders, administrative regulations, and directives have been and are being administered and implemented, with a view to determining whether existing requirements, practices, and procedures are in accordance with the policies set forth in the first section of this joint resolution, and to recommending such changes at it may determine are necessary or desirable. The Commission shall also consider and submit reports and recommendations on the adequacy or deficiencies of existing statutes, Presidential orders, administrative regulations, and directives, and the administration of such statutes, orders, regulations, and directives, from the standpoints of internal consistency of the overall security program and effective protection and maintenance of the national security.

POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 7. (a) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as the Commission or such subcommittee or member may deem advisable. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Commission, or the Chairman of any subcommittee with the approval of a majority of the members of such subcommittee and may be served by any person designated by such Chairman. The provisions of sections 102 to 194, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes (U. S. C., title 2, secs. 192–194), shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.

(b) The Commission is authorized to secure directly from an executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment or instrumentality information, suggestions, estimates and statistics for the purposes of this joint resolution and each such department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, establishment or instrumentality is authorized and directed to furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the chairman or vice chairman.

INTERFERENCE WITH CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND INVESTIGATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

SEC. 8. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any agency of the United States to release any information possessed by it when, in the opinion of the President, the disclosure of such information would jeopardize or interfere with a pending or prospective criminal prosecution, or with the carrying out of the intelligence or investigative responsibilities of such agency, or would jeopardize or interfere with the interests of national security.

REPORTS

SEC. 9. The Commission may submit interim reports to the Congress and the President at such time or times as it deems advisable, and shall submit its final report to the Congress and the President not later than March 31, 1956. The final report of the Commission may propose such legislative enactments and administrative actions as in its judgment are necessary to carry out its recommendations. The Commission shall cease to exist 90 days after submission of its final report.

MULTIPLE USE OF SURFACE OF PUBLIC LANDS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1713) to amend the act of July 31, 1947 (61 Stat. 681), and the mining laws to provide for multiple use of the surface of the same tracts of the public lands, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the first committee amendment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President——

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, it is not planned to have any action on the bill at this time; but I desire to make an announcement to the Senate.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I should like to make an announcement for the RECORD, so that all Senators may have information as to the program. The leadership proposes to bring before the Senate at an early date Calendar No. 269, S. 1633, relating to a constitutional convention in Alaska,

Calendar No. 521, S. 1292, to readjust postal classification on educational and cultural materials.

Calendar No. 542, S. 2220, a bill to authorize appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission for the construction of plants and facilities, including acquisition or condemnation of real property or facilities, and for other purposes. That bill, Mr. President, will be the next measure to be considered. It is hoped that we may be able to bring it up tomorrow.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I should like to call to the attention of the majority leader Calendar No. 627, Senate bill 609, to provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or aquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

I do not believe there is any major controversy involved in that bill. I thought it might be taken up at the time the other atomic bill was considered, namely, S. 2220. I understand there is only one item which is likely to occasion much debate on S. 2220. I think the bill came out of the committee unanimously, except for the one item.

There is no great controversy over S. 609. Since the representatives of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will be on the floor to present one bill, I thought the majority leader might want to have the other bill considered at the same time. I merely suggest that since both are atomic energy bills, and the same Senator will be in charge of both bills.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I wish to thank the minority leader for his constructive suggestion. As usual, it is a helpful suggestion. I hope we may be able to follow the procedure he has outlined.

Mr. President, I believe the last bill I mentioned was Calendar No. 542, S. 2220.

Following the bills I have mentioned I expect to ask that the Senate consider Calendar No. 579, S. 63, providing for the appointment of the heads of regional and district offices of the Post Office Department by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and

Calendar No. 580, Senate bill 1849, to provide for the grant of career conditional and career appointments in the competitive civil service to indefinte employees who previously qualified for competitive appointment.

I also call attention to the fact that it is hoped the Senate may be able to act, before next Thursday, on the conference reports on four appropriation bills, namely, those for the Departments of State, Justice, and the Judiciary; Labor, Health and Welfare; Defense; and Commerce.

In addition, there was reported today a resolution from the Banking and Currency Committee which would extend the Defense Production Act, the Housing Act, and the Small Business Administration Act, which are due to expire on June 30. The simple resolution extends the

life of those three acts until action can be taken by both Houses. The Senate has already acted.

Also, if the House acts favorably, it is expected to have a conference report on the Draft Act and the Doctor Draft Act.

It is hoped to be able to consider all those measures prior to next Thursday evening. That is as far as the leadership can go in stating the schedule for the remainder of the week.

The public-works bill, which is in the Appropriations Committee, is in the markup stage, I believe. Hearings have been concluded. The Senate probably will have to extend the acts having to do with foreign aid, legislative appropriations, and public works.

I have no other announcement to make.

THE SCHOOL CRISIS

Mr. PURTELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD an interesting article, written by Neil H. McElroy, president of the Procter & Gamble Co., and Chairman of the White House Conference on Education, and published in the June issue of the Woman's Home Companion.

The article describes what is going on in the country today as American citizens tackle their elementary- and secondary-school problems. It tells how people everywhere are being aroused to a more active participation in school affairs, through the President's program to improve education.

In Connecticut, some 600 educators and lay citizens attended a statewide conference on education at Hartford last fall. This spring, in March and April, countywide meetings were held throughout the State as a followup to the State conference to discuss, analyze, and report on educational problems. All told, several thousand Connecticut citizens took part in the program, which was held in cooperation with the White House Conference. Connecticut's educators and lay citizens deserve the congratulations of their fellow citizens for their time and effort in trying to improve Connecticut's educational system. Special thanks are due to our State commissioner of education, Finis Engleman, whom President Eisenhower appointed as Vice Chairman of the Committee for the White House Conference on Education; the conference Cochairmen, Robert W. Hoskins, president of the Connecticut Council on Education; and William H. Flaherty, our deputy State commissioner of education, as well as hundreds of others who worked hard to make Connecticut's conference program a success.

Connecticut's school system has always ranked as one of the finest in the Nation. I am delighted to report that the educators and lay citizens, through their annual conferences on education, are doing their best to insure that Connecticut schools remain among the best in the Nation.

The historic conference next November 28–December 1, at Washington, will be attended by an estimated 2,000 persons—educators and lay citizens. They will discuss six major subjects currently under study by various subcommittees of the Committee for the White House Conference on Education. All six are vitally important. But one that appeals to me in particular, deals with the question, How can we get enough good teachers—and keep them? This is a national problem, is as much the concern of my own State of Connecticut as it is the concern of the other 47 States. I have always believed that the teachers in our public schools deserve far more consideration than they have been getting. This consideration is especially pertinent in regard to their relatively low salaries. They have contributed enormously to the spiritual and intellectual heritage of our Nation. I am delighted to observe that the Nation as a whole is awakening to the salary crisis in the ranks of our teachers. They deserve the attention and help of every citizen—not just the consideration of municipal, State, and national authorities—but of every man and woman who has attended school.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CRISIS IN YOUR SCHOOL

(By Neil McElroy)

A tremendously exciting thing is happening all over this vast country of ours. People—plain ordinary people everywhere—are beginning to do something about our education crisis.

For months—for years, really—the experts have been warning us of the classroom shortage, the teacher shortage, the onrushing tidal wave of new students. During World War II our school-building program virtually stopped. But our birth rate didn't; it soared to an all-time high and continued high. The situation called for immediate emergency action right after the war. We didn't take that action. That's why we're in trouble now.

Often, I'm sure, the problem has seemed so huge, so overwhelming, that well-meaning people have said to themselves, "Yes, it's true and it's terrible but what can I do about it? I'm just one person. It's too big for me."

Well, the problem looks like bad trouble—and it is. But today, if you put your ear close to the ground almost anywhere from Bangor to San Diego or from Seattle to Miami, you will hear small, apparently unrelated but tremendously heartening sounds. For example:

In Richmond, Va., next year all teachers will receive an across-the-board salary increase of $300. Why? Because a special citizens committee, appointed by the school board, studied the local situation, came up with suggestions which the board approved as sound and realistic. The citizens committee didn't stop working until the increase was made part of the city manager's new budget. This was a good step in the right direction.

In Great Neck, N. Y., where the junior high school had been forced to hold double sessions, votes gave solid approval to the construction of a 1,400-pupil junior high and a 1,200-pupil senior high school. The turnout of voters was the largest ever recorded in town and 80 percent of the voters approved. Why? Because they wanted to provide better educational opportunities for their youth.

In West Des Moines, Iowa, a bond issue was passed last January for the construction of 12 new classrooms. The vote was amazing: 799 in favor, 69 against. Why? Because a citizens committee studied buildings, budget, and school population. It dramatized its findings with charts, brochures, and a detailed survey book. It sold the idea, just the way an insurance salesman sells insurance—and the public bought the bond issues 12 to 1.

These are just three random samples but consider them along with scores of others and you must feel a thrill of excitement chase itself along your spine. These and many other individual examples of civic improvement are, I feel sure, the forerunners of a great national movement. They are true manifestations of one of the mightiest forces on earth: town-meeting democracy in action.

Ever since I can remember, I've held the opinion that the most reassuring thing about America is what people can do about a community problem if they put their minds to it. They may take a little while to size up the situation and organize themselves for effective action. They may need—in fact, they usually do go through—a period in which inertia and apathy seem to prevail. But then, in a great surge of public-spirited energy, they get something done.

This year of 1955, I truly believe, is going to be remembered as the year when our attack on our school problems really began to roll.

In his State of the Union message delivered in January last year, President Eisenhower began this attack when he expressed his concern over our mounting educational problems. He said: "Youth—our greatest resource—is being seriously neglected in a vital respect. The Nation as a whole is not preparing teachers or building schools fast enough to keep up with the increase in our population." He went on to say that he hoped the States would hold conferences on these problems that would lead to a White House Conference on Education.

Congress responded by appropriating $700,000 to help defray the expenses of State conferences. In September a letter from the White House went out to 53 States and Territories informing the governors that this money was available and asking them to set up State conferences to study their educational problems and determine what action should be taken.

The response to this invitation was almost unanimous. All 48 States, plus the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have replied affirmatively. Some State conferences have already been held; others will be held this summer and fall. These conferences will be climaxed in Washington next November in a great White House Conference on Education.

President Eisenhower has appointed all the members of a committee to plan and conduct this White House Conference and has named me as Chairman. Dr. Finis Engleman, commissioner of education of Connecticut, is our Vice Chairman. The committee working with us is made up of good citizens from all over the country. They have backgrounds in the fields of education, labor, business, agriculture, industry, and so forth. And in Washington we have a devoted staff headed by Clint Pace, of Dallas.

We hope that the delegates who will come to the White House Conference—and we expect about 2,000 persons—will be made up largely of people who have already participated in the State conferences. Less than half of these people will be professional educators. We have, in fact, recommended a proportion of 2 laymen to 1 educator. Ideally, each delegation to Washington will be as diversified as possible in terms of political, racial, religious, social and economic background. They will meet for 4 days: Monday, November 28, through Thursday, December 1. They won't be talked at; speeches and lectures will be held to a minimum. They will talk with one another at small round-table conferences, each composed of less than a dozen delegates. We are bringing these people together, not to give them the answers but to let them find the answers among themselves. This is truly the American way.

The attention of this conference—first of its kind ever called by a President—will

be focused mainly on our primary and secondary schools, where the most pressing situation exists. We will ask ourselves these six major questions:

1. What should our schools accomplish?
2. In what ways can we organize our school systems more efficiently and economically?
3. What are our school building needs?
4. How can we get good teachers—and keep them?
5. How can we finance our schools—build and operate them?
6. How can we obtain a continuing public interest in education?

Subcommittees of the White House Conference Committee will explore these six basic questions beforehand to break them down in detail and collect material with which to launch effective discussion of them.

No one expects complete agreement from 2,000 strong-minded conference participants and no one is promising any magical, foolproof solutions. My own personal hope and belief are that the final results will provide citizens everywhere with useful facts and recommendations, will reduce tremendous amounts of information to workable terms and will greatly clarify the problems.

Interest in the conference is already high and will continue to mount, I'm sure, as November 28 approaches. It's not confined to any one segment of our population, either. "Mr. McElroy," said one of our office elevator girls when she heard of my appointment, "I sure am glad they've asked you people to tackle the school problem. I think it's just about the most important thing there is."

Would she have felt that way 10 years ago? I doubt it.

We've come a long way in 10 years—something we should remember when the problems that lie ahead look insurmountable. Consider PTA membership. In 1945 it was about 3½ million. Today it's close to 9 million—including 3 million men.

In 1949, when it was first organized, the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools knew of only 17 local citizen groups working in behalf of better schools. Now it's in touch with 2,650 such local groups and estimates that 4 times that number probably exist.

We've come a long way in terms of public awareness but we still have a long way to go in terms of achievement.

In 1949, $4.3 billion was spent for school operating costs. This year, 1955, the figure will reach $6.6 billion. By 1965 the bill will jump to $10 billion or $15 billion.

As for school construction, in the middle of World War II, we were spending $55 million annually. By 1949, it was $664 million. Now about $2 billion is being spent annually on school construction and it's estimated that between now and 1960 a total of more than $16 billion will be needed.

This is a staggering amount of money but our expanding national economy can stand it and I think the citizens are not merely going to endure it—they're going to demand it. They know that a person's earning power matches his education almost directly. Census Bureau figures show that men with high school or college educations earn 80 percent of the incomes over $7,000—and men with only an eighth-grade education or less earn 77 percent of the incomes under $500.

The people know that education—or lack of it—has a tremendous influence on the crime rate, on the amount of juvenile delinquency in any given area.

They know that our actual security as a nation is closely tied to education. Modern soldiers have to be skilled technicians. In five States, Korean war draft rejections because of failure to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test ran more than twice as high as the national average. These were States where a high proportion of the population between the ages of 25 and 34 had had only 5 years of schooling—or less. Such persons are known as "functional illiterates" and our last census showed that we still have about 8 million of them—an appalling national waste of human beings.

To correct these conditions will cost money. And people, whether or not they think of school taxes in terms of a child of their own, are becoming more and more aware of the value of good schools to all of us.

As president of a large corporation, I feel sure that industry will be found more than ready to shoulder its share of the tax burden. This is not just a matter of idealism or patriotism with us businessmen; it's also a question of plain self-interest. Where can we find our skilled labor or draw our executive personnel from except the ranks of educated young people? Without first-class schools, how can we count on an alert, informed electorate to maintain the system of free enterprise under which we operate? How can we be sure of having voters who will respond to the appeals of enlightened statesmen and reject the rabble rouser and demagog?

Survey after survey has shown us that earning power and living standards go hand in hand with the amount and quality of education available in a given area. No wonder enlightened business leaders have gone on record, when considering new sites for new factories, as being more interested in a good school system than in a low tax rate. Intelligence in our offices, know-how in our factories, initiative, imagination, honesty, energy—we in industry are constantly searching for these qualities in people. They are found oftenest in soundly schooled people.

Today's vast awakening of public interest in education is tremendously exciting to me. You might say I've been in close contact with school problems ever since I was born: my father was a high-school physics teacher and school superintendent; my mother was a grade-school teacher before she married. Nobody had to sell them on the value of education and from the time that my brothers and I were very young our parents were determined that we should go to a fine college even though our family finances hardly seemed to justify such an ambition.

In my case, the labor shortage during World War I made it possible for me, still in my early teens, to get some pretty good part-time jobs. I was able actually to save up $1,000—a lot of money in those days—and this, plus my scholarship aid and modest support from my father, enabled me to graduate from Harvard in 1925. I've been keenly interested in educational problems ever since.

My interest is based partly also on the fact that my wife and I have 3 lively youngsters. I remember that my father, being a teacher, had 3 months more or less free during the summer and was able to be with us much of the time. That companionship was priceless to my brothers and me and I try to give our 2 teen-age daughters and our young son as much time as I can. But the demands of my job and related activities are heavy and I know from personal experience how difficult the pace of modern living makes it for most parents to spend as much time with their children as they'd like. That is 1 more reason why we can't afford to settle for anything less than the best in schools.

One thing I have come to believe: the schools in a community are as good as the citizens make them—and no better. I have little patience with parents who complain constantly about the quality of their children's schooling, the overcrowded classrooms, the shortage of teachers—and then do nothing about it. Something can always be done. It's being proved in hundreds of communities every day.

Here in Cincinnati, for instance, we have a citizens school committee that was originally formed for the sole purpose of endorsing school-board candidates, trying to get qualified persons elected. But its scope has steadily expanded. Right now its working on the problem of getting more community recognition for schoolteachers. Our citizens committee organized a teachers recognition night, with a first-class program of entertainment at the Cincinnati Gardens—an arena capable of seating 14,000 or 15,000 people. The profits are used to stimulate teacher recognition in various ways, the whole purpose being to make these hard-working, loyal people feel that they are appreciated, admired, and a valued and respected part of our city.

In Beloit, Wis., a citizens school committee conducted a joint study with school officials to find out how good was its schools' college-preparatory training. As a result of their survey, courses were added to the high school curriculum, others were strengthened and citizen interest was greatly stimulated.

Out in Lewiston, Idaho, residents were asked to vote on a $900,000 bond issue to finance a 5-year school-expansion plan. Service clubs, the PTA, the board of education, and others who worked in the campaign got an able—and free—assist from radio station KRLC. Spot announcements were broadcast 7 or 8 times a day, with additional comment at night. School officials were interviewed, so were average voters. The bond issue passed by nearly 6 to 1. Much the same thing happened in Muscatine, Iowa, where station KWPC lent a hand.

These are local efforts and the truth is that while our educational problems are national, our schools are local—just as local as I am or as you are. The White House Conference in November will do a sound job, I'm sure, in terms of long-range planning and reducing masses of data to workable terms. But these plans, these tools, become effective only when used on the local level. It takes the active and enlightened interest of the citizen on the spot to turn our educational dreams into realities.

I think it would be a magnificent contribution to our American way of life if, in the next 12 months, thousands of community conferences on education could be held all over this great land of ours. Not everybody can attend a State conference and to some the White House Conference may seem pretty remote. But a local citizens committee for the schools can do wonders in any town if it will (a) be representative of the entire community, (b) base its recommendations on a study of all available facts, and (c) cooperate fully with the legally established school authorities.

If your town already has such a committee, offer it your support. Join it if you can. Check its work in the six discussion areas of the White House Conference. Obviously, school conditions vary greatly from place to place. In your town the classroom shortage may be less acute than, say, the teacher shortage. Perhaps your community has too many school districts for efficient administration. Perhaps restrictive laws are making it impossible to finance a needed program. It's the committee's job to find out the area where improvement is most needed and then work with school authorities to bring about that improvement.

If no such committee exists in your town, the very fact that you have read thus far indicates that you are perfectly capable of starting one yourself. Inexperience in such matters should not deter you. Thousands of worthwhile community efforts have started with some individual who approached other individuals, formed a group, analyzed the problem and started action to solve it.

You don't have to grope your way blindly or work out details alone. A great deal of help is available today just for the asking. Early this year, recognizing the need for such a grassroots effort to tie in with the proposed State and White House conferences, two national volunteer organizations started

working together to aid and stimulate such local ventures in every possible way.

One of these two organizations, the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools, has prepared a working guide in the form of a booklet titled "How Can We Discuss School Problems?" It has also made up a planning check list that is a step-by-step outline anyone can follow. These and other extremely helpful booklets are available to any interested person. Just write to the commission at 2 West 45 Street, New York 36, N. Y., and state your needs.

The other organization, the National School Boards Association, has set up a field staff to service communities planning local conferences. Headed by Dr. Maurice Stapley, director of projects for the NSBA, trained advisers will be available to consult with local organizations and individuals and generally lend a hand in setting up such meetings. Dr. Stapley, on leave of absence from Indiana University, may be reached at Box 47, Bloomington, Ind. He is being aided by five regional coordinators whose names and addresses are listed on this page.

Another place to turn for help, of course, is our White House Conference office. We have there full lists of source material you can use as a basis for discussing the six problems we will take up next fall. Simply write to Clint Pace, Director, the White House Conference on Education, Washington 25, D. C.

Why not take advantage of these opportunities to get into the fight for better schools? As I said before, this is the critical year, the year of maximum effort. The great counteroffensive against apathy and inertia has already begun. You will find it, I can assure you, tremendously satisfying to be a part of this crusade.

TRIBUTE TO CHARLES E. DANIEL, OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an editorial entitled "A South Carolina Statesman," published in the Charleston (S. C.) News and Courier of June 22, 1955; and also an editorial entitled "A Merited Award," published in the Greenville News, of Greenville, S. C., on June 19. Both editorials refer to the distinguished public-service award presented by the South Carolina department of the American Legion to my distinguished predecessor in the Senate, Charles E. Daniel. I wish to add my hearty approval of the editorials regarding the great work being done by former United States Senator Charles E. Daniel.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Charleston (S. C.) News and Courier of June 22, 1955]

A SOUTH CAROLINA STATESMAN

Mr. Charles E. Daniel, of Greenville, is not only a successful businessman. He also possesses statesmanlike vision.

In his recent address to the American Legion at Myrtle Beach, Mr. Daniel showed a clear understanding of the economic problems which will face South Carolina in the years to come. His concept of a proper program to assure the State's prosperity is a balanced economy. Mr. Daniel stressed the importance of developing agriculture as well as industry.

South Carolina has not even approached the attainment of the vast potentials of its agriculture. We produce commercially 38 of the 52 vegetables grown in this country. Yet we must import agricultural products to feed our own people.

With proper planning, the State could be developed into the food center of the Southeast. This would encourage development of subsidiary indutries such as packing plants, frozen-food units, cheese, and canning factories. The coastal plains of South Carolina could become the home of some of the most profitable truck farms in the country.

Mr. Daniel sees great possibilities from sheep raising in South Carolina. A woolscouring and combing plant has already been established in Johnsonville. Another is near completion at Jamestown. With proper management, the wool industry will bring millions of dollars of additional income to producers and workers alike.

South Carolina can produce not only the agricultural requirements of its own people, but vast surpluses for export as well. By becoming exporters of food products and farm produce, we can increase considerably the income of citizens and State.

Mr. Daniel, of course, predicts tremendous industrial expansion. He believes that we can double our industrial expansion of the last 10 years to $2 billion within the next decade.

Mr. Daniel is a man of vision. More important, however, if he is a dreamer, he is blessed with the most constructive kind of capacity for dreaming. We call this statesmanship, for Mr. Daniel knows whereof he speaks.

During the critical years ahead, we shall need men of Mr. Daniel's stature in key posts in Government. We hope that the people of South Carolina will not long delay in utilizing his talents in public office. Already he has made a start with a brief appointive term in the United States Senate. Sourth Carolina, as well as the Federal Government, is in dire need of statesmen these days. We cannot afford to bury obvious talent in this respect under a mountain of public apathy.

[From the Greenville (S. C.) News of June 19, 1955]

A MERITED AWARD

The South Carolina Department of the American Legion, in conferring on Charles E. Daniel, of Greenville, its distinguished public service award, has honored justly a man who is devoting his life to achieving the ideals the award represents.

In an address which followed the presentation yesterday at the annual Legion convention at Myrtle Beach, the Greenville builder, former United States Senator, college trustee, and director in multi-faceted business enterprises told Legionnaires the things he wants for his native State:

Among them were these:

A continuation of good government as represented by the administrations of Governors Thurmond, Byrnes, and Timmerman, last three of the State's chief executives.

Implementing of plans to make South Carolina self-sufficient agriculturally and end the present necessity of its having to import half of its food products.

Distribution of the present steady stream of new industries flowing into the State (for which Mr. Daniel is largely responsible) so that all of South Carolina's 46 counties will benefit by having at least one manufacturing plant of consequence.

Analysis of State universities and colleges to the ends of allocating important fields of education to the institutions best suited to conduct them, of eliminating competition for students and of increasing the efficiency of each college.

The writing of a new State constitution to supplant the archaic provisions of the present one by which the State has been governed since 1895.

A comprehensive property survey and tax equalization program to bring under taxation all property in the State on an equal and equitable basis.

If and when South Carolina achieves all of these goals, it will have reached political and economic maturity. If and when they are attained, it will be through the vision and efforts of such men as Charlie Daniel.

It is deserved and befitting that he take his place alongside the other winners of the Legion award since it was established in 1927, a company of great South Carolinians among whom are numbered such as James F. Byrnes, Dr. D. B. Johnson, David R. Coker, Dr. Henry Nelson Snyder, Miss Wil Lou Gray, Richard I. Manning, Mrs. A. F. McKissick, Gen. Charles P. Summerall, Dr. D. W. Daniel, and J. C. Self.

THE APPEARANCE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON TELEVISION

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, television is still a novel force in our national culture. In only a very few years, this marvelous new medium of communication has swept across our Nation until soon there will be few communities in which it does not reach into the majority of homes. However, we have not yet had time fully to assess its effects as a source of information and its impact on public opinion.

In combining image and sound—the picture of speaking persons with the sound of their spoken words—television goes far beyond its ancestor, radio, in creating an image of immediacy and persuasiveness. This is a marvelous accomplishment of science. But TV lends itself with equal facility to truth and to illusion. It will impartially show either unadorned fact or the most imaginative flights of fancy. Yet, because of its youth, TV's reputation for truth and veracity is still fairly good. This fact, I fear, gives it a potentially dangerous power in our public life.

As in the case of radio, the role of television is justly conceived to be both in the field of entertainment and in the field of enlightenment. But the medium itself does not differentiate between the two, and therein lies an opportunity for the political huckster, and a danger to the democratic process.

Some of the new techniques for obtaining political publicity on television have recently been discussed by Mr. Douglass Cater, in an article published in The Reporter magazine of June 16, 1955. Mr. Cater describes how Congressmen can have their images dubbed into spectacular television films showing military planes or great Federal atomic installations or travelogs of Washington, or how film strips showing members of the national administration are available to Congressmen of the administration's party for splicing together into a television program apparently showing a live interview between the two statesmen on an issue of current interest—which may then be broadcast as a nonpolitical public service feature by the congressman's hometown TV station.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from The Reporter, entitled "Every Congressman a Television Star,"

be printed at this point in the RECORD, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EVERY CONGRESSMAN A TELEVISION STAR

(By Douglas Cater)

Just behind the House Office Building, in offices above the dingy old George Washington Inn, a small group of Republican staff workers are pioneering in adapting politics to the midtwentieth century. The group, led by a public-relations expert and a former legman for Fulton Lewis, Jr., works for the National Republican Congressional Committee. To a city accustomed on occasion to the composite photograph in politics, this group has brought the composite political telecast.

Take a recent memo sent by this group to every Republican Member of Congress. Would the Congressman be interested in filming a short discussion with Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey on such items of public interest as the budget, spending, security, more jobs, and the cost of living? If so, he should drop by the Joint House and Senate Recording Facility. He is furnished a written list of questions, which he is to address to a TV camera. Without further fuss, a completed film will be turned over to him in which, as the memo makes clear. "The camera—or the voices if it is just for radio—will * * * switch back and forth between the Member and his guest (Secretary Humphrey) in a smooth manner as though both were present in the same room."

BIG MAN IN WASHINGTON

A reasonably energetic Republican Congressman can now have his supposed familiarity with the highest policymakers widely publicized with little loss of his own time and even less of theirs—in fact, without ever having met them. He might have been seen discussing labor relations with Labor Secretary James Mitchell.

"CONGRESSMAN. There has been a lot of talk, Secretary Mitchell, about the Eisenhower administration's not being prolabor. * * *

"MITCHELL. Now you know, Congressman, * * * that kind of talk makes my hair stand on end. I cannot say it too strongly: The Eisenhower administration is prolabor."

Or he might have been shown discussing the Salk vaccine with Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Hobby:

"A 3-minute TV-radio narration on the part the Eisenhower administration is playing in promoting the use of this life-saving vaccine."

Occasionally, the skillful operators of this new craft have run into snags. The script prepared for the interview with Secretary of Labor Mitchell, for example, contained a section in which Mitchell was supposed to say to the Congressman apropos a Democratic argument:

"I do not need to point out to you, Congressman * * * that is entirely wrong. You in * * * have the great * * * industry in * * * and the * * * industry in * * *. These * * * industries have different needs and so do their workers."

Mitchell was to read words to fill the missing blanks for each Congressman, which would be spliced in at the appropriate places in the film. This section had to be dropped. The TV composite cannot be personalized that much yet.

But Republican ingenuity has not ended with the television interview. The omnipresent Congressman, if he chooses, can be dubbed into a real spectacular of rocketing Nikes, or, alternatively, of zooming F–84 Thunderjets, B–47's, and B–36's releasing an incredible string of bomb clusters, which explode against the ground in what seems like a never-ending series of blasts. He can be seen introducing a grand panorama of powerplants and atomic installations while he explains the complex issues of Dixon-Yates. ("Members can arrange to be photographed at the television facility voicing their own opening and closing narrations—or the entire script, for that matter," the Dixon-Yates routine began, reflecting a certain wariness on the part of the ghosts as to whether the Member could handle so tough a subject.) The Member may also be seen behind his desk giving a lecture on paperwork, which he will describe as a "monster threatening to engulf the very function for which the Government was established."

Finally, for the well-rounded Congressman, the National Republican Congressional Committee will supply a 3-minute Washington travelog. ("If you are visited by a group of students or other tourists from your district, our photographer would be happy to shoot some motion picture scenes on the steps of the Capitol showing the group being greeted by you. Then the travelog would be inserted, and your program would explain that these were some of the scenes which the group saw in their tour of Washington.")

GHOST APPEARANCE

In sum, the Republican staff workers are making a valiant effort to move from ghostwriting to the ghost appearance. And it is not a highpriced operation. The film clips of which most such features are composed can be obtained from the armed services or almost as cheaply from the commercial television news companies. The Joint House and Senate Recording Facility, a private studio subsidized by Congress to the extent of rent and taxes, is equipped to make film shots of Congressmen and to edit and prepare finished prints at dirt-cheap prices. A 30-minute print can be bought for less than $150. A 1-minute spot costs the Congressman as little as $4.40.

Best of all, the Republicans are labeling their between-campaign TV and radio offerings as public service features, so that the Congressman can dun his local station for free time. Evidently the rules relating to this kind of thing are fairly lax. The National Republican Congressional Committee, for example, recently sent out a letter to its members describing a newly proposed animated film entitled "The Mystery of the Lost Depression," which it was reported, "factually exposes the alarms and distortions made by the gloomers. * * * The film is free from partisan politics and is designed to be used on TV as a public service," announced the letter with a strictly partisan letterhead signed by the National Republican Congressional Committee's Public Relations Director Harold Slater.

"This use of animation," Slater prophesied modestly, "introduces a new technique in politics which we believe will be most effective. * * *" Cartoons were done by staff artists, the narration by a professional New York actor-announcer. Presumably the bit part played by the lowly Congressman is done live.

THE EISENHOWER SPEECH

Speaking to the radio and television broadcasters on May 24, President Eisenhower pointed to their industry's great capacity for swaying public opinion and argues that this gives them added responsibility "to see that the news * * * is truthfully told, with the integrity of the entire industry behind it. * * * Of course you want to entertain," Mr. Eisenhower added. "Of course you want people to look at it, and I am all for it. * * * But when we come to something that we call news—and I am certain that I am not speaking of anything that you haven't discussed earnestly among yourselves—let us simply be sure it is news."

So far no one has questioned the ghosted appearance, the phony interview, the synthetic repartee, and the other more serious fakeries that seem to be the public-relations experts' notion of how to campaign on TV. One lonely critic, Senator RICHARD NEUBERGER, freshman Democrat from Oregon, has raised an alarm about the concealed use of teleprompters and facial makeup by candidates. The Senator wants to pass a law against it. Obviously, however, legislation is not the main answer to fraudulent politics.

One thing is certain. Those now caught up in the business fail to see why there is any need for improvement. One of the group that helps prepare these programs, when queried about some of the practices, answered rather sharply: "You don't think anything about it when a Hollywood movie shows the star singing from the back of a horse. Yet you know he actually didn't sing on horseback. What's the difference?"

During the campaign last fall, this same group in the Republican congressional committee prepared for radio such visceral appeals as this 1-minute radio spot:

(Sound: printing presses.)

NEWS ANNOUNCER. Those are the printing presses of the Communist Party. Listen to them.

(Repeat: sound of presses.)

NEWS ANNOUNCER. The date is April 1954. Those printing presses are turning out the official Communist Party line.

MAN WITH RUSSIAN ACCENT (presumably Soviet official). Defeat the Republican congressional candidates in 1954. That is our order from Moscow. Return America to a New Deal type administration. Moscow orders that.

NEWS ANNOUNCER. Yes, that is the official blueprint for political action in the Communist Party, United States of America, that rolled off the presses in April 1954. Don't take orders from Moscow. Vote for a Republican Congress in 1955 and 1956. Vote Republican in November.

IMPRESSIONABLE PEOPLE

The President also told the radio and TV executives: "* * * with the television or with the radio, you put an appealing voice or an engaging personality in the living room of the home, where there are impressionable people from the ages of understanding on up. In many ways, therefore, the effect of your industry in swaying public opinion * * * particularly about burning questions of the moment, may be even greater than the press.

Of course the President is right again. But perhaps he should have addressed his appeal for responsibility to the politicians—beginning with those of his own party—as well as to the broadcasters.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, earlier in this session I suggested that legislation is needed to assure the TV-viewing public a knowledge of what they are being shown on their TV screens when events and persons of public importance are involved. As a first step toward such basic honestly in televising public affairs, I introduced a bill to require an announcement, before a political TV broadcast, of whether the speaker is speaking extemporaneously or is reading from a hidden teleprompter or idiot board, and whether he is using special television makeup. This modest proposal has won some favorable attention from commentators who have also become concerned about the dangerous temptation to mix the illusions of entertainment into what purports to be factual reporting of events of public significance.

A few persons have misinterpreted my proposal as being one seeking to outlaw makeup, teleprompters, and other artificial aids to television performers; but I have tried to make it clear that I propose only a policy of adequate disclosure, and only with respect to broadcasts of political significance.

I repeat, Mr. President, that only the relative novelty of television could lead anyone to underestimate its potential impact on the political processes of a democracy such as ours, or to consider this a trivial problem.

The foundation of our theory of representative government has been the faith that the people could judge for themselves the ablity and integrity of candidates for public office, and their willingness to state clearly and candidly their views on the important issues of the day. To this opportunity for popular judgment, television can obviously make an unparalleled constructive contribution, or a destructive one. If politicians' speeches are to be staged like comedians' jokes, and if public policies are to be merchandised like soap, we shall soon see the effects of a Gresham's law of politics, in which showmanship on the TV screen will take the place of statesmanship, and public officials will be chosen for histrionic aptitude by those who can afford to contribute the immense financial expense of a television buildup.

It is because of this threat to our democratic system, Mr. President, that I hope measures will soon be considered by the Federal Communications Commission and the Congress to set standards of honesty in television broadcasts of public affairs.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

UNITED STATES SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1955.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. W. KERR SCOTT, a Senator from the State of North Carolina, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

WALTER F. GEORGE,
President pro tempore.

Mr. SCOTT thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore signed the following enrolled bills, which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

H. R. 1142. An act for the relief of Capt. Moses M. Rudy;

H. R. 1825. An act creating a Federal commission to formulate plans for the construction in the District of Columbia of a civic auditorium, including an Inaugural Hall of Presidents and a music, fine arts, and mass communications center;

H. R. 3659. An act to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act;

H. R. 4221. An act to amend section 4004, title 18, United States Code, relating to administering oaths and taking acknowledgments by officials of Federal penal and correctional institutions;

H. R. 4954. An act to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws, establishing a uniform statute of limitations, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 6499. An act making appropriations for the Executive Office of the President and sundry general Government agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes.

WHEAT MARKETING QUOTAS

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I should like to direct my attention for a few moments to the vote which took place yesterday on wheat quotas. The newspapers of today feature some very fine articles on the results of the vote. There are several points which I believe need to be stressed, in order that a proper interpretation of what took place may be made.

I have before me the issue of the Washington Evening Star for Monday, June 27, which carries an Associated Press dispatch on the front page. The article is entitled "Vote for Wheat Quotas Amazes Farm Leaders." The subheadline reads: "Rigid Controls Okayed Decisively—$1.81 a Bushel Price Assured for 1956."

It is fair to say that there was a good deal of doubt as to whether the American wheat farmer would approve the new marketing quotas for the coming crop year, in view of the fact that the farmer had been called upon to take not only a drop in price but also an acreage reduction. Production has been cut severely for wheat farmers, and the price has dropped considerably in the past year and a half. In my opinion a great victory for American agriculture took place on June 25.

The Department of Agriculture expressed a position of neutrality on the wheat referendum. I was very much concerned about the neutrality of the Department, and so expressed myself on several occasions. I protested what I considered to be the failure of the leadership on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture and his associates and aides.

A year ago the Department of Agriculture was not very neutral on the subject of price supports. On the contrary, it took a rather vigorous and, I may say, effective position—effective, I will say, from the Department's point of view.

In recent statements of the Department concerning wheat quotas, the Department took a position of leaving it all up to the farmers themselves.

In the past week, after visiting farm leaders, I stated that if the wheat quota referendum were defeated, the whole structure of American agricultural price supports would be threatened, and that the economic results might very well be catastrophic.

It is reassuring, therefore, to note that in yesterday's vote the farmers not only were willing to accept controls, which they always said they would, but that they also acted decisively on the question of quotas. They were away out in front on the public opinion samplers of the Department of Agriculture, and I believe they are away out in front of Congress. The farmers are in desperate need of a sound price support program, and they know full well that they cannot expect one unless they are also willing to accept controls when there is overproduction or overplanting.

Therefore, Mr. President, let us not have any more comment to the effect that all the farmer wants is the unlimited right to plant and to harvest and to sell. The American farmers wants to get no more and no less than fair treatment. He is willing to accept restrictions and limitations if the good of the economy is involved. He is willing to accept severe acreage reductions and quota restrictions and limitations if it is necessary to do so in order to get a reasonable price for what he produces.

Regretfully, Mr. President, the wheat farmer was compelled in this instance to acknowledge his allegiance to a price-support program, even though that price-support program is inadequate.

Some farm organizations made it quite clear—for example, I refer to the National Farmers Union, which represents a large number of farmers—that if the quotas were turned down it would be a major blow against agricultural income and agricultural price supports. Those organizations made it quite clear that if the quotas were turned down, it would be in the nature of advice to Congress that farmers were not interested in an effective price-support program. Likewise, they made it clear—and when I say "they," I mean the leaders of those organizations, particularly of the National Farmers Union—that if farmers wished Congress to hear the voice of agriculture in a positive and direct way with reference to the need of an effective price-support program, they should vote in the wheat referendum for marketing quotas.

I should like to call the attention of the Senate to the story which I alluded to a few moments ago, which appears in the Washington Evening Star, and which is a feature story by the Associated Press. I should like to read a paragraph or two from it, and make some comments as I read the words:

By a decisive majority, the Nation's wheat farmers have voted for tight controls on their next year's crop in return for a Government-guaranteed price averaging $1.81 a bushel.

In doing so, the growers caused Secretary of Agriculture Benson to lay aside a proposal that they seek broader markets at home and abroad by offering the grain at considerably lower prices than would prevail otherwise.

The heavy support given quotas came as a surprise to many farm leaders because advance reports from various producing areas had indicated a closer vote. These reports stressed farmer dissatisfaction with

sharp income reductions resulting from already imposed cutbacks in wheat production. Some growers had voiced the opinion that a new wheat program should be sought.

There has been speculation, too, that farmers would vote against quotas as a way of registering disapproval of the Eisenhower administration's flexible-support program under which Mr. Benson can set price props on most basic crops at between 75 and 90 percent of parity, depending on the size of supplies.

I should like to comment on that paragraph.

Apparently, the writer of that item is a good writer, but he does not quite understand American agriculture. The truth is that had this quota failed, price supports would have gone down to 50 percent. The farmers are not going to register disapproval of the farm program by making it less effective. The real story behind it is that the farmers of the Midwest, in particular—and I am very proud of my own State of Minnesota, where there was a much larger participation this year than last year, and where the farmers gave greater support this year than last year—felt that this was the only alternative they had, except to take little or nothing, namely, 50 percent of parity.

Mr. President, I issued a statement yesterday in reference to this vote of the farmers and I ask unanimous consent to have the statement incorporated in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHEAT REFERENDUM STATEMENT

America's wheat growers have shown they have a better understanding of their problem than the present administration has. I am highly gratified by this overwhelming evidence of their willingness to cooperate in necessary production adjustments.

I hope the proper interpretation is put upon this vote. It is in no sense an endorsement of administration policies. Instead, it is a reflection on the growers' confidence in Congress changing such policies as now depriving them of decent prices. The facts cannot be ignored. Secretary Benson did not once encourage a favorable vote, in spite of the chaos that would have existed in all our farm programs if the quotas had been rejected. Instead, he encouraged a negative vote behind a veil of neutrality, by talking at the last minute about having a new wheat program ready to submit to the Congress. All the encouragement for a "yes" vote came from advocates of higher price supports, who pledged farmers a continuing fight for more effective supports. I consider this vote a mandate to the Congress to keep faith with our farmers, and match their willingness to cooperate in necessary production adjustments by restoring 90 percent of parity for the crop they produce within their quotas.

While growers were offered even lower support prices in return for approving quotas this year than last, they approved acceptance of quotas by an even larger percentage than last year. That doesn't in any sense mean acceptance of the lower support prices. It means instead an overwhelming rejection of those who have cried so long and loud about regimentation, in the hopes of fooling farmers into destroying the farm programs they have worked so many years to achieve.

Farmers have shown willingness to do their part toward production adjustments, despite every discouragement Secretary Benson has thrown in their path. Is Secretary Benson now willing to do his part by ending his crusade against effective price supports, and cooperating with the Congress in giving farmers decent prices for their more limited production?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I invite attention to the last paragraph of my statement, in which I said:

Farmers have shown willingness to do their part toward production adjustments, despite every discouragement Secretary Benson has thrown in their path. Is Secretary Benson now willing to do his part by ending his crusade against effective price supports, and cooperating with the Congress in giving farmers decent prices for their more limited production?

We are going to have an opportunity in this Congress, Mr. President, to rewrite the agricultural program. I say "rewrite" because I do not think we can afford merely to patch up what we have. The Agriculture Department is not doing the job it should do. Under its present policy the present administration is guilty of encouraging insolvency in agriculture, depression in agriculture, dropping of income in agriculture; and neither one of the alternatives is desirable.

I suggest that we direct our attention in the months ahead toward preserving the family-type farm pattern by an effective price-support program and by an improved credit program for the benefit of low-income farmers.

Finally, Mr. President, I suggest that the Department of Agriculture turn its attention now to the important task of furthering the sale and disposal of our usable surplus commodities. Much more can be done than has been done. While I have the floor, I should like to direct the attention of the Secretary of Agriculture to a study which I have made as to the use of surplus wheat by converting it into a palatable product which will be a substitute for rice in the rice-producting areas of the world. I have called it Boulgar wheat. Over the weekend it was my privilege to talk with processors of this particular type of wheat. We think it may be made useful to and edible for the peoples in the Near East and the Far East. If the administration would spend a little more time figuring out how it can package and sell this product, we would be making the progress we should be making in disposing of some of our surplus commodities.

I shall speak further on this subject and shall address communications to the Department, as I have done heretofore, and ask that they get off dead-center and quit talking about their problems and start talking about solutions. An administration which cannot figure out what to do with wheat, which the whole world needs, will be in trouble when it goes into conferences with the Bolsheviks. If they cannot solve this problem, how can they solve the problem of disarmament? If we cannot figure out what to do with a surplus of one of the greatest foods in the world, how can we successfully come to an agreement on disarmament with representatives of the Kremlin?

I suggest that as a token of good faith to the American people the Department of Agriculture spend a little time putting its best brains and best talent to the task of solving this problem, and if it has not enough talent at the present time, that it get some new talent to give attention to the matter, quit griping about the blessing of the fruits of the earth, and do more to create a better and more stable society.

CONVEYANCE OF TRACT OF LAND IN MACON COUNTY, GA.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 564, House bill 2973.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will state the bill by title for the information of the Senate.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (H. R. 2973) to provide for the conveyance of all right, title, and interest of the United States in a certain tract of land in Macon County, Ga., to the Georgia State Board of Education.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator for Texas.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the bill. I am a little surprised that it is to be considered at this time. I thought we had succeeded pretty well in establishing the policy that Federal interest in property should receive some compensation by the taxpayers of the country from local governmental units. I think that here is a case in which the Morse formula, calling for 50 percent of the assessed fair market value of the reversionary interest, should be followed. I do not know what it is worth. I understand it is not worth very much. I have always insisted upon a uniform application of the Morse formula including transfers of property in my own State.

If the reversionary interest involved in this bill is worth only a small sum, the State of Georgia ought to pay 50 percent of it. It is a principle of fair compensation which we should protect. I refuse to believe that the great State of Georgia cannot raise a very small sum of money to pay 50 percent of the appraised fair-market value of this reversionary interest. I have had an interesting experience with this problem as I have discussed it around the country. I have found almost a unanimity of support of the principle of the Morse formula in the grassroots of America.

I remember the situation in a town in Oregon where I discussed the matter. The case involved one-fifth of an acre of land. I talked with the local authorities, and they said, "We did not understand the purpose of the Morse formula, but we would have been willing to pay 100 percent of the value of the one-fifth of an acre of land. It was land we needed to straighten out a street, and we were not seeking it for nothing." In that case Members of Congress thought they would win votes by trying to get it for nothing.

Of course, Mr. President, I cannot speak for Georgia, but I would be very

much surprised, if the responsible officials of Georgia had an opportunity to understand what the problem is all about, if they would not raise in some way, somehow, 50 percent of the appraised fair-market value of this reversionary interest.

I wish to be absolutely fair about it.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. RUSSELL. I think the Senator should be apprised of the fact that this conveyance was made prior to the time the so-called Morse formula went into effect.

Mr. MORSE. I was about to talk about that when I said I wished to be perfectly fair about this.

Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator from Oregon is far too good a lawyer to try to suggest something which is ex post facto.

Mr. MORSE. I am not applying the Morse formula to this case as something which is ex post facto.

Mr. RUSSELL. The reversionary interest in the land, if used for other than educational purposes, is about as ephemeral as a cloud. I do not think the Senator would find any person who would possibly pay $5 for the land. The Government would lose money trying to negotiate a sale under these circumstances.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Georgia is an excellent lawyer. Would that I were half so good. But I am good enough to know that I am not talking about something which is ex post facto. What I am talking about is a Federal reversionary interest in land the title to which is now vested in the Federal Government. There is nothing ex post facto about it.

Mr. RUSSELL. Technically, the Senator is correct. But the real value involved had already been transferred prior to the time the Senator from Oregon enunciated his formula.

Mr. MORSE. I want to discuss that point, because I think the record must be made perfectly clear on it.

The property was conveyed prior to the general adoption by the Senate in 1946, with an exception now and then, of the Morse formula.

Ever since 1946, in most instances with some unfortunate exceptions, when the Morse formula has been circumvented by way of motion the Senate has required 50 percent of the fair appraised market value for the transfer to local governmental units for public purposes of the Federal interest in property in which it has reversionary interests.

The record is perfectly clear that that has been done in the case of reversionary interests.

But, as the Senator from Georgia points out, the original conveyance was to the school authorities of Georgia, with the reversionary clause relating to mineral rights reserved to the Federal Government. I think the Senator from Georgia is correct in his statement that the land probably is not of very much value. But who are we to be certain? I mention a hypothetical possibility. Suppose the Senate passed the bill this afternoon, and next week oil was found under the land. The Senator from Georgia would not then be heard to say that the reversionary interest was of little value. It might be of tremendous value.

Why have we rather consistently, in the transfer of Federal property, followed the policy of reserving the mineral rights in the Federal Government? It is because sometimes mineral deposits of great value are found.

I may also say good naturedly, and I am certain my friend from Georgia will enjoy this with me, that I am delighted to feel that I have won a recruit, in the person of the junior Senator from Georgia, in support of my long-proposed legislation for Federal aid to education, because the Senator from Georgia really is for Federal aid to education in principle in this bill. When all is said and done, the principle of Federal aid to education to the State of Georgia is represented by the bill. The reversion has value, if it be only one copper, and that value will be given to education in Georgia by the Federal Government as a form of Federal aid to education.

I might be sold on the principle of this bill if a uniform doctrine could be applied, under which all States would receive equality of treatment, and would not be dependent on whether a Senator introduced a bill in order to secure special consideraiton for his State.

Also, I would be less than fair to the Senator from Georgia if I did not frankly admit that we are dealing with a matter of small consequence, so far as materiality is concerned. But I think we are dealing with something of great consequence, so far as principle is concerned.

I simply cannot follow an inconsistent policy on the floor of the Senate in regard to this matter, even though I should like to accommodate the two Senators from Georgia so far as the material matter is concerned. The benefit will go to a school district. I support as a general policy aid to schools. Nevertheless, I simply cannot accommodate the Georgia Senators, because I think the bill would not result in uniform treatment of schools. I think it violates the principle of the Morse formula of which I have spoken.

I think we cannot be certain that an exception such as that which is proposed may not boomerang, because some day we may wake up to find that we gave away much more than we thought we were giving, in that oil or some other valuable mineral might be found under this land.

I have mentioned the fact that the bill involves a transfer which dates back to the early 1940's, around 1944 or 1945, when the Morse formula was not in effect. But that does not change the fact that what was retained by the Federal Government was a Federal property interest. I should have much preferred having the Senators from Georgia try to have the officialdom of Georgia find a way to pay 50 percent of the fair appraised market value of this reversionary interest. They not having done so, I must object, and I have to suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call may be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill is open to amendment.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I call up my amendment designated "6–17–55–A" and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 2, after line 21, it is proposed to insert the following new section:

SEC. 2. The conveyance authorized by this act shall be conditional upon the Georgia State Board of Education agreeing to pay to the Administrator of the Farmers' Home Administration, in return for the interests conveyed, an amount equal to 50 percent of the fair market value of such interests to be determined by the Administrator of the Farmers' Home Administration after appraisal.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the amendment speaks for itself. It is simply a clear statement that, whatever the reversionary interest is worth, the State of Georgia shall pay 50 percent of its appraised fair market value.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

The amendment was rejected.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question now is on the third reading and passage of the bill.

The bill was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, let the RECORD show that the Senator from Oregon voted against this giveaway bill.

MULTIPLE USE OF SURFACE OF PUBLIC LANDS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 559, Senate 1713.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1713) to amend the act of July 31, 1947 (61 Stat. 681), and the mining laws to provide for multiple use of the surface of the same tracts of the public lands, and for other purposes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Texas.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

EXTENSION OF RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amend-

ment of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 4904) to extend the Renegotiation Act of 1951 for 2 years, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. BYRD. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment, agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Acting President pro tempore appointed Mr. BYRD, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. KERR, Mr. MILLIKIN, and Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania conferees on the part of the Senate.

RECESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, if no other Senator desires the floor, I am about to move that the Senate stand in recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

I move that the Senate recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 2 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, June 28, 1955, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1955

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty and ever-blessed God, we are lifting our hearts unto Thee in adoration and gratitude, for Thou art the source of our blessings, the answer to our problems, and the goal of all our aspirations.

Grant that in these troubled days, when there is so much of tension and estrangement and sinister forces are trying to bring discord and division among the nations, we may know how to keep aglow the light of freedom and righteousness.

Help us to believe that Thou hast placed at our disposal the inexhaustible resources of Thy grace and that all things are working together for good if we seek to do Thy will, and all will be well when we are on Thy side.

Inspire us to hasten the coming of the time when there shall be peace on earth and good will among men.

Hear us in Christ's name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, June 23, 1955, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. McBride, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the House of the following titles:

H. R. 1825. An act creating a Federal commission to formulate plans for the construction in the District of Columbia of a civic auditorium, including an Inaugural Hall of Presidents and a music, fine arts, and mass communications center;

H. R. 3659. An act to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act;

H. R. 4221. An act to amend section 4004, title 18, United States Code, relating to administering oaths and taking acknowledgments by officials of Federal penal and correctional institutions; and

H. R. 4954. An act to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws, establishing a uniform statute of limitations, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills and a concurrent resolution of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 48. An act to provide for the disqualifications of certain former officers and employees of the District of Columbia in matters connected with former duties;

S. 182. An act to require a premarital examination of all applicants for marriage licenses in the District of Columbia;

S. 256. An act to eliminate cumulative voting of shares of stock in the election of directors of national banking associations unless provided for in the articles of association;

S. 665. An act to revive section 3 of the District of Columbia Public School Food Services Act;

S. 666. An act to extend the period of authorization of appropriations for the hospital center and facilities in the District of Columbia;

S. 972. An act to amend the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended;

S. 1275. An act to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to designate employees of the District to protect life and property in and on the buildings and grounds of any institution located on property outside of the District of Columbia acquired by the United States for District sanatoriums, hospitals, training schools, and other institutions;

S. 1287. An act to make certain increases in the annuities of annuitants under the Foreign Service retirement and disability system;

S. 1391. An act granting the consent of Congress to the States of California and Nevada to negotiate and enter into a compact with respect to the distribution and use of the waters of the Truckee, Carson, and Walker Rivers, Lake Tahoe, and the tributaries of such rivers and lake in such States;

S. 1585. An act to provide for the return to the town of Hartford, Vt., of certain land which was donated by such town to the United States as a site for a veterans hospital and which is no longer needed for such purposes;

S. 1739. An act to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to fix rates of compensation of members of certain examining and licensing boards and commissions, and for other purposes;

S. 1741. An act to exempt from taxation certain property of the Jewish War Veterans, U. S. A., National Memorial, Inc., in the District of Columbia;

S. 1855. An act to amend the Federal Airport Act, as amended;

S. 2171. An act to amend the Subversive Activities Control Act so as to provide that upon the expiration of his term of office, a member of the Board shall continue to serve until his successor shall have been appointed and shall have qualified;

S. 2176. An act to repeal the requirement that public utilities engaged in the manufacture and sale of electricity in the District of Columbia must submit annual reports to Congress;

S. 2177. An act to repeal the prohibition against the declaration of stock dividends by public utilities operating in the District of Columbia; and

S. Con. Res. 39. Concurrent resolution recognizing, on the occasion of her 75th birthday, June 27, 1955, the efforts of Miss Helen Keller in behalf of physically handicapped persons throughout the world.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House to a joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S. J. Res. 67. Joint resolution to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to sell certain vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines; to provide for the rehabilitation of the interisland commerce of the Philippines, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 6499) entitled "An act making appropriations for the Executive Office of the President and sundry general Government agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes."

APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND RELATED AGENCIES, 1956

Mr. PRESTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H. R. 6367) making appropriations for the Department of Commerce and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none and appoints the following conferees: Messrs. PRESTON, THOMAS, ROONEY, YATES, SHELLEY, FLOOD, CANNON, CLEVENGER, BOW, HORAN, MILLER of Maryland, and TABER.

THE DEBT LIMIT

By direction of the Committee on Ways and Means, Mr. COOPER submitted a privileged report to accompany the bill (H. R. 6992) to extend for 1 year the existing temporary increase in the public debt limit, which was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Ways and Means, I call up the bill (H. R. 6992) to extend for 1 year the existing temporary increase in the public debt limit, and ask unanimous consent that the bill may be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is this the bill to extend the debt limit?

Mr. COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. PATMAN. Would the gentleman explain what it proposes to do? Does it go beyond the $6 billion?

Mr. COOPER. It just proposes to extend the present limitation for one more year.

Mr. PATMAN. That is for the $6 billion additional over the $275 billion?

Mr. COOPER. That is correct.